GIFT   OF 


REPORT  ON  THE 


Organization  of  the  Land  Forces 
of  the  United  States 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
1912 


"• 

- 


WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
Washington,  August  10,  1912. 

The  accompanying  report  of  the  General  Staff  on  "The  Organization  of  the 
Land  Forces  of  the  United  States,"  contains  the  broad  outlines  of  a  compre- 
hensive military  policy.  The  General  Staff  has  been  directed  to  proceed  with  a 
detailed  study  of  the  plan  with  the  view  of  securing  specific  recommendations 
for  the  Executive  and  legislative  action  necessafy  to  carry  the  policy  into  effect. 
During  the  progress  of  this  work  comments  and  suggestions  with  the  view  of 
perfecting  the  policy  are  invited,  and  for  this  purpose  the  report  is  published 
for  the  consideration  of  the  Army,  the  National  Guard,  and  all  others  who  are 
interested  in  the  development  of  a  sound  military  policy  for  the  Nation. 

HENRY  L.  STIMSON, 

Secretary  of  War. 
3 


320139 


THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  LAND  FORCES  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES. 


SYNOPSIS. 

I.  General  relations  *bet ween  the  land  and  naval  forces. 
II.  Relations  between  the  land  forces  at  home  and  abroad. 

1.  The  detachments  on  foreign  service. 

Philippines. 

Oahu. 

Panama. 

Guantanamo. 

Alaska. 

Porto  Rico. 

2.  Summary  of  .advantages  to  be  derived  from  a  separate  organiza- 

tion of  the  detachments  on  foreign  service. 

III.  The  land  forces  withia  the  territorial  limits  of  the  United  States. 

1.  The  traditional  military  policy  of  the  United  States. 

2.  The  time  required  to  raise  armies. 

3.  Two  classes  of  citizen  soldiers,  organized  and  unorganized. 

4.  Relation  of  the  Regular  Army  to  the  Nation's  war  power. 

€.  Employment  of  regulars  and  citizen  soldiers  in  Great  Britain. 
6.  The  joint  use  of  regulars  and  citizen  soldiery. 

IV.  The  peace  administration  of  the  regular  land  forces. 

1.  Relations  between  the  Coast  Artillery  and  the  mobile  army. 

2.  Essential  differences  affecting  the  administration  of  Coast  Artil- 

lery and  mobile  forces  in  peace  and  war. 

3.  The  distribution  of  the  mobile  army  and  its  relation  to  tactical 

organization  and  administration.     The  policy  of  segregation  as 
outlined  by  the  Secretary  of  War. 

4.  A  proposed  organization  for  the  peace  administration  of  the  regu- 

lar land  forces. 

5.  The  difficulty  of  securing  a  tactical  organization  in  peace,  as  illus- 

trated by  the  actual  distribution  of  the  troops  in  the  present  cen- 
tral territorial  division. 

6.  The  present  subdivision  of  commands  in  the  central  territorial 

division. 

7.  A  plan  of  tactical  organization  and  administration  adapted  to  the 

present  dispersion  of  the  mobile  army. 

8.  Quartering  and  administering  the  mobile  troops  in  peace. 

5 


6  ORGANIZATION    OF   THE   LAND   FORCES. 

V.  The  necessity  of  a  reserve  system. 

1.  Maintenance  of  strength  in  war. 

2.  The  solution  of  the  problem. 

3.  Power  of  expansion. 

4.  Proposed  plan  for  a  Regular  Army  reserve. 

5.  The  relation  of  the  reserve  system  to  foreign  service. 
x    6.  Unorganized  reserves. 

7.  Status  of  the  reservist. 

8.  Special  reserves. 

9.  Reserve  officers. 

10.  Reserves  for  the  citizen  soldiery. 

11.  Prolongation  of  the  term  of  service  in  time  of  emergency. 

12.  The  relation  of  localization  to  the  reserve  problem  and  to  recruit- 

ment. 
VI.  The  tactical  organization  of  mobile  troops. 

1.  Infantry. 

2.  The  Infantry  brigade  and  the  division. 

3.  Cavalry. 

4.  Field  Artillery. 

5. 'Ammunition  service. 

6.  Components  of  the  division  and  the  field  army. 
VII.  Relation  of  promotion  to  organization. 

VIII.  An  initial  tactical  organization  for  the  mobile  army  with  a  program  of 
gradual  expansion  into  a  field  army. 

1.  The  troops  available  after  providing  for  the  foreign  garrisons,  and 

the  policy  of  organization  proposed. 

2.  The  proposed  organization  of  the  skeleton  field  army. 

3.  First  increment  of  the  skeleton  field  army. 

4.  Subsequent  increments  of  the  field  army. 

5.  The  number  of  general  officers  required  by  the  tactical  organiza- 

tion. 

6.  Additional  officers  required  for  duties  other  than  regimental. 

IX.  Raising  and  organizing  the  national  volunteer  forces. 

1.  Limitations  upon  the  availability  of  the  State  militia  rfls  a  National 

force. 

2.  Establishment  of  division  districts  as  a  means  for  systematically 

raising  and  organizing  the  volunteer  forces. 

X.  Considerations  determining  the  strength,   composition,   and   organization 

of  the  land  forces  of  the  United  States. 
XL  A  council  of  national  defense. 


THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  LAND  FORCES  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES. 


GENERAL  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  THE  LAND  AND  NAVAL  FORCES. 

A  general  consideration  of  our  responsibilities  and  our  geographical  posi- 
tion indicates  that  the  maintenance  of  our  policies  and  interests  at  home  and 
abroad  demand  an  adequate  fleet  and  a  well-organized  and  sufficient  army. 
The  function  of  the  Navy  is  to  secure  and  maintain  the  command  of  the  sea. 
To  accomplish  this  it  must  be  free  to  seek  and  defeat  the  enemy.  The  use 
of  any  part  of  the  fleet  for  local  defense  therefore  defeats  the  chief  object 
of  naval  power.  The  principal  role  of  the  Navy  is  offensive  and  the  requirements 
of  local  defense  must  be  met  by  other  means.  A  fleet  unsupported  by  an 
army  is  unable  to  secure  the  fruits  of  naval  victory;  a  fleet  defeated  at  sea 
is  powerless  to  prevent  invasion.  The  solution  of  the  problem  of  national 
defense  lies,  therefore,  in  the  provision  of  suitable  land  and  sea  forces  and  a 
due  recognition  of  their  coordinate  relations. 

II. 

RELATIONS  BETWEEN  THE  LAND  FORCES  AT  HOME  AND  ABROAD. 

Any  plan  for  the  organization  of  the  land  forces  of  the  United  States  should 
be  based  upon  a  recognition  of  the  fact  that  these  forces  are  and  'must  be 
divided  into  two  distinct  parts: 

1.  The  Army  on  service  beyond  the  territorial  limits  of  the  United  States. 

2.  The  Army  within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  United  States. 

The  Army  on  detached  service  beyond  the  territorial  limits  of  the  United 
States  consists  of  the  detachments  required  to  meet  the  special  military  problems 
of  the  Philippines,  Panama,  Oahu,  Alaska,  Guantanamo,  and  Porto  Rico.  Each 
of  these  detachments  has  a  distinct  tactical  and  strategic  mission  and  is  to 
operate  within  a  restricted  terrain.  All  of  them  depend  upon  over-seas  com- 
munication with  the  home  country,  and  all  of  them  may  therefore  be  isolated 
for  considerable  periods,  especially  in  the  critical  first  stages  of  war.  It  is 
obvious  that  under  these  circumstances  these  detachments  should  be  prepared  to 
meet  all  military  emergencies  until  reenforcements  from  the  United  States  can 
reasonably  be  expected.  They  must,  therefore,  be  organized  with  the  view  to 
being  self-supporting  until  the  Navy  has  accomplished  its  primary  mission  of 
securing  the  command  of  the  sea. 

The  Army  within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  United  States  is  on  an  entirely 
different  basis.  It  may  or  may  not  be  given  an  adequate  strength  in  time 
of  peace,  but  it  is  supported  by  all  of  the  resources  of  the  Nation.  It  may 
be  increased  at  the  pleasure  of  Congress,  and  it  may  be  reenforced  by  con- 
siderable forces  of  citizen  soldiery.  It  follows  from  these  considerations  that 
the  military  establishment  of  the  United  States  in  time  of  peace  should  first 
provide  effective  and  sufficient  garrisons  for  the  political  and  strategic  outposts 
of  the  United  States  and  that  the  residue  at  home  should  be  organized  with  the 

7 


8  ORGANIZATION    OF   THE   LAND   FORCES. 

view  to  ultimate  expansion  into  such  war  forces  as  national  interests  may  re- 
quire. The  essential  difference  between  the  forces  at  home  and  the  forces  abroad 
is  thus  seen  to  be  that  they  have  different  capacities  with  reference  to  expansion 
at  the  outbreak  of  war.  The  Army  at  home  is  expansible  to  the  highest  degree, 
while  the  detachments  abroad  are  not  expansible  at  all  in  the  brief  but  critical 
period  that  marks  the  first  stage  of  modern  war. 

1.  THE  DETACHMENTS  ON  FOREIGN   SERVICE. 

The  minimum  garrisons  required  for  the  maintenance  of  national  interests 
beyond  the  limits  of  the  United  States  are  as  follows : 

The  Philippines. — 4  regiments  of  Infantry  at  maximum  statutory  strength 
(150  men  per  company),  2  regiments  of  Cavalry  at  maximum  statutory 
strength  (100  men  per  troop),  2  battalions  of  Field  and  Mountain  Artillery 
(6  batteries),  2  companies  of  Engineers,  2  companies  of  Signal  troops  (one  of 
these  a  field  company),  24  companies  of  Coast  Artillery,  52  companies  of  Philip- 
pine Scouts,  1  ambulance  company,  1  field  hospital,  with  detachments  pertaining 
to  the  Ordnance  Department  and  enlisted  men  of  the  Hospital  Corps  on  duty 
with  organizations. 

It  is  the  duty  of  this  force  to  support  the  authority  of  the  United  States 
throughout  the  archipelago,  and  in  war  it  must  be  prepared  to  hold  the  defenses 
of  Manila  Bay  at  all  costs  until  our  fleet  is  free  to  operate  in  eastern  waters.  The 
garrison  of  mobile  troops  proposed  for  the  Philippines  comprises  substantially  the 
same  enlisted  strength  as  has  been  included  in  the  garrison  maintained  there  for 
the  past  few  years.  It  is  proposed  to  increase  its  economy  and  effectiveness  by 
concentrating  the  bulk  of  this  garrison  in  the  vicinity  of  Manila.  It  is  also 
proposed  to  maintain  organizations  permanently  or  for  long  periods  in  the 
Philippines,  thus  avoiding  the  waste  of  money  and  loss  of  efficiency  due  to  fre- 
quent changes  of  station  between  the  islands  and  the  United  States.  Until 
recently  entire  organizations  have  been  shifted;  under  the  new  policy  the 
personnel  will  gradually  be  changed  as  enlistments  expire  or  as  the  officers 
complete  their  allotted  tours,  but  the  organizations  will  remain  where  they 
can  prepare  and  train  for  their  peculiar  functions  in  peace  and  war.  The 
expense  of  this  garrison  has  further  been  reduced  by  replacing  12  regiments 
of  Infantry  and  Cavalry  at  reduced  strength  by  6  regiments  of  Infantry  and 
Cavalry  at  the  maximum  strength  authorized  by  law.  This  materially  reduces 
the  per  capita  cost  of  the  Philippines  garrison  and  permits  the  withdrawal  of 
feix  regiments  for  use  at  home  or  in  the  other  foreign  garrisons. 

Oahu. — The  maintenance  of  this  naval  base  is  essential  to  the  defense  of  our 
Pacific  coast  and  to  securing  the  full  military  value  of  the  Panama  Canal  as  a 
strategic  highway  between  the  two  oceans.  Pearl  Harbor  will  be  covered 
by  seacoast  fortifications,  'which  are  now  nearing  completion;  but  as  the 
coast  defenses  of  Pearl  Harbor  will  be  unable  to  prevent  hostile  landings  on 
the  100  miles  of  coast  which  lie  beyond  the  range  of  their  guns,  the  security 
of  the  island  and  of  the  naval  base  ultimately  depends  upon  maintaining  a 
mobile  force  sufficient  to  defeat  such  hostile  forces  as  may  succeed  in  landing 
at  any  place  on  the  island.  Under  conditions  of  modern  warfare  we  can  not 
count  with  certainty  upon  reenforcing  the  peace  garrison  of  the  island  after  a 
declaration  of  war  or  while  war  is  imminent.  The  security  of  our  naval  base 
in  the  Pacific  therefore  demands  that  the  garrison  of  Oahu  must  be  able  to 
hold  out  at  all  hazards  until  our  fleet  can  arrive  in  Hawaiian  waters.  This 
may  be  taken  as  40  days,  assuming  that  the  fleet  is  not  employed  on  another 
mission  and  that  the  Panama  Canal  is  open  to  its  use. 

The  minimum  peace  garrison  of  Oahu  is  therefore  placed  as  follows :  6  regi- 
ments of  Infantry  at  maximum  statutory  strength  (150  men  per  company), 


ORGANIZATION    OF   THE   LAND   FORCES.  9 

/ 

R 

1  regiment  of  Cavalry  at  maximum  statutory  strength  (100  men  per  troop), 
8  battalions  of  Field  Artillery  (9  batteries),  1  company  of  Engineers,  1  field 
company  of  Signal  troops,  10  companies  of  Coast  Artillery,  1  ambulance  com- 
pany, 1  field  hospital. 

Plans  are  being  made  for  the  expansion  of  the  Hawaiian  National  Guard 
and  the  organization  of  volunteers  from  the  American  population.  But  the 
foundation  of  the  defense  must  rest  upon  trained  regulars  who  are  familiar 
with  the  complicated  terrain  of  the  island.  Our  naval  base  in  the  Pacific  will 
never  be  attacked  except  by  troops  of  the  highest  skill  and  training  and  the 
attack  will  be  made  before  extemporized  troops  can  be  prepared  or  hardened 
for  full  military  effectiveness. 

Panama. — Upon  its  completion,  the  Panama  Canal  will  be  our  most  important 
strategic  position.  By  our  control  of  this  highway  between  the  two  oceans  the 
effectiveness  of  our  fleet  and  our  general  military  power  will  be  enormously 
increased.  It  is  therefore  obvious  that  the  unquestioned  security  of  the  canal 
is  our  most  important  military  problem.  The  permanent  garrison  must  bo 
strong,  enough  to  guard  the  locks  and  other  important  works  and  to  prevent 
a  naval  attack  which  under  modern  conditions  may  even  precede  a  declaration 
of  war.  We  must  therefore  be  able,  even  in  peace,  to  man  the  seacoast  guns 
that  cover  the  approach  to  the  canal,  and  we  must  have  enough  mobile  troops 
to  protect  the  rear  of  the  forts  and  to  defeat  naval  raids.  A  modern  fleet  can 
land  a  raiding  party  of  several  thousand  bluejackets,  and  such  a  force  landing 
out  of  range  of  the  seacoast  guns  could  penetrate  to  some  vulnerable  part  of 
the  canal  within  a  few  hours.  The  permanent  garrison  must  therefore  include 
a  mobile  force  strong  enough  to  anticipate  and  defeat  naval  raids  at  the 
beginning  of  hostilities,  and  to  secure  the  canal  until  reenforcements  can  be 
expected  from  the  United  States. 

The  minimum  peace  garrison  necessary  for  the  defense  of  the  canal  is  as 
follows :  3  regiments  of  Infantry  at  the  maximum  strength  recommended  in 
Chapter  VI  of  this  report,  1  battalion  of  Field  Artillery  (3  batteries),  1  squad- 
ron of  Cavalry,  1  signal  company,  1  engineer  company,  1  ambulance  company, 
1  field  hospital,  18  companies  of  Coast  Artillery. 

By  treaty  with  the  Republic  of  Panama,  this  garrison  should  be  given  facili- 
ties, in  time  of  peace,  to  operate  beyond  the  Canal  Zone,  in  order  that  the  troops 
may  be  properly  trained  for  their  special  mission  and  be  made  familiar  with  the 
terrain  over  which  they  may  be  called  upon  to  operate  in  defending  the  canal. 

Guantanamo. — The  policy  of  the  United  States  contemplates  the  establish- 
ment of  a  naval  base  at  Guantanamo.  It  is  most  necessary  that  the  garrisons 
of  coast  artillery  and  mobile  troops  necessary  for  its  land  defense  should  be 
determined  with  the  least  possible  delay. 

Alaska. — The  present  garrison  of  Alaska  comprises  1  regiment  of  Infantry 
and  2  companies  of  Signal  troops.  As  troops  can  be  withdrawn  from  Alaska 
only  during  a  part  of  the  year,  this  garrison  can  not  be  included  among  the 
troops  available  for  general  military  purposes.  The  assignment  of  one  infantry 
regiment  as  the  garrison  for  Alaska  is  not  with  any  idea  of  the*  defense  of  the 
Territory  in  the  event  of  war,  but  simply  to  furnish  a  police  force  to  quell 
local  disorders. 

With  the  settled  conditions  that  now  obtain  in  the  government  of  Alaska  it 
is  believed  that  the  time  has  come  to  relieve  the  Army  from  this  police  duty  and 
that  a  force  of  constabulary  should  be  organized  and  charged  with  the  police 
of  the  Territory.  The  two  companies  of  the  Signal  Corps  should  also  be  with- 
drawn and  the  lines  turned  over  to  the  proper  civil  authorities. 

Porto  Rico. — The  garrison  of  this  island  is  the  Porto  Rico  regiment  of  In- 
fantry, comprising  2  battalions  or  8  companies.  Its  enlisted  men  are  native 


10 


ORGANIZATION    OF   THE   LAND   FORCES. 


Porto  Ricans.  Its  field  officers  are  detailed  from  the  United  States  Army,  and 
its  captains  and  lieutenants,  some  of  whom  are  Porto  Ricaus,  are  specially 
commissioned  for  this  regiment.  This  regiment  might  serve  outside  of  Porto 
Rico  under  certain  contingencies,  but  it  can  not  be  considered  as  available  for 
general  military  purposes. 

It  is  recommended  that  this  regiment  be  completed  so  as  to  conform  in 
organization  to  the  infantry  regiment  recommended  in  this  report  and  that 
promotion  to  the  grade  of  major  be  authorized  for  the  permanent  officers  of  the 
regiment. 

Passing  through  this  regiment  each  year  are  a  number  of  trained  men.  It  is 
recommended  that  two  regiments  pf  National  Guard  be  organized  in  Porto  Rico, 
which  with  the  regular  regiment  would  form  a  brigade.  The  detailed  colonel 
of  the  regular  regiment  should  also  be  .given  the  militia  rank  as  brigadier 
general  and  be  charged,  under  direction  of  the  governor,  with  the  administra- 
tion and  training  of  the  National  Guard  of  Porto  Rico  and  With  the  command 
of  the  brigade  whenever  it  operates  as  such. 

The  following  table  gives  a  summary  of  the  minimum  forces  required  for 
the  maintenance  of  national  interest  in  the  outlying  possessions  of  the  United 
States : 


Philip- 
pines. 

Oahu. 

Panama. 

Alaska. 

Porto 
Rico. 

Total  for 
foreign 
service. 

Regiments  of  Infantry  ...     . 

4 

6 

3 

1 

14 

Regiments  of  Cavalry  . 

2 

1 

A 

Ql 

Battalions  of  Field  Artillery... 

2 

3 

1 

Companies  of  Coast  Artillery  

24 

10 

•  18 

52 

Companies  of  Philippine  Scouts. 

52 

52 

Porto  Rico  Regiment  of  Infantry 

1 

I 

Companies  of  Engineers  
Field  companies,  Signal  Corps 

2 
1 

1 
1 

1 
1 

4 
3 

Other  companies,  Signal  Corps.  .   .  . 

1 

2 

3 

Field  hospitals 

1 

1 

1 

3 

Ambulance  companies  

1 

1 

1 

3 

1  The  equivalent  of  3  regiments  of  Field  and  Mountain  Artillery  under  the  existing  organization. 

The  following  table  gives  the  total  numbers  of  organizations  now  existing  in 
the  Army  of  the  United  States,  the  total  numbers  required  to  meet  the  mini- 
mum requirements  of  the  foreign  garrisons,  and  the  residues  that  will  be 
available  within  the  United  States  after  providing  the  minimum  requirements 
of  the  foreign  garrisons: 


s 

Total 
organiza- 
tions in 
Military 
Establish- 
ment. 

Required 
for  foreign 
service. 

Organiza- 
tions 
remaining 
at  home 
after  pro- 
viding for 
the  foreign 
garrisons. 

Regiments  of  Infantry        

30 
15 
5 
1 
52 
1 
12 
5 
7 
4 
4 
170 

14 

? 

16 

•JF 

1 

Regiments  of  Cavalry 

Regiments  of  Field  and  Mountain  Artillery 

Regiments  of  Horse  Artillery.  . 

Companies  of  Philippine  Scouts  

52 
1 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
52 

Porto  Rico  Regiment  of  Infantry. 

"*8 

2 
4 
1 
1 
118 

Companies  of  Engineers 

Field  companies,  Signal  Corps  

Other  companies,  Signal  Corps  . 

Field  hospitals... 

Ambulance  companies.. 

Coast  Artillery  companies   . 

ORGANIZATION    OF   THE   LAND   FORCES.  11 

2.   SUMMAEY  OF  ADVANTAGES  TO  BE  DERIVED  FEOM  A  SEPARATE  ORGANIZATION 
OF  THE  .DETACHMENTS  ON  FOREIGN   SERVICE. 

The  following  advantages  will  result  from  the  organization  of  the  foreign 
garrisons  as  distinct  and  separate  parts  of  the  Military  Establishment : 

1.  Simplification    of    the    problems    of    training    and    administration. — Until 
recently  the  organizations  have  been  shifted  back  and  forth  between  home  and 
foreign  service.     There  has  been  in  consequence  a  constant  change  of  function 
and   an   incomplete   or   imperfect   adaptation   of   the   shifting   units  to   either 
function. 

2.  Simplification  of  problems  of  or^antea  New  .—Under  the  old  system  although 
there  were  distinct  kinds  of  service  and  an  actual  separation  of  the  Army 
into  parts,  yet  the  difference  of  function  of  these  parts  has  not  been  recognized 
as  the  basis  of  organization.     The  Army  has  been  treated  as  a  homogeneous 
whole,  with  the  same  organization  at  home  and  abroad.     Regiments  that  have 
been  maintained  at  low  strength  at  home  on  the  theory  of  expansibility  have 
been  maintained  at  the  same  strength  on  foreign  service,  where  expansion  of 
any  kind  is  impracticable. 

3.  Greater   economy. — Keeping   war   strength   units  permanently   on   foreign 
service  will  reduce  the  per  capita  cost  of  the  foreign  garrisons.     The  reduction 
in  cost  for  any  given  foreign  garrison  is  due  chiefly  to  the  following  causes : 

(a)  Economies  due  to  the  maintenance  if  permanent  organizations  on  foreign 
service. — This  necessarily   results  in  reduced  expenditure  for  transportation. 
With  permanent  regiments  the  transportation  is  limited  to  that  required  to 
maintain  the  desired  strength ;   that  is,  the  transportation  of  officers  and  en- 
listed men  who  return  to  the  United  States  on  account  of  disability  or  upon 
discharge,  or  upon  the  completion  of  the  allotted  time  of  foreign  service,  and 
the  transportation  of  the  officers  and  men  who  are  sent  out  to  fill  vacancies. 
With  shifting  regiments,  in  addition  to  the  above-described  maintenance  travel, 
entire  organizations  with  all  personnel  and  impedimenta,  must  be  transported 
at  stated  intervals. 

(b)  Economies  due  to  increased  enlisted  strength  in  existing  organizations. — 
This  necessarily  results  in  greatly  reduced  cost  per  effective  combatant  soldier. 
If  900  enlisted  men  be  formed  into  a  new  regiment,  the  pay  and  allowances  of 
additional  officers  and  high-priced  noncommissioned  officers  must  be  considered. 
But  if  the  same  number  of  men  be  added  to  organizations  already  in  existence, 
there  is  no  appreciable  increase  in  overhead  or  administrative  expenses,  and  it 
is  only  necessary  to  estimate  for  the  pay  and  allowances  of  the  privates  added. 
In  any  given  garrison  the  cost  of  barracks  and  quarters  is  determined  largely 
by  the  number  of  companies.     The  per  capita  cost  for  housing  is  therefore  a 
minimum  when  the  enlisted  strength  per  company  is  a  maximum. 

It  is  calculated  that  the  annual  cost  of  the  proposed  garrisons  of  the  Philip- 
pines, Oahn,  and  Ptinama  on  the  permanent  war  strength  basis  will  be  upward 
of  $4,000,000  per  year  less  than  the  cost  of  garrisons  of  the  same  strength 
maintained  under  the  old  system  of  shifting  low-strength  regiments.  Barracks 
and  quarters  for  the  proposed  garrisons  will  cost  at  least  $6,000,000  less  than 
barracks  and  quarters  for  the  same  enlisted  strength  organized  as  at  present. 

4.  Localization  of  regiments  at  home. — As  soon  as  we  discontinue  the  transfer 
of  organizations  to  and  from  foreign  service  we  may  localize  the  Army  at  home. 
This  will  result  in  further  economies  and  in  increased  effectiveness.     Problems 
of  recruitment  will  be  simplified  and  plans  for  the  expansion  of  the  home  Army 
into  an  effective  war  force  will  become  more  definite.    The  important  problems 
involving  the  relations  of  the  Regular  Army  to  the  citizen   soldiery  may  be 
worked  out  on  a  more  definite  basis  and  will  receive  more  intelligent  attention 


12  ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND  FORCES. 

when  the  functions  and  duties  of  the  home  Army  are  recognized  as  distinct 
from  those  of  the  detachments  abroad.  While  serving  abroad  the  war  prepara- 
tion of  officers  and  men  will  be  for  the  defense  of  an  important  but  restricted 
local  terrain.  While  serving  at  home  the  war  preparation  of  officers  and  men 
will  be  for  general  military  service. 

5.  As  problems  of  administration  will  be  simplified  so  will  problems  of  exec- 
utive policy  and  legislation.  With  the  Army  organized  in  distinct  units,  each 
with  definite  functions,  it  will  be  easier  for  Congress  to  determine  the  real 
military  needs  of  the  Nation.  The  complex  problem  of  national  defense  will 
be  simplified  by  a  resolution  into  several  distinct  and  separate  problems,  each 
to  be  met  by  a  separate  and  distinct  military  organization. 

III. 

THE    LAND    FORCES    WITHIN    THE    TERRITORIAL    LIMITS    OF    THE 

UNITED  STATES. 

1.  THE  TRADITIONAL  MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 

The  problem  of  military  organization  has  two  aspects,  a  dynamic  aspect  and 
a  political  aspect.  The  measure  of  military  force  required  to  meet  any  given 
emergency  is  purely  dynamic,  wThile  the  form  of  military  institutions  must  be 
determined  on  political  grounds,  with  due  regard  to  national  genius  and  tradi- 
tion. There  can  be  no  sound  solution  of  the  problem  if  either  of  these  funda- 
mental aspects  be  ignored.  The  military  pedant  may  fail  by  proposing  adequate 
and  economical  forces  under  forms  that  are  intolerable  to  the  national  genius, 
while  the  political  pedant  may  propose  military  systems  which  lack  nothing 
except  the  necessary  element  of  trained  and  disciplined  military  force.  The 
practical  military  statesman  must  recognize  both  of  these  elements  of  the  prob- 
lem. He  does  not  propose  impracticabla  or  foreign  institutions,  but  seeks  to 
develop  the  necessary  vigor  and  energy  within  the  familiar  institutions  that 
have  grown  with  the  national  life.  But  the  ultimate  test  is  dynamic.  In  any 
military  system  the  final  test  is  capacity  to  exert  superior  military  force  iu  time 
to  meet  any  given  national  emergency. 

It  is  the  traditional  policy  of  the  United  States  that  the  military  establish- 
ment in  time  of  peace  is  to  be  a  small  Regular  Army  and  that  the  ultimate 
war  force  of  the  Nation  is  to  be  a  great  army  of  citizen  soldiers.  This  funda- 
mental theory  of  military  organization  is  sound  economically  and  politically. 
The  maintenance  of  armies  in  time  of  peace  imposes  a  heavy  financial  burden 
on  the  Nation,  and  the  expenditure  for  this  purpose  should  be  kept  at  a  mini- 
mum consistent  with  effectiveness  for  war.  But  reliance  upon  citizen  soldiers 
is  subject  to  the  limitation  that  they  can  not  be  expected  to  meet  a  trained 
enemy  until  they,  too,  have  been  trained.  Our  history  is  full  of  the  success  of 
the  volunteer  soldier  after  he  has  been  trained  for  war,  but  it  contains  no  record 
of  the  successful  employment  of  raw  levies  for  general  military  purposes. 

It  is  therefore  our  most  important  military  problem  to  devise  means  for 
preparing  great  armies  of  citizen  soldiers  to  meet  the  emergency  of  modern  war. 
The  organization  of  the  Regular  Army  is  but  a  smaller  phase  of  this  problem. 
It  is  simply  the  peace  nucleus  of  the  greater  war  army,  and  its  strength  and 
organization  should  always  be  considered  with  reference  to  its  relation  to  the 
greater  war  force  which  can  not  be  placed  in  the  field  until  war  is  imminent. 
The  problem  is  one  of  expansion  from  a  small  peace  force  to  a  great  war 
force.  Its  solution  therefore  involves  the  provision  of  a  sufficient  peace 
nucleus,  the  partial  organization  and  training  of  citizen  soldiers  in  peace,  and 
provisions  for  prompt  and  orderly  expansion  on  the  outbreak  of  war. 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND   FORCES.  13 

But  the  practical  solution  of  the  problem  can  not  be  met  by  the  promulgation 
of  a  general  theory.  The  Army  at  any  time  and  place  must  be  strong  enough 
to  defeat  any  enemy  that  may  oppose  it  at  that  time  and  place.  We  are  con- 
cerned more  with  the  time  required  to  raise  the  force  of  trained  troops  than 
with  their  ultimate  numbers.  If  we  need  60,000  soldiers  in  a  given  terrain 
within  30  days  and  can  only  deploy  50,000  soldiers  in  that  time  and  place,  we 
are  not  prepared  for  the  emergency  even  if  our  plans  provide  for  ten  times 
that  number  at  some  period  in  the  future.  Whatever  our  military  institutions 
may  be,  we  must  recognize  the  fundamental  facts  that  victory  is  the  reward 
of  superior  force,  that  modern  wars  are  short  and  decisive,  and  that  trained 
armies  alone  can  defeat  trained  armies. 

2.  THE  TIME  REQUIRED  TO  RAISE  ARMIES. 

The  time  required  for  the  training  of  extemporized  armies  depends  largely 
on  the  presence  or  absence  of  trained  instructors.  If  there  be  a  corps  of 
trained  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  and  a  tested  organization  of 
higher  units  with  trained  leaders  and  staff  officers,  the  problem  of  training  is 
limited  to  the  training  of  the  private  soldier.  This  can  be  accomplished  in  a 
relatively  short  time,  and  under  such  conditions  if  arms  and  equipment  are 
available  a  respectable  army  can  be  formed  within  six  months.  But  where 
the  leaders  themselves  are  untrained  and  where  officers  and  men  must  alike 
stumble  toward  efficiency  without  intelligent  guidance,  the  formation  of  an 
efficient  army  is  a  question  of  years.  Indeed,  such  a  force  can  not  become  an 
army  at  all  within  the  period  of  duration  of  modern  war.  As  the  American 
War  of  1861-1865  presents  the  singular  phenomenon  of  two  extemporized 
armies  gradually  developing  while  in  conflict  with  each  other,  it  is  a  most 
remarkable  record  of  the  evolution  of  such  forces.  In  the  conflicts  of  1861  both 
officers  and  men  were  untrained  for  the  duties  demanded  of  them.  Even  the 
companies  were  imperfectly  organized  as  units  of  the  regiment,  and  the  lack 
of  cohesion  was  still  more  apparent  in  the  higher  units.  Bull  Run  disorganized 
both  armies.  One  was  demoralized  by  defeat  and  the  other  by  victory.  By 
1862  effective  regiments,  brigades,  and  divisions  had  come  into  being,  but  the 
conduct  and  leading  of  higher  units  as  a  rule  was  still  imperfect.  It  was  not 
until  1863  that  the  armies  confronted  each  other  as  complete  and  effective 
military  teams.  But  even  in  the  early  stages  of  the  war  the  influence  of  trained 
and  able  leaders  was  apparent.  The  time  required  to  make  an  effective  soldier 
depends  very  largely  on  the  organization  in  which  the  recruit  is  enrolled.  The 
recruit  of  1861  could  not  become  a  good  private  until  his  captain  became  a  good 
captain,  but  the  recruit  of  1863  was  absorbed  in  a  team  already  trained,  and 
therefore  became  a  trained  soldier  in  a  few  months  of  active  service.  But  while 
the  history  of  the  Civil  War  is  instructive  as  a  record  of  military  evolution  it 
can  not  be  invoked  as  a  guide  of  military  policy,  for  we  can  count  upon  it  that 
in  our  career  as  a  world  power  no  serious  competitor  will  ever  oppose  us  with 
extemporized  armies. 

In  view  of  these  considerations  it  is  obvious  that  the  citizen  soldier  must 
have  some  training  in  peace  if  he  is  to  be  effective  in  the  sudden  crisis  of  mod- 
ern war.  The  organization  in  which  he  is  to  serve  must  exist  and  function  in 
time  of  peace,  and  in  view  of  the  limited  time  available  for  training  it  should 
be  a  fundamental  principle  of  American  policy  that  no  officer  should  be  in- 
trusted with  the  leadership  of  American  soldiers  who  has  not  prepared  himself 
for  that  responsibility  in  time  of  peace.  The  American  soldier,  whether  regular 
cr  volunteer,  is  entitled  to  trained  leadership  in  war. 

It  will  never  be  possible  for  citizen  soldiers  to  acquire  thorough  military 
training  and  experience  in  time  of  peace.  Their  training  and  hardening  must 


14  ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND  FORCES. 

be  completed  after  mobilization,  but  the  period  required  for  such  final  training 
will  be  reduced  exactly  in  proportion  to  the  amount  of  training  already  re- 
ceived in  time  of  peace.  If  the  total  peace  training  of  a  National  Guard  com- 
pany is  equivalent  to  two  months  in  the  field,  it  will  be  available  for  duty  at 
the  front  two  months  earlier  than  a  company  of  raw  men,  assuming  other  con- 
ditions equal  in  each  case.  But  in  any  event  during  the  period  of  final  training, 
which  will  vary  for  different  companies  and  regiments,  the  Regular  Army  must 
meet  the  situation  at  the  front.  If  our  citizen  soldiery  is  put  on  a  proper  basis 
as  to  organization  and  training — a  basis  on  which  it  does  not  now  rest — its 
regiments  will  soon  reenforce  the  line.  Even  with  their  limited  peace  training 
they  will  soon  be  effective  for  defense,  and  after  a  short  period  of  field  practice 
the  best-officered  organizations  will  begin  to  expand  the  Army  for  general  mili- 
tary purposes. 

3.  Two  CLASSES  OF  CITIZEN  SOLDIERY,  ORGANIZED  AND  UNORGANIZED. 
'  The  traditional  army  of  citizen  soldiery  should  be  considered  as  divided  into 
two  distinct  classes,  as  follows: 

1.  The   organized    citizen    soldiery,    comprising    those   who    are   enrolled    in 
definite  military  organizations  and  are  partially  trained  in  peace.     This  force 
is  now  known  as  the  National  Guard,  and  is  organized  under  the  militia  clause 
of  the  Constitution. 

2.  The  unorganized  citizen  soldiery.     Included  in  this  class  is  the  Reserve 
Militia,  which  is  made  up  of  all  the  able-bodied  citizens  liable  for  militia  duty, 
but  who  are  not  enrolled  as  members  of  the  National  Guard. 

In  the  past  the  citizens  liable  for  military  duty  have  served  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment under  three  distinct  conditions :  First,  by  being  enrolled  into  a  militia 
regiment  which  had  been  or  was  to  be  mustered  into  the  service  of  the  United 
States;  second,  by  being  enrolled  into  a  State  volunteer  regiment;  third,  by 
being  enrolled  into  a  United  States  volunteer  regiment. 

For  the  purpose  of  the  present  discussion  the  term  "  National  Guard  "  will 
be  applied  to  the  citizen  soldiery  which  is  actually  organized  in  time  of  peace, 
whether  as  a  State  force  or  a  National  force,  and  the  term  "Volunteers"  to 
the  additional  citizen  soldiery  which  will  be  organized  upon  the  imminence  of 
war.  The  defects  of  the  National  Guard  system,  as  now  organized  under  the 
militia  clause  of  the  Constitution,  will  be  considered  in  Chapter  IX  of  this  re- 
port. For  the  present  the  term  "  National  Guard "  will  be  applied  for  con- 
venience to  the  organized  citizen  soldiery  without  reference  to  its  legal  status. 

As  the  trained  armies  of  modern  nations  will  seek  a  decision  in  the  early 
stages  of  war,  and  as  extemporized  armies  will  rarely  be  fit  for  use  within  the 
brief  duration  of  such  a  conflict,  it  is  obvious  that  our  military  policy  should 
aim  at  increasing  the  peace  strength  and  efficiency  of  the  organized  citizen 
soldiery.  Provisions  should  be  made  for  the  organization  of  such  new  volunteer 
units  as  may  be  necessary  on  the  outbreak  of  war,  but  it  should  always  be  the 
goal  of  sound  policy  to  form  the  proper  units  in  peace  so  that  the  war  con- 
tingent of  raw  recruits  can  be  absorbed  into  trained  teams  already  in  exist- 
ence. This  policy  must  be  based  upon  the  principle  that  a  nation's  military 
power  is  to  be  measured  not  by  the  total  number  of  its  male  citizens  capable 
of  bearing  arms,  but  by  the  number  of  trained  soldiers  with  which  it  can  meet 
a  given  emergency. 

4.  RELATION  OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY  TO  THE  NATION'S  WAR  POWER. 

From  a  general  consideration  of  our  institutions  and  the  requirements  of 
modern  war,  it  thus  appears  that  the  Regular  Army  is  simply  the  peace  nucleus 
of  the  greater  war  Army  of  the  Nation.  Its  strength  and  organization  should 


ORGANIZATION    OF    THE   LAND   FOECES.  15 

therefore  be  determined  by  its  relation  to  the  larger  force.  It  must  form  a 
definite  model  for  the  organization  and  expansion  of  the  great  war  Army,  and 
it  must  also  be  prepared  to  meet  sudden  and  special  emergencies  which  can 
not  be  met  by  the  Army  of  citizen  soldiery.  Some  of  the  special  functions  of 
the  Regular  Army  are  indicated  below : 

1.  The  peace  garrisons  of  the  foreign  possessions  of  the  United  States  must 
be  detachments  of  the  Regular  Army. 

2.  The  peace  garrisons  of  our  fortified  harbors  and  naval  bases  with  a  suffi- 
cient nucleus  of  the  mobile  army  elements  of  coast  defense  must  be  regular 
troops,  definitely  organized  in  time  of  peace. 

3.  The  peace  establishment  of  the  Regular  Army  must  be  sufficient  to  prevent 
naval  raids,  which  under  modern  conditions  may  precede  a  declaration  of  war. 
A  successful  raid  of  this  character  may  determine  the  initiative  by  giving  the 
enemy  a  convenient  base  for  future  operations. 

4.  The  Regular  Army  must  form  a  mobile  reserve  prepared  to  reenforce  the 
foreign  garrisons  during  periods  of  insurrection  and  disorder. 

5.  The  Regular  Army  must  be  prepared  to  furnish  expeditionary  forces  for 
minor  wars  or  for  the  occupation  of  foreign  territory  where  treaty  rights  or 
fundamental  national  policies  are  threatened. 

6.  The  Regular  Army  must  be  prepared  to  cooperate  with  the  Navy  in  the 
formation  of  joint  expeditions  in  support  of  the  foreign  interests  of  the  United 
States  and  for  the  protection  of  American  citizens  abroad. 

7.  At  the  outbreak  of  war  regular  forces  should  be  concentrated  and  ready 
to  seize  opportunities  for  important  initial  successes.     Such  opportunities  will 
frequently  be  offered  before  the  mobilization  of  the  Army  of  citizen  soldiers  can 
be  completed. 

8.  At  the  outbreak  of  war  special  regular  detachments  should  be  ready  to 
seize  important  strategic  positions  before  they  can  be  occupied  or  adequately 
defended  by  the  enemy  and  before  the  concentration  of  the  Army  of  citizen 
soldiers  is  complete.     Initial  operations  of  this  kind,  such  as  seizing  the  cross- 
ings of  a  river  frontier  or  a  port  of  embarkation,  frequently  determine  the  future 
conduct  of  war  and  assure  an  early  decision.     Capacity  to  take  the  initiative 
with  an  effective  force  is  the  best  preventive  of  war. 

9.  By  its   definite   organization   in   peace   the   Regular   Army   becomes   the 
nucleus  of  the  greater  war  Army.     By  its  peace  practice,  its  varied  experience 
on  foreign  service,  and  its  participation  in  expeditions,  the  Regular  Army  be- 
comes the  experimental  model  of  the  Volunteer  Army.     It  solves  practical  prob- 
lems of  equipment,  armament,  and  supply,  and  makes  its  technical  experience  in 
these  matters  available  for  the  larger  force  which  is  normally  absorbed  in  peace- 
ful occupations.    It  makes  our  war  problem  one  of  definite  and  orderly  expan- 
sion instead  of  the  vastly  more  difficult  problem  of  extemporization. 

10.  The  Regular  Army  will  furnish  a  school  of  military  theory  and  practice 
and  will  develop  officers  with  special  equipment  and  training  for  the  higher 
staff  duties  in  war. 

11.  Through  its  professional  schools  and  General  Staff  the  Regular  Army  will 
develop   the  unified  military  doctrine  and   policy   which   must  permeate  the 
entire  National  Army  if  it  is  to  succeed  in  war. 

12.  Through  its  administrative  and  supply  departments  the  Regular  Army 
in  peace  will  prepare  in  advance  for  the  equipment,  transportation,  and  supply 
of  the  great  war  Army  of  the  Nation. 

5.  EMPLOYMENT  OF   REGULARS  AND   CITIZEN   SOLDIERS  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN. 

The  land  forces  of  Great  Britain  have  been  completely  reorganized  as  a  re- 
sult of  the  experience  of  the  Boer  War.     As  the  English  system  is  based  on  the 


16  ORGANIZATION    OF   THE   LAND   FORCES. 

same  principle  of  voluntary  service  as  our  own,  and  as  her  military  establish- 
ment comprises  a  regular  army  for  expeditionary  purposes  and  a  home  defense 
army  of  citizen  soldiery,  it  may  be  interesting  to  observe  her  solution  of  the 
problem  of  the  mutual  relations  of  the  two  forces.  The  British  Army  comprises 
the  army  in  India  and  the  colonies  and  the  army  at  home.  The  latter  is  divided 
into  the  expeditionary  force  composed  of  regulars,  and  the  territorial  army 
composed  of  citizen  soldiers.  Both  forces  have  appropriate  reserves  designed 
to  raise  their  peace  establishments  to  war  strength  and  to  replace  wastage  at 
the  outbreak  of  war. 

The  expeditionary  force  comprises  6  infantry  divisions  and  4  cavalry  bri- 
gades. Its  function  is  to  furnish  immediate  reenforcement  to  any  of  the  foreign 
garrisons,  to  form  expeditions  in  the  conduct  of  small  wars,  and,  at  the  out- 
break of  a  great  war,  to  form  the  strategic  striking  force  by  means  of  which 
Great  Britain  will  profit  by  her  naval  command  of  the  sea.  The  territorial 
army  is  composed  of  14  infantry  divisions  and  14  cavalry  brigades.  It  is  com- 
posed entirely  of  citizen  soldiers  who  enlist  for  four  years  and  who  have  about 
the  same  amount  of  annual  training  as  the  best  of  our  National  Guard  organiza- 
tions. 

Each  division  of  either  force  comprises  about  12,000  infantry  with  from  54 
to  TO  guns,  about  3.20  divisional  cavalry  with  engineers,  sanitary  units,  and  other 
special  troops.  Each  cavalry  brigade  comprises  about  1,500  sabers. 

The  territorial  army  is  definitely  organized  in  division  districts  and  each  of 
these  districts  contains  an  infantry  division  and  a  cavalry  brigade.  The  men 
of  the  expeditionary  force  and  their  reserves  are  subject  to  service  at  any  place 
where  it  may  be  necessary  to  send  them  in  war.  The  divisions  of  the  terri- 
torial army  are  primarily  for  home  defense  and  can  not  be  ordered  out  of  the 
United  Kingdom,  though  individual  officers  and  men  and  particular  organiza- 
tions may  volunteer  for  active  service  abroad.  In  this  respect  the  mission  of 
the  British  territorial  army  is  more  restricted  than  that  of  our  citizen  soldiery. 
The  general  limitation  of  the  territorial  army  to  home  defense  is  possible  be- 
cause the  United  Kingdom  has  no  land  frontiers.  The  strategic  position  of 
the  United  States  is  different  in  this  respect.  Our  citizen  soldiery  must  be  ready 
to  expand  the  war  Army  for  offensive  operations,  especially  if  an  enemy  should 
threaten  us  from  either  of  our  land  frontiers. 

The  British  territorial  army  is  to  be  called  out  at  the  outbreak  of  war, 
and  through  the  preponderance  of  the  British  fleet  it  is  expected  that  the 
force  will  have  time  to  complete  its  training  in  the  interval  between  mobili- 
zation and  actual  contact  with  the  enemy.  It  will  be  ready  for  defensive 
operations  almost  immediately,  and  it  is  estimated  by  the  army  authorities 
that  it  will  be  effective  for  general  military  purposes  in  about  six  months 
after  mobilization.  The  officers  of  the  territorial  army,  like  the  enlisted  men, 
are  citizen  soldiers.  Each  regiment  and  artillery  brigade,  however,  has  a  per- 
manent routine  staff  consisting  of  an  officer  and  instructor  sergeants  detailed 
from  the  regular  forces.  Each  division  district  is  commanded  and  inspected 
by  a  general  officer  and  staff  of  two  officers  from  the  regular  establishment. 
The  permanent  divisional  staff  keeps  in  touch  with  the  progress  of  imperial  war 
plans  and  is  prepared  at  any  moment  to  mobilize  the  division  and  place  it  in 
its  allotted  position  in  any  particular  military  situation.  This  is  in  the  interest 
of  decentralization.  The  British  war  office  thus  deals  with  a  limited  number 
of  divisions.  Each  division  headquarters  deals  with  the  component  units  of  its 
division.  To  concentrate  a  complete  field  army  of  regulars  and  volunteers  at 
any  threatened  point  on  the  British  coast,  it  would  only  be  necessary  to  send 
one  brief  telegram  to  each  of  three  or  four  division  commanders.  Each  division 
commander  could  simply  issue  orders  already  prepared  by  his  staff,  for  details 


ORGANIZATION    OF   THE   LAND   FORCES.  17 

of  mobilization,  concentration,  supply,  and  transportation  are  always  kept  up 
to  date  by  the  permanent  regular  staff  of  the  divisions.  The  advantage  of 
such  simplicity  is  obvious.  Under  our  centralized  system,  instead  of  three 
or  four  units  to  deal  with  in  cases  of  this  kind,  there  would  be  a  hundred 
or  more  units  to  deal  with,  a  hundred  or  more  telegrams  to  write,  a  hundred 
of  more  transportation  and  supply  problems  to  solve,  and  all  this  at  a  time 
of  diplomatic  and  political  stress. 

The  simplicity  of  the  British  system  is  based  on  the  fact  that  both  regulars 
and  citizen  soldiers  are  organized  in  divisions  in  time  of  peace.  Each  division 
is  simply  a  little  army  complete  in  itself,  and  the  whole  army  or  any  giren 
field  army  is  simply  an  aggregation  of  divisions.  The  war  office  does  not 
deal  with  all  of  the  multitudinous  units  that  comprise  the  force.  An  order 
to  one  division  commander  is  an  order  to  all  of  the  component  units  of  his 
division.  Under  this  system  the  absolute  minimum  is  left  to  extemporization. 
The  citizen  soldiers  of  Great  Britain  have  a  definite  place  in  a  machine  which 
is  as  definitely  organized  as  the  regular  army.  With  us  the  whole  system 
must  be  extemporized.  With  us  the  Regular  Army  as  well  as  the  Volunteer 
Army  is  a  complex  of  units  without  permanent  grouping. 

6.  THE  JOINT  USE  OF  REGULARS  AND  CITIZEN  SOLDIERY. 

In  the  defense  of  Great  Britain  regular  divisions  and  territorial  divisions 
will  be  combined  in  field  armies  for  joint  action.  Any  group  of  two  or  more 
divisions  will  form  a  field  army.  This  permits  the  two  forces  to  cooperate 
fully  in  the  national  defense  and  yet  bases  the  ultimate  grouping  of  the  divi- 
sions on  the  undoubted  differences  of  function  of  the  two  forces.  This  is 
pointed  out  because  a  different  theory  of  organization  has  been  proposed  in 
this  country,  based  on  the  idea  of  mixing  regular  troops  and  citizen  soldiery 
in  the  same  divisions..  It  has  been  proposed  to  form  divisions  comprising  two 
brigades  of  Regulars  and  one  brigade  of  citizen  soldiers  or  one  brigade  of 
Regulars  and  two  brigades  of  citizen  soldiers,  with  various  other  combinations 
of  these  two  classes  of  troops.  A  slight  consideration  will  show  the  funda- 
mental defects  of  this  system. 

In  the  first  place,  regular  troops  may  and  frequently  will  be  dispatched  on 
special  missions  before  the  citizen  soldiery  is  called  out.  If  the  normal  divi- 
sion organization  includes  both  classes  of  forces,  every  time  the  regular  troops 
are  detached  to  perform  their  special  functions  one  or  more  of  the  divisions 
of  the  normal  organization  will  be  disrupted.  Again,  while  trained  volunteers 
will  be  fully  effective  in  war,  it  can  not  be  disputed  that  at  the  outbreak  of  war- 
regular  troops  will  have  more  training,  greater  endurance,  and  therefore  higher 
maneuvering  velocity.  But  a  division  is  a  fundamental  army  unit.  If  the  regu- 
lars are  formed  in  separate  divisions,  we  will  have  a  small  force  with  the 
endurance  and  velocity  necessary  for  the  sudden  strategic  enterprises  which  de- 
termine the  initiative  in  war.  These  divisions  can  move  at  once  and  may  even 
be  put  in  a  favorable  initial  position  for  striking  a  blow  at  the  very  outbreak 
of  war.  They  can  be  quietly  concentrated  in  many  cases  before  diplomatic  and 
political  conditions  justify  the  calling  out  the  National  Guard  or  volunteers. 
But  if  these  forces  are  the  component  parts  of  mixed  divisions  they  can  not 
move  as  divisions  at  all,  until  the  citizen  soldier  contingents  of  the  divisions 
are  embodied,  and  when  they  do  move,  the  velocity  and  endurance  of  the 
mixed  divisions  will  be  determined  by  the  condition  of  their  newly  mobilized  ele- 
ments. Under  such  an  organization  it  will  be  impossible  to  utilize  the  special 
qualities  of  the  highly  trained  nucleus,  except  at  the  expense  of  disrupting  the 
normal  organization  at  the  very  outbreak  of  war. 
50043°— 12 2 


18  ORGANIZATION    OF   THE   LAND   FORCES. 

It  is  presumed  that  the  main  reason  for  suggesting  the  placing  of  regiments 
of  citizen  soldiery  in  brigades  with  regular  regiments,  or  the  placing  of  citizen 
soldier  brigades  in  divisions  with  regular  brigades,  is  to  give  raw  troops  the 
example  of  trained  troops  on  the  march  and  in  battle.  This  will  undoubtedly 
be  an  advantage  in  special  cases,  but  it  should  not  be  made  the  basis  of  per- 
manent organization.  It  should  be  our  policy  to  develop  our  citizen  soldiers  in 
peace,  so  that  they  will  no  longer  be  raw  troops  when  they  meet  the  enemy. 
But  the  acceptance  of  this  policy  will  not  preclude  the  adoption  of  special 
measures  to  meet  special  occasions  where  raw  troops  must  be  employed  to  the 
best  advantage.  Even  on  the  defensive,  where  untrained  troops  have  always 
shown  to  the  best  advantage,  it  would  seem  that  regular  troops  should  not  be 
completely  dispersed  in  the  trenches,  but  should  be  used  as  a  reserve  to  re- 
pulse the  main  attack  or  to  make  an  offensive  counterstroke  if  an  opportunity 
offers.  Jackson's  troops  at  New  Orleans  were  able  to  hold  an  intrenched  posi- 
tion with  protected  flanks,  but  he  had  no  troops  with  sufficient  organization  or 
training  to  complete  the  victory  by  a  vigorous  pursuit  of  the  defeated  enemy. 

We  may  therefore  accept  the  following  general  principles  as  the  basis  of 
correct  organization  of  our  mobile  forces : 

1.  The  mobile  elements  of  the  Regular  Army  should  have  a  divisional  organi- 
zation in  time  of  peace.     This  requires  that  it  be  organized  in  tactical  divisions, 
even  if  these  divisions  be  incomplete  and  insufficient  in  number.     Even  a  small 
army  should  be  correctly  organized  as  an  army. 

2.  Every  effort  should  be  made  to  give  a  divisional  organization  to  the  organ- 
ized citizen  soldiery  in  time  of  peace.     If  our  citizen  soldiers  ever  go  to  war, 
they  must  be  organized  into  divisions  before  they  can  be  employed  effectively 
against  the  enemy.     In  order  to  employ  them  promptly,  every  possible  detail  of 
this  organization  should  be  settled  in  time  of  peace. 

Whenever  it  becomes  necessary  to  reenforce  the  Regular  Army  and  the 
National  Guard  by  volunteer  organizations,  it  is  important  that  they  should 
be  prepared  for  effective  service  in  the  minimum  of  time.  This  requires  that 
they  be  formed  by  trained  officers  acting  under  prearranged  plans.  It  is  be- 
lieved that  this  can  best  be  accomplished  by  forming  the  new  organizations  as 
United  States  Volunteers  under  a  national  volunteer  law  like  that  proposed  in 
S.  2518,  known  as  the  du  Pont  bill.  (A  copy  of  this  bill,  with  a  memorandum 
by  Senator  du  Pont  on  the  history  of  the  volunteer  forces,  is  appended  to  this 
report  as  Appendix  I.) 

So  long  as  our  National  Guard  is  organized  under  the  militia  clause  of  the 
Constitution  it  will  be  impracticable  to  provide  Federal  division  commanders  in 
time  of  peace.  But  under  the  power  to  organize  and  inspect  the  militia  it 
would  seem  feasible  to  organize  definite  districts,  to  encourage  the  formation 
of  the  necessary  units,  and  to  give  each  division  an  inspection  staff,  through 
which  the  war  preparation  can  be  kept  up  in  peace. 

Each  division  district  should  contain  a  complete  division  and  all  of  the  plans 
for  its  mobilization,  supply,1  and  concentration  should  be  prepared  in  peace  and 
continually  corrected  to  date.  This  can  only  be  accomplished  by  assigning 
trained  officers  to  arrange  the  details  of  organization  under  the  supervision  of 
the  General  Staff,  which  is  intrusted  by  law  with  plans  for  war.  Under  present 

1  The  supply-depot  system  should  be  extended  so  that  the  materiel  and  equipment 
necessary  to  equip  any  organization  to  war  strength  would  be  centrally  stored  within 
the  division  district.  Requisitions  should  be  filled  from  these  depots  and  the  stores 
issued  replaced,  so  that  a  minimum  of  deterioration  would  result.  The  ideal  condition 
would  be  to  have  this  additional  war  equipment  actually  in  the  hands  of  organizations. 
but  this  can  not  be  accomplished  generally  with  the  National  Guard  until  adequate 
storage  facilities  have  been  supplied. 


ORGANIZATION    OF   THE   LAND   FORCES.  19 

conditions  it  would  be  necessary  to  organize  the  fundamental  war  units  after 
mobilization.  The  War  College  can  and  has  prepared  plans  for  such  mobiliza- 
tion, but  in  the  absence  of  a  definite  policy  embodied  in  the  law  there  is  no 
assurance  that  such  plans  can  be  carried  into  effect.  Solid  and  stable  arrange- 
ments for  mobilization  can  not  be  based  on  a  hypothetical  policy.  Until  there 
is  a  legalized  system  our  actual  mobilization  will  depend  upon  political  condi- 
tions at  the  time  of  the  crisis.  Gaps  in  our  legislation  will  be  filled  in  haste 
and  no  human  agency  will  be  able  to  predict  what  the  law  will  be.  Our  tradi- 
tional theory  of  a  small  Regular  Army  and  a  great  war  army  of  citizen  soldiers 
is  not  yet  embodied  as  a  definite  institution.  The  mobilization  of  our  citizen 
soldiery  to-day  would  not  result  in  a  well-knit  national  army.  It  would  be  an 
uncoordinated  army  of  50  allies,  with  all  of  the  inherent  weaknesses  of  allied 
forces,  emphasized  by  the  unusual  number  of  the  allies. 

A  more  detailed  discussion  of  the  national  citizen  soldiery  will  be  presented 
in  Chapter  IX,  after  a  consideration  of  the  organization  and  distribution  of  the 
regular  forces. 

IV. 

* 

THE  PEACE  ADMINISTRATION  OF  THE  REGULAR  LAND  FORCES. 
1.  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  THE  COAST  ARTILLERY  AND  THE  MOBILE  ARMY. 

The  land  forces  of  the  United  States  are  divided  into  two  distinct  parts, 
the  Coast  Artillery  and  the  Mobile  Army.  The  coast  fortifications  are  local  in 
character  and  are  designed  to  protect  important  seaports  from  direct  naval 
attacks  and  naval  raids,  to  prohibit  hostile  landings  at  particular  places,  to 
secure  our  naval  bases  in  the  absence  of  the  fleet,  to  prohibit  the  use  of  certain 
harbors  and  waters  as  bases  for  naval  operations  against  us,  to  secure  safe 
havens  for  our  vessels,  and  to  release  our  fleet  for  offensive  operations.  The  in- 
fluence of  coast  fortifications  is  limited  to  the  areas  within  the  range  of  their 
guns,  and  while  they  must  be  recognized  as  of  supreme  importance,  within  the 
scope  of  their  proper  functions,  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  they  have  any 
power  to  prevent  invasion  if  we  should  lose  command  of  the  sea.  The  total 
length  of  our  coast  line  is  enormous,  and  the  stretches  covered  by  harbor  de- 
fenses are  and  must  remain  very  small  compared  with  the  unprotected  in- 
tervals that  lie  between  them.  If  we  should  lose  the  command  of  the  sea  an 
invader  would  simply  land  in  one  of  these  intervals.  It  therefore  follows  that 
our  ultimate  defense  depends  upon  defeating  a  mobile  army  of  invasion,  and 
this  can  be  done  only  by  having  a  mobile  army  prepared  to  operate  in  any 
possible  theater  of  war.  The  complete  defense  of  our  coasts  is  therefore  a 
problem  of  cooperation  between  coast  artillery  and  mobile  forces. 

2.  ESSENTIAL  DIFFERENCES  AFFECTING  THE  ADMINISTRATION  OF  COAST  ARTILLERY 
AND  THE  MOBILE  ARMY  IN  PEACE  AND  WAR. 

The  general  relations  between  the  coast  fortresses  and  the  mobile  troops  have 
already  been  indicated.  Their  essential  difference  lies  in  the  fact  that  the 
Coast  Artillery  is  local  and  will  remain  local  both  in  peace  and  in  war.  The 
mobile  forces,  however,  will  not  be  confined  to  a  definite  territory.  They 
occupy  peace  stations  for  purposes  of  training,  but  it  can  never  be  predicted 
in  what  theater  of  war  they  may  be  employed.  The  coast  batteries  that  covei 
the  entrance  to  New  York  Harbor  will  remain  in  their  present  positions  in  any 
contingencies,  but  the  mobile  forces  that  may  be  stationed  in  the  vicinity  of 
New  York  may  be  employed  at  any  place  within  the  sphere  of  national  interest. 


20  OKGANIZATION    OF   THE   LAND   FORCES. 

A  correct  organization  of  the  two  forces  should,  therefore,  be  based  upon  a 
recognition  of  these  essential  differences.  The  Coast  Artillery  is  territorial- 
ized and  may  properly  have  a  territorial  organization  in  war  and  peace. 

The  mobile  army,  however,  must  be  free  to  move  and  should  not  be  tied  by 
its  peace  administration  to  any  particular  locality.  The  present  organization 
of  our  Army  violates  this  principle.  The  same  brigadier  general  commands 
mobile  troops  and  immobile  troops  under  a  system  of  administration  which  must 
necessarily  break  down  in  war. 

The  organization  of  the  Department  of  the  Gulf  is  a  typical  example  of  this 
illogical  arrangement.  This  department  comprises  1  regiment  of  Infantry.  1 
regiment  of  Cavalry,  and  27  companies  of  Coast  Artillery.  The  organization 
seems  to  be  based  on  some  idea  of  convenience  for  peace  administration,  but 
is  not  designed  to  meet  any  military  contingency.  It  is  unsound,  because  the 
command  itself  is  an  illogical  command,  it  being  impossible  to  conceive  any 
military  situation  which  would  properly  place  those  units  under  a  single  com- 
mander in  war.  It  is  also  unsound,  because  it  must  be  immediately  disrupted 
in  war  and  the  whole  machinery  of  administration  broken  up  at  the  very  time 
when  definite  organization  is  of  supreme  importance.  It  would,  therefore,  seem 
that  a  correct  organization  of  our  land  forces  should  provide  homogeneous 
commands  for  our  brigadier  generals  in  time  of  peace.  This  can  be  accom- 
plished by  grouping  the  present  Coast  Artillery  districts  into  three  Coast 
Artillery  Inspections  and  by  giving  a  definite  brigade  and  division  organiza- 
tion to  the  mobile  troops.  Under  this  arrangement  the  eastern  territorial 
region  will  comprise  two  Coast  Artillery  Inspections  and  the  nucleus  of  the 
first  division  of  the  mobile  army,  with  certain  extra -divisional  auxiliaries.  The 
central  territorial  region  will  comprise  the  nucleus  of  the  second  division  of 
the  mobile  army,  with  two  or  more  Cavalry  brigades  and  other  extra-divisional 
troops.  The  western  territorial  region  will  comprise  one  Coast  Artillery 
Inspection  and  the  nucleus  of  the  third  division  of  the  mobile  army. 

With  the  present  distribution  of  our  mobile  army  a  strict  administration  by 
tactical  units  is  nSt  wholly  practicable,  but  under  the  policy  of  concentration  pro- 
posed by  the  Secretary  of  War  it  is  expected  that  the  mobile  army  will  ultimately 
be  segregated  in  strategic  localities  so  that  tactical  units  may  be  trained  and 
administered  as  such.  There  must  be  a  period  of  transition,  however,  before 
this  ideal  can  be  realized,  but  during  this  period  of  transition  the  organization 
should  be  based  upon  the  idea  of  the  military  employment  of  the  troops. 
Because  a  force  is  dispersed  can  hardly  be  urged  as  a  reason  for  an  incorrect 
organization.  The  troops  must  ultimately  receive  a  tactical  organization  before 
they  can  fight,  and  the  fact  that  they  are  dispersed  is  really  an  additional 
reason  for  attempting  to  correct  their  organization  in  time  of  peace. 

Even  where  mobile  troops  are  concentrated  the  commander  of  the  territorial 
region  must  perform  certain  territorial  functions.  In  addition  to  the  command 
of  his  tactical  units  he  will  generally  have  problems  of  recruitment  and  supply  1 
and  may  be  charged  with  the  preparation  of  plans  for  the  joint  use  of  Regulars 
and  National  Guard  in  several  possible  theaters  of  war,  but  the  territorial  func- 
tions should  be  kept  separated  from  the  tactical  functions.  This  can  be  accom- 
plished by  a  proper  organization  of  the  staff.  One  part  of  the  staff  should  deal 
with  the  mobile  tactical  units  in  the  command  and  should  be  free  to  move  when 
those  units  are  assembled  for  war,  wrhile  the  other  part  of  the  staff  should  deal 

1  See  note,  page  18,  in  reference  to  supply  depots.  These  supply  depots  should  be 
under  the  control  of  the  territorial  conmmanders  recommended  in  this  report.  All  plans 
for  mobilization  should  be  so  completely  worked  out  that  the  equipping  of  a  unit  to 
war  strength  should  simply  mean  the  releasing  of  the  necessary  equipment  from  the 
proper  depot. 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND  FORCES.  21 

with  the  territorial  functions,  such  as  the  care  of  posts  and  supply,  and  should 
continue  to  perform  those  functions  after  the  troops  have  gone  into  the  field. 

It  is  a  matter  of  no  little  inconvenience  that  the  word  "  division  "  is  ren- 
dered ambiguous  in  our  service  by  being  applied  to  two  entirely  distinct  things. 
In  all  languages  the  name  "  division  "  is  applied  to  a  force  of  all  arms  which  is 
the  fundamental  mobile  army  unit.  The  word  is  used  in  this  sense  with  us, 
and  it  is  also  applied  to  the  territorial  areas  into  which  it  has  been  considered 
convenient  to  divide  the  country  for  purpose  of  military  administration.  It 
would  be  in  the  interest  of  clearness  to  find  some  means  of  avoiding  this  am- 
biguity, and  for  this  purpose  it  is  recommended  that  the  term  "  division  "  be 
restricted  in  the  future  to  the  tactical  unit  of  that  name;  that  the  term  "de- 
partment "  be  applied  to  the  present  territorial  "  divisions,"  and  to  all  other 
independent  territorial  commands,  and  that  brigadier  generals  be  assigned  to 
the  command  of  brigades  of  mobile  troops  or  of  Coast  Artillery  Inspections. 

3.  THE  DISTRIBUTION  OF  THE  MOBILE  ARMY  AND  ITS  RELATION  TO  TACTICAL 
ORGANIZATION  AND  ADMINISTRATION.  THE  POLICY  OF  SEGREGATION  AS  OUT- 
LINED BY  THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 

The  complete  development  of  a  tactical  organization  of  the  mobile  army 
must  depend  upon  a  gradual  correction  of  its  present  dispersion.  The  policy 
of  the  War  Department  with  reference  to  this  important  question  is  given  in 
the  following  extracts  from '  the  letter  of  the  Secretary  of  War  in  reply  to 
House  resolution  343,  second  session  Sixty-second  Congress  (H.  R.  Doc. 
No.  490)  : 

If  the  mobile  army  is  to  be  efficient,  its  distribution  must  meet  the  following 
requirements : 

1.  It  must  be  favorable  for  the  tactical  training  of  the  three  arms  combined 
(Infantry,  Cavalry,  and  Field  Artillery). 

2.  It  must  be  favorable  for  the  rapid  concentration  of  the  Army  upon  our 
northern  or  southern  frontier  or  upon  our  eastern  or  western  seaboard. 

3.  It  must  favor  the  best  use  of  the  Army  as  a  model  for  tfce  general  military 
training  of  the  National  Guard. 

4.  It  must  favor  the  use  of  the  Regular  Army  as  a  nucleus  for  the  war  organi- 
zation  of  the   National   Guard   and  such   volunteer  forces   as   Congress  may 
authorize  to  meet  any  possible  military  emergency. 

5.  The  distribution  must  favor  economical  administration  with  the  view  of 
developing    the   maximum    return    for    the    money    appropriated    for    military 
purposes. 

6.  The  distribution   must  permit  a   peace  organization  which  will  also  be 
effective  in  war ;  that  is,  an  organization  which  will  permit  a  prompt  expanson 
in  time  of  war  by  means  of  a  system  of  reserves. 

These  requirements  can  best  be  met  by  correcting  the  present  dispersion  of 
the  mobile  army.  The  mobile  army  is  now  scattered  in  49  posts.  It  should 
be  segregated  into  detachments  of  all  arms,  each  of  which  can  be  readily 
assembled  for  team  training  by  reasonable  marches  of  concentration.  Each  of 
the  several  tactical  groups  should  be  stationed  in  the  vicinity  of  strategic 
centers  where  facilities  are  favorable  for  transportation,  administration,  and 
supply.  The  exact  location  of  these  centers  should  depend  upon  a  careful 
study  of  many  considerations,  but  they  may  be  approximately  indicated  as 
follows : 

1.  Two,  and  possibly  three,  groups  on  the  line  between  the  St.  Lawrence  and 
Atlanta,  covering  the  Atlantic  seaboard. 

2.  Two,  and  possibly  three,  groups  on  the  line  between  Puget  Sound  and  Los 
Angeles,  covering  the  Pacific  seaboard. 

3.  At  least  two  groups  between  the  Great  Lakes  and  the  Rio  Grande  serving 
as  first  reserves  for  either  seaboard  and  as  nuclei  for  the  development  of  the 
National  Guard  and  volunteer  forces  to  be  organized  in  the  interior  of  the 
continent. 

The  number  of  groups  to  be  organized  is  primarily  restricted  by  the  total 
strength  of  the  mobile  army.  No  group  should  contain  less  than  a  brigade 


22  ORGANISATION   OF   THE   LAND  FORCES. 

of  Infantry,  with  a  proper  proportion  of  Cavalry,  Field  Artillery,  and  special 
troops,  and  at  least  one  group  should  contain  a  full  tactical  division.  Proper 
tactical  training  demands  the  combined  use  of  the  three  arms,  and  this  can 
be  secured  only  by  massing  the  troops  of  each  group  in  a  single  post  or  in 
several  posts  within  marching  distance  of  a  common  center.  Without  such 
concentration  joint  training  can  not  be  secured  except  at  heavy  expense  for 
transportation.  In  addition  to  these  detachments  of  all  arms,  there  should  be 
at  least  two  independent  Cavalry  brigades. 

A  study  of  the  question  indicates  that  the  stationing  of  our  present  mobile 
Army  in  more  than  eight  or  possibly  nine  such  groups  would  be  inconsistent 
with  the  demands  of  maximum  economy  and  tactical  efficiency. 

The  solution  of  this  problem  is  apparently  complicated  by  the  fact  that  the 
posts  now  occupied  by  the  mobile  army  represent  a  large  investment  which  must 
be  abandoned  if  an  efficient  plant  is  to  be  established.  But  while  most  of  the 
posts  now  occupied  have  lost  their  military  value,  the  national  military  reser- 
vations have  acquired  a  great  value  as  real  estate.  As  a  business  proposition 
it  should  be  possible  to  refund  the  investment  and  largely  finance  the  reloca- 
tion of  the  Army  from  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  of  the  real  estate  which  is  no 
longer  needed  for  military  purposes.  The  project  would  be  similar  in  many 
respects  to  the  Reclamation  Service  as  now  established  by  Congress.  In  that 
service  a  fund  is  formed  from  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  of  certain  public  lands, 
and  from  this  fund  certain  approved  projects  are  successively  executed  under 
general  rules  prescribed  by  Congress. 

It  is  believed  that  the  Army  can  in  this  way  be  scientifically  distributed  at 
an  expense  little  if  any  in  excess  of  the  proceeds  of  the  sales  of  the  properties 
to  be  abandoned. 

Studies  at  the  War  College  indicate  that  if  the  present  mobile  army  were 
concentrated  in  eight  posts,  its  cost  would  be  reduced  by  about  $5,500,000  per 
annum.  In  six  years  this  saving  would  pay  for  the  new  quartering  of  the 
mobile  army,  even  if  nothing  could  be  realized  from  the  sale  of  real  estate  no 
longer  needed. 

But  in  applying  the  principles  outlined  above  so  many  practical  difficulties 
must  be  encountered  that  the  solution  for  any  particular  group  of  posts  can 
not  be  stated  dogmatically.  In  a  region  where  there  are  now  several  widely 
scattered  posts  it  is  obvious  that  maximum  economy  and  efficiency  will  be 
attained  when  all  of  the  troops  in  the  region  are  so  concentrated  that  the 
entire  command  can  be  assembled  by  marching,  and  without  the  expense  in- 
cident to  rail  transportation.  But  the  actual  plans  for  accomplishing  such 
concentration  should  rest  upon  a  careful  and  separate  study  of  each  region, 
with  the  view  of  ascertaining  the  best  location  in  the  particular  region,  and  the 
extent  to  which  existing  posts  can  be  retained  without  prejudice  to  the  broader 
economic  and  military  interests  of  the  Government.  While  there  may  be 
decided  practical  limitations  upon  efforts  to  perfect  the  distribution  of  the 
present  force,  much  can  be  accomplished  by  recognizing  sound  principles  in 
making  future  locations.  In  the  gradual  development  of  the  mobile  army  a 
station  now  occupied  by  an  isolated  regiment  may  ultimately  become  one  of 
a  group  occupied  by  a  force  of  all  arms.  Where  such  a  post  is  favorably 
located  strategically,  the  tactical  isolation  may  thus  be  economically  corrected 
by  the  expansion  of  existing  plant  instead  of  by  relocation. 

The  problem  is  thus  seen  to  be  one  of  great  complexity,  but  the  ultimate  solu- 
tion is  clearly  indicated.  Whether  the  mobile  army  be  increased  or  not,  it 
should  gradually  be  segregated  into  tactical  groups,  each  group  containing  a 
force  of  all  arms  or  a  Cavalry  brigade.  The  loci  of  the  several  groups  should  be 
carefully  worked  out  in  conformity  with  the  general  policy  of  placing  the 
force  so  that  it  can  be  promptly  employed  upon  either  seaboard  or  upon 
either  the  northern  or  the  southern  land  frontier  of  the  country.  But  the 
present  faulty  distribution  can  not  be  corrected  at  once.  New  stations  must 
be  provided  before  old  stations  can  be  abandoned,  but  future  changes  should 
always  be  made  with  the  view  of  the  gradual  formation  of  proper  tactical 
commands. 


OF  THE  LAND  FORCES.  23 

4.  A  PROPOSED  ORGANIZATION  FOR  THE  PEACE  ADMINISTRATION  OF  THE  REGULAR 

LAND  FORCES. 

The  three  territorial  divisions  under  which  the  Army  is  now  administered 
conform  to  the  three  main  strategic  regions  referred  to  in  the  letter  of  the 
Secretary  of  War.  Each  of  these  territorial  areas  contains  a  proportion 
of  mobile  troops,  and  in  each  of  them  the  forces  are  widely  dispersed.  Under 
the  general  policy  of  concentration  these  forces  will  ultimately  be  segregated 
into  two  or  more  centers  in  each  strategic  region,  and  the  troops  of  the 
several  centers  when  assembled  will  constitute  the  nucleus  of  a  tactical 
division  and  one  or  more  Cavalry  brigades.  The  peace  organization  of  the 
mobile  army  should  be  based  on  these  general  strategic  principles. 

The  mobile  troops  in  the  three  main  geographical  regions  should  be  organized 
as  distinct  mobile  commands,  and  in  such  future  increases  of  the  mobile  army 
as  Congress  may  authorize  it  should  be  the  national  policy  successively  to  ex- 
pand the  nuclear  divisions  into  complete  tactical  divisions.  Thus  in  due  time 
a  complete  tactical  division  and  one  or  more  Cavalry  brigades  may  be  provided 
for  each  of  three  main  strategic  regions  and  thereafter  further  expansion 
should  be  with  the  view  of  dividing  the  central  region  into  two  such  territorial 
regions,  so  that  complete  tactical  divisions  each  with  proper  extra-divisional 
troops,  will  eventually  cover  the  northern  and  southern  land  frontiers  and  the 
Atlantic  and  Pacific  coasts. 

Having  in  mind  the  distinct  functions  of  the  mobile  forces  and  the  seacoast 
fortifications,  the  following  peace  organization  of  the  regular  land  forces  is 
recommended : 

EASTERN    DEPARTMENT. 

This  department  conforms  to  the  present  Eastern  Division.  Within  this 
area  the  mobile  troops  will  constitute  the  nucleus  of  the  first  tactical  division, 
with  a  Cavalry  brigade  and  certain  other  extra-divisional  troops  of  the  mobile 
army  considered  as  an  expeditionary  force.  The  Coast  Artillery  within  the 
department  should  be  organized  as  two  Coast  Artillery  Inspections,  as  follows : 
1.  The  North  Atlantic  Inspection,  comprising  the  Coast  Artillery  districts  from 
Maine  to  the  Delaware  River,  both  inclusive.  2.  The  South  Atlantic  Inspec- 
tion, comprising  the  Coast  Artillery  districts  from  the  Delaware  River,  ex- 
clusive, to  Texas,  inclusive. 

CENTRAL    DEPARTMENT. 

This  department  conforms  to  the  present  Central  Division.  Within  this 
area  the  mobile  troops  will  constitute  the  nucleus  of  the  second  tactical 
division,  with  two  or  more  Cavalry  brigades  and  certain  other  extra-divisional 
troops  of  the  mobile  army  regarded  as  an  expeditionary  force. 

WESTERN    DEPARTMENT. 

This  department  conforms  to  the  present  Western  Division.  Within  this 
area  the  mobile  troops  will  constitute  the  nucleus  of  the  third  tactical  division, 
with  certain  extra-divisional  troops  of  the  mobile  army  regarded  as  an  ex- 
peditionary force.  The  Coast  Artillery  within  the  department  should  be 
organized  as  the  Pacific  Inspection,  comprising  the  Coast  Artillery  districts 
from  Washington  to  California,  both  inclusive. 

THE  FOREIGN    COMMANDS. 

The  Philippines  Department,  comprising  all  the  troops  serving  within  the 
Philippines. 


24  OBGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND  FORCES. 

The  Hawaiian  Department,  comprising  all  the  troops  serving  within  the 
Hawaiian  Islands.  At  present  this  is  a  department  of  the  western  division, 
but  its  special  functions  make  it  properly  a  separate  command. 

The  Panama  Department,  comprising  all  the  troops  serving  within  the  Canal 
Zone.  This,  too,  will  be  a  separate  command  in  war  and  to  tie  it  to  a  territorial 
command  within  the  United  States  would  simply  produce  confusion  by  provid- 
ing a  peace  organization  which  must  be  disrupted  in  war  time.  It  is  and  must 
remain  a  distinct  command  strategically. 

The  Porto  Rico  Regiment. — The  Porto  Rico  Regiment  is  now  a  part  of  the 
Department  of  the  East,  but  this  affiliation  can  not  continue  in  war.  The 
isolation  of  this  garrison  requires  the  formation  of  a  separate  administration 
for  it,  but  the  small  size  of  the  garrison  does  not  appear  to  justify  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  separate  department.  The  permanent  administration  of  the  Porto 
Rico  garrison  and  its  relation  to  the  home  forces  is  a  problem  that  awaits 
further  study.  For  the  present  it  will  probably  be  necessary  to  leave  it  attached 
to  the  proposed  Eastern  Department. 

5.  THE  DIFFICULTY  OF  SECURING  A  TACTICAL  ORGANIZATION  rN  PEACE,  AS  ILLUS- 
TRATED BY  THE  ACTUAL  DISTRIBUTION  OF  THE  TROOPS  IN  THE  PRESENT  CENTRAL 
DIVISION. 

The  practical  difficulties  involved  in  providing  a  definite  tactical  organiza- 
tion in  peace  can  be  illustrated  by  considering  the  peace  administration  of  the 
mobile  forces  now  serving  in  the  Central  Division. 

The  troops  in  the  Central  Division  were  as  follows,  February  20,  1912 :  *  9 
regiments  of  Infantry,  1  regiment  of  Mountain  Artillery,  1  regiment  Horse  Artil- 
lery, 1$  regiments  of  Light  Artillery,  6  regiments  of  Cavalry,  1  battalion  of 
Engineers  (1  company  present,  3  companies  under  orders  to  join),  2  field 
companies  Signal  troops,  2  technical  companies  Signal  troops,  1  field  hospital, 
2  ambulance  companies. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  command  comprised  1  Infantry  division,  substan- 
tially complete,  and  2  Cavalry  brigades.  The  tactical  organization  of  these 
units  would  be  as  follows : 

The  Infantry  Division. 

3  brigades  of  Infantry,  3  regiments  each. 

1  brigade  of  Artillery,  li  regiments  Light  and  1  regiment  Mountain. 

1  regiment  of  divisional  Cavalry. 

1  battalion  of  Engineers,  4  companies. 

2  field  companies  Signal  troops. 
1  field  hospital. 

1  ambulance  company. 

The  First  Cavalry  Brigade. 

3  regiments  of  Cavalry. 

1  battalion  of  Horse  Artillery. 

The  Second  Cavalry  Brigade. 

2  regiments  of  Cavalry. 

1  battalion  of  Horse  Artillery. 

If  these  forces  should  remain  in  the  central  territorial  region  they  would 
ultimately,  under  the  policy  proposed  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  be  concentrated 

i  This  strength  is  subject  to  change,  as  ultimately  some  of  these  organizations  will  be 
sent  to  Panama  or  Oahu. 


ORGANIZATION   OF  THE  LAND  FORCES.  25 

in  a  few  closely  allied  groups  of  stations,  as  follows:  3  Infantry  brigade  com 
mands,  each  command  comprising  a  full  Infantry  brigade  and  a  detachment  of 
divisional   Field  Artillery  and  Cavalry;   2  Cavalry  brigade  commands,   each 
command  comprising  two  or  more  regiments  of  Cavalry  with  one  or  more 
batteries  of  Horse  Artillery. 

The  bulk  of  the  divisional  Artillery  could  be  distributed  among  the  brigade 
commands  or  could  be  concentrated  at  some  place  like  Fort  Sill,  where  ex- 
perimental Artillery  practice  would  be  practicable.  The  Engineers,  Sanitary 
troops,  Signal  troops,  and  other  auxiliaries  would  be  attached  to  groups  where 
most  convenient. 

It  is  obvious  that  with  this  arrangement  there  would  be  a  maximum 
economy  of  administration  and  maximum  facilities  for  training.  It  is  also 
obvious  that  under  such  an  arrangement  the  division  and  cavalry  brigades 
would  be  most  promptly  available  for  war  or  for  expeditionary  purposes. 
The  territorial  commander  in  his  peace  administration  would  be  con- 
cerned with  6  or  7  stations  instead  of  22  stations,  as  at  present.  All  of  the 
troops  could  be  concentrated  for  active  service  with  a  minimum  of  friction 
and  all  would  be  prepared  for  such  service  by  their  peace  training.  The 
Infantry  division,  when  assembled,  would  assemble  under  the  general  officers 
who  had  trained  the  brigades  in  peace,  and  the  Cavalry  brigades  would  be 
definite  organizations  in  peace  and  war. 

But  while  the  advantages  of  this  organization  are  obvious  it  can  serve  as 
little  more  than  a  goal  of  future  policy,  for  under  actual  conditions  the  troops 
are  not  only  dispersed,  but  are  so  mixed  that  not  even  a  reenforced  brigade 
can  be  assembled  without  splitting  up  the  peace  organization  and  then  ex- 
temporizing a  new  command.  The  situation  becomes  apparent  upon  an  ex- 
amination of  the  actual  peace  organization  which  follows : 

6.  THE  PRESENT  SUBDIVISION  OF  COMMANDS  IN  THE  CENTRAL  TERRITORIAL 

DIVISION. 

On  February  20,  1912,  the  mobile  troops  of  the  Central  Division  were  sub- 
divided for  command  as  follows: 

The  Department  of  the  Lakes. — 4J  regiments  of  Infantry,  1  battery  of  Field 
Artillery,  1  squadron  of  Cavalry. 

These  troops  are  scattered  in  6  posts  extending  from  Michigan  to  North 
Dakota. 

The  Department  of  the  Missouri.— 2  regiments  of  Infantry  (each  regiment 
lacked  1  battalion,  which  was  stationed  in  some  other  department),  2  regiments 
of  Cavalry ;  1  field  company,  signal  troops ;  2  technical  companies,  signal  troops. 

These  troops  are  scattered  in  6  posts,  extending  from  Iowa  to  Wyoming. 

The  Department  of  Texas. — 1£  regiments  of  Infantry;  1£  regiments  of  Cav- 
alry; 1  regiment  of  Field  Artillery  (less  1  battalion)  ;  1  regiment  of  Field 
Artillery  (less  1  battery). 

These  troops  are  scattered  in  6  posts,  extending  from  Arkansas  to  New 
Mexico. 

Brigade  Post  No.  1  (Fort  D.  A.  Russell). — 1  regiment  of  Infantry;  1  regi- 
ment of  Cavalry ;  1  regiment  of  Mountain  Artillery ;  1  field  company,  signal 
troops ;  1  field  hospital ;  1  ambulance  company. 

Brigade  Post  No.  2  (Fort  Riley). — 1  regiment  of  Cavalry;  1  regiment  of 
Horse  Artillery. 

Brigade  Post  No.  3  (Fort  Leavenworth). — 1  regiment  of  Infantry;  1  squadron 
of  Cavalry;  1  battalion  of  Engineers  (1  company  present,  the  other  3  en  route 
to  join)  ;  1  ambulance  company. 


26  ORGANIZATION   OP   THE   LAND  FORCES. 

Each  of  the  above  detachments  is  to  be  commanded  by  a  brigadier  general, 
but  it  will  be  observed  that  not  a  single  detachment  is  the-  appropriate  command 
for  an  officer  of  that  rank.  An  Infantry  brigade  could  be  formed  in  the  De- 
partment of  the  Lakes,  but  if  it  should  go  to  the  front  under  the  department 
commander  there  would  be  a  residue  of  1J  regiments-  of  Infantry,  1  squadron 
of  Cavalry,  and  1  battery  of  Field  Artillery  left  in  the  department  without  a 
department  commander.  To  form  a  second  Infantry  brigade  another  depart- 
ment commander  would  leave  his  command,  but  in  this  case  it  would  be  neces- 
sary to  disrupt  2  or  more  of  the  peace  commands  in  order  to  find  him  a 
brigade.  f 

Under  the  present  policy  of  administration  by  territorial  divisions  all  ad- 
ministration is  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  the  division  commander  and  the 
department  commanders  have  been  restricted  to  the  tactical  supervision  and 
instruction  of  the  troops  assigned  to  them.  This  is  undoubtedly  a  step  in  the 
right  direction,  for  the  difficulties  of  mobilization  above  indicated  would  be 
greatly  increased  if  each  of  the  brigadier  generals  were  absorbed,  as  formerly,  in 
purely  administrative  duties.  The  assignment  of  tactical  duties  to  brigadier 
generals  is  sound  in  principle  and  conforms  to  the  practice  of  all  well-organized 
armies.  But,  in  order  to  secure  the  desired  advantages,  it  is  essential  that  the 
brigadier  general  be  assigned  an  appropriate  command  and  one  that  he  will  con- 
tinue to  command  in  the  field.  If  he  be  assigned  such  a  command  he  will  pro- 
pare  it  for  war  and  the  relation  between  the  leader  and  troops  will  be  estab- 
lished in  peace.  But  to  give  him  a  command  that  can  not  approximate  to  war 
conditions,  one  in  fact  that  must  be  disrupted  on  mobilization,  is  not  a  step 
toward  sound  organization. 

An  examination  of  the  subdivision  of  command  in  the  Central  Division 
will  show  that  the  present  organization  does  not  meet  the  required  conditions. 
The  Department  of  the  Missouri  comprises  four  battalions  of  Infantry  and  two 
full  regiments  of  Cavalry.  No  military  situation  is  conceivable  that  would  con- 
tinue this  affiliation  in  war.  It  is  not  a  brigade,  because  it  is  not  homogeneous. 
A  brigadier  general's  proper  command  is  a  brigade  of  his  own  arm.  If  such 
a  brigade  is  together,  he  can  command  it  and  instruct  it  to  great  advantage. 
But  even  if  it  be  dispersed  he  can  at  least  inspect  it,  supervise  its  instruction, 
and  prepare  the  plans  for  its  mobilization  and  concentration.  The  only  thing 
definite  that  can  be  said  of  the  force  under  the  commander  of  the  Department 
of  the  Missouri  is  that  the  peace-command  unit  will  cease  to  exist  when  war 
comes.  It  is  an  organization  without  tactical  stability,  and  it  is  not  even  a 
proper  inspection  unit  for  a  brigadier  general.  A  Cavalry  brigadier  general  is 
the  proper  tactical  inspector  and  instructor  of  a  Cavalry  brigade,  and  an  In- 
fantry brigadier  general  is  the  proper  tactical  inspector  and  instructor  of  an 
Infantry  brigade. 

7.  A  PLAN  OF  TACTICAL  ORGANIZATION  AND  ADMINISTRATION  ADAPTED  TO  THE 
PRESENT  DISPERSION  OF  THE  MOBILE  ARMY. 

Under  the  policy  of  concentration  proposed  by  the  Secretary  of  War  the  com 
mands  will  ultimately  be  segregated  so  that  they  can  be  administered  tactically, 
but  the  practical  question  is  to  find  some  method  of  administration  that  will  pre- 
serve a  logical  tactical  organization  during  the  period  of  transition.  The  Infantry 
division  and  the  two  Cavalry  brigades  in  the  Central  Division  should  be  tactical 
entities,  even  if  they  are  dispersed  and  mixed.  There  should  be  some  means 
of  forming  an  organization  in  which  the  several  brigades  can  have  the  guidance 
and  supervision  of  their  appropriate  commanders  in  time  of  peace.  The  solu- 
tion seems  to  lie  in  a  recognition  of  the  fact  that  the  territorial  region  ac- 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE  LAND  FORCES.  27 

tually  contains  three  Infantry  brigades,  two  Cavalry  brigades,  and  one  Field 
Artillery  brigade.  Here  are  the  proper  commands,  or  inspection  districts,  for 
six  brigadier  generals,  three  of  Infantry,  two  of  Cavalry,  and  one  of  Field 
Artillery.  It  is  impracticable  to  segregate  the  six  brigades  immediately,  but  it 
is  not  impracticable  to  make  each  brigadier  general  the  inspector  and  tactical 
supervisor  of  a  brigade  of  his  own  arm.  The  territorial  region  now  com- 
prises precisely  that  number  of  brigade  commanders,  but  not  one  of  these 
brigade  commanders  is  identified  with  a  logical  brigade  unit. 

The  administration  of  the  several  posts  is  already  in  the  hands  of  the  terri- 
torial commander.  The  brigadier  generals  have  become  tactical  inspectors,  but 
are  apportioned  by  geographical  areas,  and  without  reference  to  the  composi- 
tion of  the  troops  under  them.  It  would  seem  that  a  real  tactical  administra- 
tion could  be  accomplished  in  the  following  manner : 

1.  Let  each  post  be  considered  as  a  detachment  directly  under  the  territorial 
Commander.    This  meets  all  administrative  requirements. 

2.  Let    the   troops   of   the    several    arms   be    formed    into   brigades    with    a 
brigadier  general  or  colonel  of  the  proper  arm  assigned  as  the  inspector  of 
each  brigade.     While  the  brigade  remains  dispersed  in  several  posts  the  bri- 
gade commander  inspects  it,  supervises  its  tactical  instruction  under  the  orders 
of  the  territorial  commander,  and  prepares  to  lead  it  into  the  field  if  it  is  called 
out  for  expeditionary  purposes.     As  soon  as  the  brigade  is  actually  assembled 
under  the  policy  of  concentration,  the  brigade  commander  will  be  stationed 
with  it,  but  during  the  transition  he  will  at  least  keep  the  unit  formed  as  an 
organized  tactical  entity. 

3.  The  number  of  brigades  should  be  determined  by  the  number  of  regiments 
and  not  by  the  number  of  available  brigadier  generals.     If  not  enough  general 
officers  are  provided,  the  senior  colonel  of  the  brigade  should  perform  the  func- 
tion of  brigade  inspector. 

4.  The  organization  of  the  staff  of  the  territorial  command  should  be  based  on 
a  recognition  of  the  separateness  of  the  territorial  and  tactical  functions  of 
the    commander.     As   a   territorial    commander   he    is   concerned   with   posts, 
reservations,   administrations,   and   supply.     As  a   tactical  commander   he  is 
concerned  with  the  constituent  brigades  and  special  units  of  his  command. 
One  function  is  territorial  and  fixed,  the  other  is  mobile  and  goes  with  troops. 

5.  In  the  mobile  army,  the  assignment  of  regiments  to  brigades  for  purposes 
of  tactical  supervision  and  inspection  should  supersede  the  present  territorial 
departments.     They  are  no  longer  necessary  for  administrative  purposes,  and  as 
inspection  districts  they  are  illogical  because  they  do  not  include  logical  tactical 
commands. 

6.  The  only  necessary  territorial  unit  is  the  department  proposed  herein  as  a 
substitute  for  the   "  territorial   division."     The  brigade  commanders  are  the 
tactical  assistants  of  this  territorial  commander.     If  a  special  tactical  situ- 
ation develops  within  a  territorial  command  such  as  the  recent  crisis  along 
the   Mexican  border,   it   is  only  necessary   for   the  territorial   commander  to 
assign  the  local  military  problem  to  one  of  his  brigadier  generals.    That  officer 
will  ordinarily  employ  all  or  part  of  his  own  brigade,  but  under  such  circum- 
stances all  the  troops  in  the  region  will  be  assigned  to  his  command  and  addi- 
tional troops  will  be  forwarded  to  him  if  necessary. 

7.  The  brigade  commander,   in  addition  to   inspecting  and   supervising  the 
instruction  of  his  brigade,  should  be  responsible  for  its  mobilization  and  con- 
centration.    The  brigade  under  this  plan   is  a  continuing  unit   in  peace  and 
war.     Under  present  conditions  every  organization  above  the  regiment  must 
be  extemporized. 


28  ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND  FORCES. 

8.  The  proposed  arrangement  provides  a   tactical   organization   even   under 
the  present  unsatisfactory  distribution.     As  the  distribution  is  corrected  under 
the  policy  of  the  War  Department,  the  brigade-inspection  districts  will  become 
more  compact  and  ultimately  will  become  concentrated  brigade  commands. 

9.  The  proposed  arrangement  provides  the  basis  for  an  organization  appli- 
cable alike  to  the  Regular  Army  regarded  as  an  expeditionary     force  and  as 
the  nucleus  of  the  greater  war  army.     Each  brigadier  general  is  definitely 
identified  with  a  brigade  of  the  expeditionary  force  and  is  also  available  to 
assist  the  territorial  commander  in  the  solution  of  the  broader  problems  con- 
nected with  the  development  of  all  the  military  resources  within  the  limits  of 
the  territorial  command. 

It  is  therefore  recommended  : 

(1)  That  the  Coast  Artillery  districts  within  the  United  States  be  formed 
into  three  Coast  Artillery  Inspections,  as  outlined  in  this  memorandum. 

(2)  That  the  territorial  departments,  as  now  organized  within  the  United 
States,  be  abolished,  that  the  term  department  be  applied  to  the  three  large 
territorial  commands  now  known  as  "  divisions,"  and  that  the  mobile  troops 
now  serving  therein  be  organized  for  purposes  of  inspection,  supervision,  and 
mobilization  into  brigade  inspections  of  Infantry,  Cavalry,  and  Field  Artillery. 

(3)  That  there  should  be  a  brigade  inspection  for  each  tactical  brigade  of 
Infantry,   Cavalry,   and  Field  Artillery,  and  that  to  each  brigade  inspection 
there  should  be  assigned  a  brigade  commander  or  inspector  of  the  rank  of 
brigadier  general  or  of  colonel  if  sufficient  general  officers  are  not  available. 

(4)  That  the  brigade  commanders  herein  provided  should  be  responsible  for 
the  tactical  inspection  and  mobilization  of  their  several  brigades  and  should  be 
available  for  such  other  duties  as  may  be  assigned  to  them  by  the  commander 
of  the  territorial  department. 

(5)  That  the  brigade  commanders  herein  provided  should  be  assigned  to  ap- 
propriate stations  by  the  commander  of  the  territorial  department  in  which 
their  brigades  may  be  serving. 

The  application  of  these  principles  to  the  peace  organization  of  the  mobile 
army  is  shown  in  detail  in  Chapter  VIII  of  this  report. 

8.  QUARTERING  AND  ADMINISTERING  THE  MOBILE  TROOPS  IN  PEACE. 

Having  properly  organized  the  mobile  troops  and  located  the  elements  of 
brigades  and  divisions  so  that  they  may  be  periodically  assembled  for  combined 
training,  the  next  step  is  to  simplify  all  details  of  administration  and  remove 
unnecessary  distractions,  so  that  attention  may  be  concentrated  on  training. 
Administration  becomes  unduly  cumbersome,  and  many  distractions  are  caused, 
at  the  present  time,  on  account  of  the  fact  that  the  troops  are  generally  located 
in  what  may  be  called  garrison  villages,  involving  a  most  elaborate  variety  of 
buildings,  parkways,  roads,  sewer  and  water  systems,  etc.  A  great  deal  of 
the  energy  of  troops  is  required  to  care  for  these  elaborate  establishments. 
When  our  troops  were  scattered  throughout  the  western  country,  it  was  neces- 
sary to  provide  these  isolated  posts.  Under  existing  conditions  it  is  believed 
that  the  rational  and  economic  way  of  disposing  of  our  troops  in  time  of  peace 
is  to  quarter  them  in  simple,  but  substantial  buildings  in  or  near  large  towns, 
where  all  existing  utilities  may  be  made  use  of;  and  to  build  these  quarters 
in  such  a  manner  that  the  minimum  of  time  and  attention  will  be  required  for 
their  maintenance  and  upkeep.  It  is  believed  that  if  thus  located  and  quar 
tered,  a  better  class  of  enlisted  men  may  be  secured  for  Army  service;  that 
all  necessary  elementary  instruction  can  be  given  in  the  barrack  yard,  or  within 


ORGANIZATION    OF   THE   LAND   FORCES.  29 

a  short  inarching  distance  of  the  barracks;  and  that  for  more  advanced  train- 
ing the  troops  should  be  marched  to  places  where  a  large  amount  of  varied 
territory  may  be  available. 

CHAPTER  V. 
THE  NECESSITY  OF  A  RESERVE   SYSTEM. 

1.  MAINTENANCE  OF  STRENGTH  IN  WAR. 

An  army  is  an  expensive  machine  maintained  in  order  to  support  national 
interests  in  time  of  emergency.  The  economic  efficiency  of  an  army  should  there- 
fore be  measured  by  the  effective  fighting  power  which  it  is  proposed  to  develop 
and  maintain  in  war.  It  must  not  only  be  able  to  develop  a  high  fighting  efficiency 
at  the  outbreak  of  war,  but  it  must  be  able  to  maintain  that  efficiency  during 
the  progress  of  the  campaign.  As  soon  as  war  begins  military  forces  are  sub- 
ject to  heavy  losses,  and  unless  means  are  definitely  provided  for  replacing 
these  losses  the  military  machine  will  immediately  deteriorate.  The  losses  in 
war  are  not  only  the  losses  in  battle,  but  losses  due  to  disease  and  losses  due 
to  the  hardship  of  campaign.  The  Prussian  Guard  Corps  in  its  marches  to  Sedan 
lost  5,000  men  on  the  march  alone.  It  was  necessary  for  the  corps  to  arrive 
at  the  battle  field  in  time,  and  that  required  a  velocity  of  march  that  was  more 
destructive  than  battle.  It  should  be  remembered  that  the  soldiers  in  this 
force  were  trained  soldiers  and  that  the  guard  corps  arrived  and  fought  at 
Sedan  in  spite  of  its  march  losses.  A  force  of  soft  or  raw  troops  could  not 
have  arrived  at  all.  Careful  training  is  necessary  to  prepare  troops  for  war; 
but  it  must  be  recognized  that  wastage  will  occur  and  that  if  a  really  effective 
force  is  to  be  maintained  trained  men  must  be  supplied  to  replace  this  wastage. 

It  is  the  experience  of  modern  warfare  that  any  given  unit  loses  at  least  50 
per  cent  of  its  strength  in  the  first  six  months  of  war.  If  this  loss  is  not  re- 
placed, there  is  50  per  cent  deterioration  in  the  power  of  the  unit ;  and  if  it  is 
replaced  by  raw  men,  the  quality  of  the  force  as  a  highly  trained  team  is 
destroyed. 

This  problem  has  an  important  economic  aspect  that  has  been  ignored 
throughout  our  military  history.  Military  forces  are  maintained  at  great 
expense  through  long  periods  of  peace  in  order  to  meet  a  brief  emergency  in 
war.  Sound  economics,  therefore,  demands  that  the  peace  expenditure  be  jus- 
tified by  unquestioned  war  efficiency.  A  company  of  Infantry  with  three  offi- 
cers should  contain  the  maximum  number  of  trained  riflemen  that  three  capable 
officers  can  command.  This  maximum  appears  to  be  about  150  men ;  but  if 
the  company  starts  in  the  campaign  with  150  men,  the  natural  wastage  of  war 
will  immediately  reduce  it  below  that  number.  If  the  vacancies  are  not  filled, 
it  ceases  to  be  an  economical  company,  because  under  these  conditions  we  have 
a  less  number  of  men  than  three  trained  officers  should  control;  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  if  the  vacancies  are  filled  by  untrained  men,  the  company  ceases  to 
be  a  trained  team,  as  under  these  conditions  the  three  officers  can  not  effectively 
command  150  men  in  action. 

The  United  States  is  the  only  nation  that  has  no  scientific  means  of  meeting 
this  situation.  In  all  of  our  wars  the  companies  first  sent  into  the  field  have 
dwindled  away  in  strength,  and  as  these  units  have  dwindled  away  new  levies 
under  untrained  officers  have  been  organized.  The  result  has  been  that  our 
wars  have  been  long  and  protracted  and  attended  by  great  sacrifices  of  blood 
and  treasure.  Each  battle  has  generally  been  followed  by  a  period  of  inactivity. 
Such  an  army  has  no  power  to  keep  up  persistent  military  activity. 


30  ORGANIZATION   OF    THE   LAND   FORCES. 

Without  some  solution  of  this  problem  there  can  be  no  definite  military 
organization.  The  organization  of  divisions  and  other  higher  military  units  is 
based  on  the  principle  that  the  three  arms  should  be  combined  in  definite  propor- 
tions. The  Infantry  division  is  differently  organized  in  different  countries,  but 
in  all  countries  it  consists  of  from  10,000  to  15,000  infantrymen,  with  from 
4  to  6  field  guns  per  thousand  rifles,  and  with  similar  definite  proportions  of 
cavalry,  engineers,  signal  troops,  and  other  auxiliaries.  The  infantry  strength 
is  the  basis  of  organization.  In  every  army  except  our  own  the  number  of 
infantrymen  is  definite  and  fixed,  because  means  of  replacing  losses  are  pro- 
vided in  time  of  peace.  With  us,  however,  the  infantry  strength  is  an  absolute 
variable.  We  can  only  predict  that  the  effective  strength  of  each  unit  will 
fall  after  war  begins.  Under  these  conditions  the  division  is  not  a  continuing 
unit.  Its  components  are  fluid  and  indefinite,  and  there  can  be  no  stable 
organization  under  such  conditions. 

2.  THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE  PROBLEM. 

The  solution  of  this  problem  is  very  simple,  and  it  is  a  significant  fact 
that  the  same  solution  has  been  adopted  in  all  modern  armies.  It  is  only 
necessary  to  provide  that  a  man's  army  service  shall  consist  of  two  periods, 
one  period  with  the  colors  and  the  other  a  period  of  war  obligation  for  a 
limited  time  after  leaving  active  service.  Under  these  circumstances  when 
war  is  declared  the  active  army  is  at  once  sent  into  the  field  and  the  former 
soldiers  having  a  war  obligation  are  assembled  in  depots,  where  they  can  be 
forwarded  to  the  front  as  needed.  At  the  same  time  raw  recruits  are  enlisted 
and  trained  at  the  depot.  As  losses  occur  at  the  front,  they  are  filled  first 
by  forwarding  trained  men  from  the  depot,  and  if  the  number  of  these  is 
sufficient  new  recruits  are  not  forwarded  until  after  they  have  had  a  sufficient 
period  of  training.  The  result  is  that  even  in  a  long  war,  which  would  ulti- 
mately require  the  services  of  thousands  of  raw  recruits,  it  is  so  arranged 
that  no  man  goes  to  the  front  until  he  is  trained  for  active  service  and  suffi- 
ciently hardened  and  disciplined  to  bear  the  stress  of  modern  war.  Under 
such  a  system  the  full  energy  of  military  activity  can  be  maintained  up  to  the 
limit  of  available  recruits.  Each  unit  works  at  its  maximum  efficiency,  and 
the  war  power  of  the  nation  is  developed  with  a  minimum  expenditure  of  life 
and  money. 

It  thus  appears  that  an  army  reserve  is  not  a  means  of  creating  new  forces 
or  new  units  in  time  of  war,  but  is  a  necessary  means  of  maintaining  the  war 
strength  of  the  peace  establishment,  such  as  it  may  be: 

3.  POWER  OF   EXPANSION. 

But  while  one  of  the  primary  and  necessary  functions  of  a  reserve  system  is 
to  replace  losses  during  the  period  required  for  the  training  of  raw  recruits,  the 
principal  function  is  to  furnish  the  trained  men  necessary  to  pass  from  a  peace 
to  a  war  footing.  If  we  have  a  reserve  of  trained  men  upon  whom  we  can 
count  in  war,  it  is  possible  greatly  to  reduce  the  cost  of  the  military  establish- 
ment by  giving  it  a  minimum  peace  strength.  Under  our  system  our  units  are 
maintained  in  peace  at  considerably  less  than  war  strength,  but  there  are  no 
means  of  expanding  to  the  war  strength  except  by  the  absorption  of  untrained 
men.  In  every  other  modern  army  the  economical  peace  strength  is  maintained 
without  loss  of  war  efficiency  because  trained  reserves  are  available  for  a  prompt 
expansion  with  trained  men. 


ORGANIZATION    OF    THE   LAND   FORCES.  31 

The  effect  of  the  reserve  system  on  the  cost  of  peace  establishments  can  be 
illustrated  in  the  following  way:  Let  us  suppose  that  we  require  a  regular 
army  of  100,000  men  on  the  outbreak  of  war  and  that  we  propose  to  maintain 
this  force  in  full  effectiveness  throughout  the  campaign.  This  requires  that 
means  should  be  provided  for  avoiding  a  deterioration  of  the  force  due  to  the 
absorption  of  raw  recruits  to  replace  the  first  losses  of  the  campaign.  It  may 
be  predicted  that  the  losses  will  be  50  per  cent,  or  50,000  men,  in  the  first  six 
months,  but  before  the  expiration  of  six  months,  if  we  begin  training  recruits 
at  once,  some  of  the  new  men  will  be  prepared  to  go  to  the  front.  We  may, 
therefore,  adopt  a  factor  of  safety  of  25  per  cent  instead  of  50  per  cent  and 
assume  that  the  maintenance  of  100,000  men  will  require  an  initial  organized 
strength  of  125,000  men  if  there  be  no  reserves.  Under  conditions  prevailing 
in  the  United  States  this  force  would  cost  probably  $800  per  man,  or  $100,000,000 
per  year. 

But,  if  we  had  a  system  of  reserves,  the  same  effective  war  strength  could 
be  maintained  at  a  greatly  reduced  cost.  If  the  military  establishment  com- 
prised 75,000  men  with  the  colors  and  50,000  men  with  the  reserve,  its  cost 
would  not  exceed  $65,000,000  per  year,  and  yet  its  war  effectiveness  would  be 
just  as  great  as  the  more  expensive  force  without  the  reserves. 

The  economic  effect  of  a  reserve  system,  therefore,  is  to  reduce  the  per  capita 
cost  of  any  given  army  at  the  same  time  assuring  maximum  effectiveness  in 
war.  If  we  do  not  have  reserves,  we  are  committed  to  a  policy  of  maxi- 
mum cost.  It  has  been  urged  that  a  reserve  system  for  the  Regular  Army  is 
essentially  foreign  to  our  institutions  and  connected  in  some  way  with  com- 
pulsory military  service.  It  is  true  that  the  nations  having  a  system  of  com- 
pulsory service  also  have  a  reserve  system,  but  it  is  also  true  that  Great  Britain 
regards  her  regular  army  reserve  as  an  indispensable  part  of  her  system  of 
voluntary  service.  Great  Britain  did  not  adopt  the  reserve  system  until  after 
her  army  broke  down  in  the  Crimean  War  because  reserves  were  lacking.  Her 
highly  trained,  long-service  army  almost  immediately  melted  away.  There  was 
no  way  of  renewing  its  strength  except  with  untrained  men.  She  found  that 
without  reserves  her  army  was  not  adapted  to  the  requirements  of  war. 

The  provision  of  a  regular  army  reserve  is  purely  a  business  proposition. 
The  economic  value  of  the  reserve  does  not  depend  in  any  way  upon  its  size. 
It  is  to  be  hoped  that  we  can  develop  a  sufficient  reserve,  but  even  a  small 
reserve  will  reduce  the  per  capita  cost  of  the  army  and  increase  its  effective- 
ness. 

If  we  had  had  only  6,000  men,  that  number  would  have  been  sufficient  to  have 
raised  the  recent  San  Antonio  maneuver  division  to  war  strength.  If  we  should 
have  enough  to  replace  the  initial  losses  of  war,  we  would  be  assured  of  suffi- 
cient time  to  train  and  harden  raw  recruits  before  forwarding  them  to  the 
front.  If  we  should  have  enough  more  to  give  us  some  power  of  expansion,  we 
would  be  able  to  reduce  the  per  capita  cost  of  our  peace  establishment  to  a 
minimum  without  loss  of  war  efficiency. 

4.  PROPOSED  PLAN  FOB  A  REGULAR  ARMY  RESERVE. 

In  adopting  a  new  policy  in  our  Army  it  is  important  that  present  conditions 
should  not  be  disturbed  more  violently  than  necessary.  The  present  term  of 
enlistment  is  three  years  and  our  men  are  accustomed  to  enlisting  for  that 
period  of  active  service.  It  is  therefore  believed  that  in  adopting  a  reserve 
system  the  normal  period  with  the  colors  should  be  taken  as  three  years.  It  is 
also  important  that  the  enlistment  contract  should  be  definite  in  so  far  as  it 


32  ORGANIZATION    OF   THE   LAND   FORCES. 

affects  the  obligations  assumed  by  the  recruit.  The  important  thing  is  to  take 
a  step  toward  the  new  policy,  leaving  its  perfection  to  the  experience  of  the 
future. 

It  is  therefore  recommended  that  the  enlistment  contract  be  for  6  years,  with 
the  understanding  that  the  first  three  years  are  to  be  served  with  the  colors 
and  that  during  the  last  3  years  the  man  shall  be  furloughed  to  a  reserve, 
where  he  shall  be  subject  to  duty  in  time  of  war  only.  It  should  be  further 
understood  that  men  so  furloughed  should  not  be  included  in  the  authorized 
peace  strength  of  the  Army. 

But  while  the  definite  agreement  is  to  be  for  three  years  with  the  colors  and 
3  with  the  reserve,  the  Government  should  have  the  option  of  modifying 
these  periods  in  its  discretion  and  upon  the  application  of  the  man.  The  man 
should  have  the  privilege  of  applying  to  go  to  the  reserve  before  the  expiration 
of  three  years,  the  granting  of  the  privilege  to  be  at  the  option  of  the  Govern- 
ment. So  far  as  the  man  is  concerned,  this  is  a  privilege  but  not  a  right.  The 
man  should  also  have  the  privilege  of  applying  to  remain  with  the  colors  for 
more  than  three  years,  at  the  discretion  of  the  Government.  This  is  also  a 
privilege  and  not  a  right.  The  right  to  go  to  the  reserve  at  the  end  of  three 
years  is  absolute,  but  the  privilege  of  going  at  any  other  time  or  of  remaining 
longer  is  to  be  at  the  option  of  the  Government.  If  a  man  of  good  character 
desires  to  go  to  the  reserve  at  the  end  of  one  year,  if  he  has  sufficient  training 
to  be  a  good  reservist,  and  if  recruiting  conditions  are  favorable  for  replacing 
liim  by  a  new  man,  it  is  undoubtedly  to  the  interest  of  the  Government  to  pass 
him  to  the  reserve.  . 

On  the  other  hand,  if  a  man  desires  to  remain  longer  than  three  years  with 
the  colors,  it  may  be  to  the  public  interest  to  grant  his  request,  especially  if 
at  the  time  considered  there  is  difficulty  in  obtaining  recruits.  This  system  will 
give  great  flexibility  without  sacrificing  definiteness  in  the  recruiting  contract. 
Practically  under  any  system  the  number  of  men  that  may  be  passed  to  the 
reserve  before  the  expiration  of  the  three-year  period  will  depend  upon  whether 
their  vacancies  can  be  filled  by  new  recruits,  for  the  peace  strength  must  be 
maintained.  If  only  a  few  men  desire  to  enlist,  it  will  only  be  practicable  to 
send  a  few  to  the  reserve  before  their  regular  term.  If  a  large  number  desire 
to  enlist,  it  will  be  practicable,  at  that  time,  to  send  the  maximum  number  to 
the  reserve,  and  it  will  always  be  in  the  public  interest  to  send  as  many  to  the 
reserve  as  may  be  done  without  loss  of  the  necessary  peace  strength.  The  ideal 
solution  would  be  obtained  if  recruiting  conditions  should  permit  the  adoption 
of  the  following  policy  : 

1.  No  extension  of  the  color  period  or  reenlistment  except  for  the  noncommis- 
sioned officers,  who  must  form  part  of  the  permanent  machine  for  training 
purposes,  with  enough  selected  privates  to  maintain  the  corps  of  noncommis- 
sioned officers. 

2.  Reduction  of  the  color  period  for  all  sufficiently  trained  men  who  apply  to 
pass  to  the  reserve  before  the  expiration  of  the  contract  period  of  three  years. 

The  actual  conditions  can  be  met  by  a  definite  contract  of  three  years  with 
the  colors  and  three  years  writh  the  reserve,  with  discretion  in  the  President 
to  prescribe  regulations  for  the  reduction  or  extension  of  the  contract  color 
period  in  order  to  meet  the  special  requirements  of  the  several  arms  of  the 
service. 

The  President  should  also  have  the  power,  when  funds  for  the  purpose  have 
been  appropriated  by  Congress,  to  order  reservists  to  military  posts  or  camps 
for  target  practice  or  other  instruction  for  not  to  exceed  10  days  in  any  one 
year. 


ORGANIZATION    OF   THE   LAND   FORCES.  33 

5.  THE  RELATION  OF  THE  RESERVE  SYSTEM  TO  FOREIGN  SERVICE. 

The  proposed  system  will  also  meet  the  special  circumstances  of  home  service 
or  foreign  service.  No  new  or  special  enlistment  contract  will  be  necessary, 
but  as  the  Government  interest  is  different  in  the  two  cases,  there  would  simply 
be  a  difference  in  governmental  policy.  When  a  man  enlists  for  service  In  the 
Philippines  be  would  be  held  strictly  to  three  years'  color  service.  It  would 
not  be  to  the  public  interest  in  this  case  to  pass  him  to  the  reserve  before  the 
full  term  of  his  contract  has  expired,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  in  this  case  it 
would  be  to  the  public  interest  to  permit  him  to  extend  his  contract  to  the  full 
6  years  if  he  applied  to  do  so.  In  other  words,  a  short  color  service  and  a 
long  reserve  service  is  desirable  at  home,  because  the  home  army  must  have 
power  of  expansion ;  and  long  color  service  and  a  short  reserve  service  is  de- 
sirable in  the  foreign  garrisons,  because  they  do  not  have  power  of  expansion. 
Either  condition  is  met  by  the  flexible  reserve  system  proposed.  But  while, 
as  a  general  rule,  it  would  not  be  desirable  to  shorten  the  period  of  color 
service  in  the  foreign  garrisons,  it  would  probably  be  very  desirable  to  do  so 
in  the  case  of  those  reservists  who  desire  to  settle  in  the  foreign  possession. 
If  a  soldier  in  Oahu  should  assume  the  reserve  status  in  Oahu,  is  would  be  most 
decidedly  to  the  public  interest  to  encourage  him  to  live  there,  and  replace  him 
by  another  recruit.  This  is  true  because  in  the  event  of  war  every  former  sol- 
dier residing  in  Oahu  will  positively  increase  our  war  power  in  that  island. 

6.  UNORGANIZED  RESERVES. 

There  are  two  aspects  of  the  reserve  problem.  In  order  to  have  reserves  we 
must  have  reserve  material,  and  we  must  also  provide  some  means  of  utilizing 
this  material.  Under  present  conditions  the  soldiers  who  pass  into  civil  life 
are  military  reserves.  No  means  are  provided  for  utilizing  them,  but  the  fact 
that  they  exist  in  civil  life  is  nevertheless  a  positive  military  asset.  It  is, 
therefo're,  evident  that  any  policy  which  tends  to  reduce  the  total  number  of 
these  men  is  prejudicial  to  our  interest,  whether  we  have  an  organized  reserve 
system  or  not.  For  this  reason  a  long  enlistment  period  is  contrary  to  the 
national  military  interest.  An  officer  who  has  considered  the  enlistment 
question  purely  from  the  standpoint  of  his  own  company  or  regiment  has  only 
examined  one  phase,  and  a  very  minor  one,  of  the  question.  So  long  as  he 
approaches  it  from  this  point  of  view  he  naturally  prefers  a  long  enlistment 
and  as  many  reenlistments  as  possible.  This  requires  the  minimum  number 
of  new  recruits  to  train,  and  gives  him  a  company  which  requires  a  minimum 
of  effort  on  the  part  of  the  officer.  But  for  lack  of  trained  men  to  supply 
wastage  such  a  company  will  rapidly  deteriorate  in  war.  It  is  not  believed 
that  any  officer  who  has  studied  the  question  of  enlistment  from  the  standpoint 
of  broad  national  interest  will  advocate  a  long  enlistment  without  a  reserve 
feature. 

It  has  been  urged  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  organize  a  Regular  Army  re- 
serve, because  discharged  soldiers  can  be  used  to  best  advantage  in  the  National 
Guard  or  in  Volunteers.  But  such  use  of  them  does  not  meet  the  real  problem 
of  maintaining  losses  in  the  Regular  Army,  and  this  is  the  true  function  of 
such  men.  As  we  maintain  a  Regular  Army  and  expect  to  use  it  in  war  we 
must  provide  somfe  means  of  keeping  it  at  effective  strength  in  war.  We  not 
only  desire  to  use  these  men  in  war,  but  we-  should  be  able  to  control  and  pre- 
determine the  place  where  they  are  to  be  used.  They  have  been  trained  by  the 
Regular  Army,  they  are  accustomed  to  Regular  Army  service,  and  in  most  cases 
50043°— 12 3 


34  ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND   FOECES. 

they  are  not  attracted  to  the  National  Guard.  They  should  be  available  for 
immediate  absorption  in  the  strategic  force  with  which  we  desire  to  secure  the 
initiative  in  war. 

7.  STATUS  OF  THE  RESERVIST. 

The  law  should  give  the  reserve  soldier  a  status  of  furlough.  He  should  be 
regarded  as  a  regular  soldier,  who,  after  a  period  of  training,  is  released  extvp1 
for  war  purposes.  He  should  be  required  to  report  his  address  from  time  to 
time,  and  should  be  kept  informed  as  to  the  place  where  he  is  to  report  upon 
mobilization.  At  the  time  of  these  stated  reports  he  should  receive  a  nominal 
pay,  but  the  hold  of  the  Government  upon  him  should  be  based  upon  the 
furlough  status  rather  than  upon  the  money  consideration.  If  he  fails  to 
comply  with  the  conditions  of  the  furlough  status,  the  furlough  should  be  revoked 
and  he  should  be  returned  to  the  ordinary  conditions  of  military  service.  It 
has  been  suggested  that  keeping  track  of  reservists  would  involve  great  difficul- 
ties. There  would  no  doubt  be  practical  questions  to  solve,  but  none  of  the  diffi- 
culties would  seem  to  be  insuperable.  It  is  expected  that  these  difficulties  will 
be  reduced  in  the  future.  With  permanent  regiments  on  foreign  service,  the 
regiments  at  home  will  be  localized,  and  where  regiments  are  stationed  in  popu- 
lous districts,  there  is  no  reason  why  the  reservists  in  such  districts  should  not 
be  assigned  directly  to  regiments.  In  this  way  such  organizations  will  keep  in 
touch  with  their  own  reservists.  If  a  reserve  system  is  authorized,  the  means 
of  carrying  it  into  effect  should  be  made  as  flexible  as  possible  and  left  to  the 
discretion  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

8.  SPECIAL  RESERVES. 

The  main  function  of  the  Regular  Army  reserve  is  to  raise  the  Regular  Army 
to  war  strength  and  to  maintain  its  war  strength  until  raw  recruits  can  be 
prepared  for  service  at  the  front.  Ordinarily,  it  should  not  be  called  out. except 
when  war  is  imminent,  but  it  would  be  a  great  advantage  if  the  President  could 
be  given  the  power  to  call  out  sufficient  reserves  at  any  time  to  raise  a  small 
expeditionary  force  to  war  strength. 

While  the  reserves  should  normally  contain  only  those  men  who  are  com- 
pleting their  Regular  Army  service,  provision  should  be  made  for  the  voluntary 
reenlistment  of  reservists  for  another  stated  period,  provided  such  volunteers 
have  the  necessary  physical  qualifications  and  training — regulations  governing 
such  reenlistments  to  be  determined  by  the  Secretary  of  War. 

There  should  also  be  provisions  for  enlistment  in  the  reserve  of  soldiers  who 
may  have  been  discharged  from  the  Army  before  the  inauguration  of  the  reserve 
system.  It  is  believed  that  a  considerable  number  of  these  men  would  assume 
the  war  obligation  if  there  were  some  definite  means  of  offering  their  services. 
Such  enlistments,  of  course,  should  be  subject  to  medical  examination  and  a 
scrutiny  of  the  record  of  the  particular  man. 

9.  RESERVE  OFFICERS. 

The  reserve  system  outlined  above  is  designed  to  maintain  the  effective  and 
economical  enlisted  strength,  but  it  makes  no  provision  for  the  increased  num- 
ber of  officers  that  will  become  necessary  in  war.  In  modern  military  opera- 
tions the  loss  of  officers  is  fully  as  great  as  the  loss  of  enlisted  men,  and  fur- 
ther, under  our  system  it  will  become  necessary  to  detach  officers  from  the  regu- 
lar establishment  for  staff  duty  and  for  employment  with  the  citizen  soldiery. 
The  successful  maintenance  of  large  companies  requires  the  presence  of  the  full 


ORGANIZATION    OF    THE   LAND   FORCES.  35 

quota  of  officers  and  the  whole  machine  breaks  down  if  suitable  men  are  not 
forthcoming. 

The  lack  of  some  provision  of  this  kind  is  one  of  the  greatest  defects  in  our, 
military  system.  This  defect  has  been  recognized  to  a  certain  extent  in  the 
amended  militia  law,  which  provides  that  individuals  who  pass  certain  examina- 
tions may  be  placed  on  a  list  of  persons  available  for  appointment  as  volunteer 
officers  in  war.  In  the  volunteer  bill  (S.  2518)  now  pending  in  the  Senate  it 
is  provided  that  when  officers  are  detached  from  the  Regular  Army  on  duty 
with  the  Volunteers  their  vacancies  may  be  filled  by  the  assignment  of  a 
corresponding  number  of  Volunteer  officers  to  the  regular  organizations.  But 
neither  of  these  provisions  meets  the  specific  requirement  of  providing  a 
reserve  of  junior  officers  for  the  organizations  in  the  Regular  Army.  And 
yet  there  is  an  abundance  of  such  material  which  can  easily  be  made  available. 
We  maintain  military  instructors  at  a  great  many  schools  and  colleges  in  the 
country  on  the  theory  that  such  military  training  will  become  a  military  asset 
in  war,  and  yet  the  young  men  who  graduate  at  such  institutions  pass  out 
into  civil  life  without  any  definite  place  for  them  in  our  military  establishment. 
They  may  in  some  cases  go  into  the  National  Guard,  some  of  them  may  enter 
the  regular  service,  and  some  of  them,  no  doubt,  may  find  a  place  in  the  volun- 
teer armies  of  the  future,  but  the  prospect  of  employing  them  is  vague  and 
contingent  upon  a  great  variety  of  uncertain  conditions. 

It  is  believed  that  it  would  be  in  the  interest  of  sound  policy  to  utilize  young 
men  of  this  type  as  reserve  lieutenants  in  the  Regular  Army.  Upon  their 
graduation  opportunities  could  be  given  them  to  serve  with  regular  organiza- 
tions at  camps  of  instruction  or  maneuvers.  After  such  probationary  service, 
if  found  to  be  properly  qualified,  they  could  be  commissioned  for  a  limited 
number  of  years  under  an  obligation  to  serve  in  war.  This  class  of  reserve 
officers  would  be  recruited  mainly  from  the  schools  and  colleges,  but  the 
appointments  should  be  open  to  other  suitable  classes,  such  as  former  mem- 
bers of  the  Regular  Army,  Volunteers,  and  National  Guard  who  comply  with 
proper  conditions  to  be  determined  by  the  Secretary  of  War.  These  reserve 
lieutenants  would  be  analogous  to  the  officers  of  the  Medical  Reserve  Corps  of 
the  Army.  They  should  be  definitely  commissioned,  assigned  to  an  arm,  and 
authorized  to  wear  the  uniform  of  that  arm.  Their  names  should  be  carried 
in  the  Army  Register,  and  under  certain  conditions  they  should  be  attached 
to  definite  organizations  of  the  Regular  Army,  serving  in  the  neighborhood  of 
their  homes.  They  should  receive  no  pay  except  when  called  into  the  service, 
but  should  have  the  privilege  of  serving  at  maneuvers  and  of  volunteering  as 
members  of  expeditionary  forces.  They  should  also  be  regarded  as  a  preferred 
class  from  which  civilian  appointments  in  the  Regular  Army  should  be  made. 
The  value  of  such  a  force  in  war  would  be  incalculable.  By  having  a  full 
quota  of  officers  it  would  always  be  possible  to  maintain  the  maximum  eco- 
nomical strength  of  the  Regular  Army.  They  would  replace  losses  due  to  the 
ordinary  casualties  in  war  and  would  enable  the  Regular  Army  to  spare  more 
officers  for  employment  in  the  greater  war  force.  On  the  outbreak  of  war  the 
reserve  lieutenants  should  mobilize  with  the  reserves  and  should  proceed  to 
the  front  as  the  reserves  are  called  to  the  front.  At  the  depots  they  could 
assist  in  recruiting  and  in  the  training  of  recruits  and  would  perform  many 
functions  which  must  be  left  to  chance  under  our  present  system.  It  is  also 
believed  that  such  reserve  commissions  would  be  appreciated  as  an  honor  by 
the  best  type  of  young  men  and  that  it  would  be  no  more  than  a  proper  reward 
to  them  for  giving  a  part  of  their  college  training  to  preparation  for  military 
service  in  war. 


36  ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND   FORCES. 

There  are  now  over  300  lieutenants  of  the  Army  on  detached  service.  If  the 
law  authorized  the  President  to  put  on  active  duty  not  to  exceed  300  of  these 
'reserve  officers  to  fill  the  places  of  lieutenants  necessarily  absent  on  detached 
service  it  would  enable  these  reserve  officers  to  obtain  practical  instruction  and 
it  would  facilitate  the  administration  of  the  organizations  concerned. 

Attention  is  invited  to  the  availability  of  the  Military  Academy  at  West  Point 
as  a  source  of  supply  of  reserve  officers  and  to  the  wisdom  of  making  this  source 
available.  The  Academy  as  now  conducted  'handles  between  six  and  seven 
hundred  cadets.  Its  capacity  for  efficient  training  is  much  more  than  that 
number  and,  like  any  investment,  the  institution  is  not  making  the  returns  it 
should  to  the  country  unless  its  output  is  the  maximum  possible.  Existing  or 
probable  vacancies  in  the  Regular  Army  should  not  be  considered  in  this  con- 
nection. Existing  vacancies  could  be  given  to  graduates  under  an  equitable 
plan,  while  the  remaining  graduates  could  return  to  their  homes  under  an 
obligation  to  serve  in  the  Regular  Army,  National  Guard,  or  Volunteers.  They 
would  have  the  foundation  of  an  education  for  any  walk  in  life.  In  a  few  years 
the  country  would  have  in  these  graduates  a  corps  of  reserve  officers  with 
uniform  training  and  uniform  ideas  regarding  efficiency  and  duty. 

10.  RESERVES  FOR  THE  CITIZEN  SOLDIERY. 

When  the  citizen  soldiery  is  called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States,  it, 
too,  will  encounter  influences  that  will  tend  to  reduce  its  strength.  It  should 
have  sufficient  reserves  to  maintain  full  strength  until  raw  recruits  can  be  pre- 
pared for  the  front,  and  unless  its  organizations  are  maintained  at  full  strength 
in  time  of  peace,  it  should  have  enough  other  reservists  to  cover  the  expansion 
upon  mobilization.  Under  present  law,  however,  the  Organized  Militia  bases 
its  organization  upon  that  of  the  Regular  Army,  and  until  a  reserve  system  is 
provided  for  the  Regular  Army,  arguments  for  a  National  Guard  reserve  would 
not  be  convincing  or  effective. 

Under  present  conditions  the  citizen  soldiery  will  mobilize  at  greatly  reduced 
enlisted  strength.  It  must  go  to  the  front  with  an  expensive  excess  of  officers 
in  proportion  to  its  effective  strength,  or  its  employment  must  be  deferred  until 
it  can  absorb  a  great  mass  of  untrained  and  undisciplined  material.  In  Chapter 
IX  of  this  report  the  advantages  of  a  definite  peace  organization  for  the  citizen 
soldiery  will  be  presented.  Among  the  objects  to  be  sought  through  such  an 
organization  will  be  the  provision  of  a  uniform  peace  strength  with  arrange- 
ments for  war  expansion  and  for  the  replacement  of  losses  during  the  initial 
stages  of  war.  Through  the  lack  of  such  arrangements  in  the  past  our  armies 
of  citizen  soldiery  have  been  maintained  at  maximum  cost  and  minimum 
effectiveness. 

11.  PROLONGATION  OF  THE  TERM  OF  SERVICE  IN  TIME  OF  EMERGENCY. 

Under  present  laws,  if  war  is  declared,  it  is  possible  for  many  men  to  demand 
their  discharges  for  expiration  of  term  or  service  in  the  first  crisis  of  war  and 
before  they  can  give  the  Government  any  real  return  for  the  cost  of  their  train- 
ing. Some  nations  meet  this  contingency  by  reserving  the  right  to  retain 
soldiers  in  times  of  emergency  for  a  limited  period  beyond  their  ordinary  term 
of  service.  While  Great  Britain  has  the  same  system  of  voluntary  service  as 
our  own,  she  reserves  the  right  to  "  prolong  "  the  service  of  enlisted  men  for  a 
limited  period  upon  the  imminence  of  war,  this  being  a  condition  inserted  in  the 
enlistment  contract.  It  is  believed  that  such  a  provision  should  be  embodied  in 
our  military  law  and  that  it  should  be  made  applicable  to  the  Regular  Army 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND  FORCES.  37 

and  to  the  citizen  soldiery.  After  training  a  man  at.  great  expense  in  time  of 
peace,  the  Government  should  have  the  right  to  hold  him  in  time  of  emergency, 
at  least  until  a  raw  recruit  can  be  trained  to  replace  him. 

12.  THE  RELATION  OF  LOCALIZATION  TO  THE  RESERVE  PROBLEM  AND  TO 

RECRUITMENT. 

It  has  been  indicated  that  the  establishment  of  permanent  foreign  garrisons 
will  permit  localization  of  the  units  of  the  Regular  Army  at  home.  This  will 
result  in  great  economies  of  transportation  and  will  lead  to  the  development  of 
many  reforms  which  are  almost  impracticable  so  long  as  the  organizations  of 
the  Army  are  shifted  from  place  to  place.  The  localization  of  the  Army  at 
home  will  facilitate  the  development  of  a  reserve  system,  for  where  regiments 
are  stationed  in  the  populous  parts  of  the  country  they  will  be  able,  in  many 
cases,  to  keep  in  touch  directly  with  their  reserves,  and  also  to  obtain  their 
recruits  locally.  The  present  recruiting  system  is  based  on  recruiting  for  a 
shifting  army.  The  service  has  been  conducted  with  great  ability  and  meets 
actual  conditions,  but  it  is  wasteful  and  expensive  as  compared  with  a  system 
of  local  recruiting  for  a  localized  army.  Under  present  conditions  the  recruit- 
ing service  comprises  a  total  enlisted  strength  of  2,200  men.  In  addition 
there  are  not  to  exceed  4,800  recruits  at  the  depots.  These  men  are  not 
immediately  available  as  part  of  organized  tactical  units  and  constitute  an 
element  of  waste  in  the  military  establishment.  Wherever  a  regiment  is  so 
stationed  that  it  can  secure  its  own  recruits  in  its  own  locality  it  is  obvious 
that  the  enlisted  strength  of  the  recruiting  service  can  be  correspondingly  re- 
duced. If  all  of  the  regiments  of  the  Army  were  able  to  obtain  their  recruits 
locally,  it  is  obvious  that  all  of  these  men  could  be  restored  to  the  effective 
strength  of  the  Army.  It  is  not  contended  that  this  reform  can  or  should 
be  attempted  immediately,  but  as  the  Army  becomes  localized,  it  should  be 
gradually  accomplished.  %Under  present  conditions  men  are  discharged  at  all 
periods  of  the  year,  and  small  detachments  of  recruits  are  received  through- 
out the  year.  Under  these  conditions  there  can  be  no  definite  period  of  recruit 
training.  Under  ideal  conditions,  with  a  reserve  system  and  localized  recruit- 
ing, it  would  be  possible  for  a  regiment  to  pass  all  of  its  reservists  to  the  re- 
serve about  the  1st  of  November,  and  then  devote  itself  for  a  few  weeks  to 
the  problem  of  obtaining  new  recruits.  This  would  make  the  winter  a  period 
of  recruiting  and  recruit  training,  and  would  make  it  possible  to  devote  all 
of  the  summer  and  fall  to  higher  milkary  training  without  the  evils  of  a  con- 
tinual influx  of  recruits.  Practically,  it  may  be  impossible  to  recruit  the  whole 
Army  in  this  way,  but  every  step  toward  it  will  tend  to  increase  the  efficiency 
of  the  Army,  and  to*  diminish  the  large  detachments  of  noneffectives,  which, 
under  present  conditions,  must  be  maintained  in  order  to  keep  up  the  strength 
of  the  Army. 

VI. 
THE  TACTICAL  ORGANIZATION  OF  MOBILE  TROOPS. 

The  division  is  the  fundamental  army  unit  in  which  the  several  arms  are 
combined  for  joint  action  in  the  field.  It  is  essentially  a  small  army  complete 
in  itself  and  capable  of  independent  action.  Larger  forces,  such  as  field  armies, 
are  simply  aggregations  of  two  or  more  divisions,  with  such  additional  auxilia- 
ries as  may  be  required  for  the  particular  terrain  and  mission. 


38  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  LAND  FORCES. 

The  details  of  division  organization  are  different  in  different  countries,  but 
the  essential  idea  is  that  a  division  is  a  force  of  Infantry  provided  with  a  proper 
proportion  of  field  artillery  and  cavalry  and  supported  by  certain  special  units 
which  are  concerned  with  the  special  problems  of  field  engineering,  communica- 
tion, transportation,  supply,  and  sanitation. 

1.  INFANTRY. 

Under  our  system  the  company  of  Infantry  at  war  strength  should  comprise 
the  maximum  number  of  trained  riflemen  that  can  be  handled  effectively  in 
action  by  three  officers.  This  number  appears  to  be  about  128  men,  or  1C 
squads  of  8  men  each.  As  there  will  always  be  losses  from  casualties,  the 
.total  strength  will  not  be  available  on  the  firing  line,  and  for  this  reason  S  addi- 
tional riflemen  should  be  added  to  the  war  strength  as  a  reasonable  factor  of 
safety.  In  order  to  give  the  desired  strength  the  following  is  recommended  as 
the  war  organization  of  the  infantry  company:  1  captain,  1  first  lieutenant, 
1  second  lieutenant,  1  first  sergeant,  1  quartermaster  sergeant,  6  sergeants, 
1C  corporals,  3  cooks,  1  artificer,  2  musicians,  120  privates;  total  commissioned, 
3;  total  enlisted,  150. 

The  peace  strength  of  the  company  of  Infantry  is  governed  by  several  con- 
siderations : 

1.  It  is  desirable  for  fiscal  reasons  to  reduce  the  peace  strength  to  a.  mini- 
mum.    But  such  reductions  of  strength  are  fatal  to  war  efficiency  unless  means 
are  provided  for  expansion  without  the  absorption  of  raw  recruits.     If  the  war 
expansion  is  to  be  by  raw  recruits,  the  war  company  will  not  be  a  trained 
company,  and  it  will  therefore  be  impracticable  for  three  officers  to  control 
150  men  effectively. 

2.  Even  if  reserves  are  available,  the  peace  strength  of  the  company  should 
be  sufficient  for  purposes  of  instruction.     The  men  who   serve  in   the  Army 
must  become  trained  soldiers,  and  full  Infantry  training  is  not  practicable  if 
the  peace  strength  be  reduced  too  far.     It  is  beliefed  that  for  purposes  of 
instruction  the  peace  strength  of  the  Infantry  company  should  not  be  reduced 
below  100  enlisted  men. 

3.  If  trained  reserves  are  not  available,  at  least  one  division  of  the  Regular 
Army  should  be  maintained  at  war  strength  in  order  to  provide  an  expedi- 
tionary force  for  sudden  emergencies. 

THE    INFANTRY    BATTALION. 

The  war  strength  of  the  Infantry  battalion  should  be  as  follows:  1  major, 
1  lieutenant  (adjutant),  1  sergeant  major,  4  companies,  2  ammunition  wagons; 
total  commissioned  officers,  14;  total  enlisted,  601. 

HEADQUARTERS    COMPANY. 

In  order  to  avoid  unnecessary  detachments  from  the  companies  and  to  pro- 
vide a  definite  organization  for  machine  guns,  scouts,  and  the  regimental  wagon 
train,  a  headquarters  company  is  recommended  for  each  regiment  of  Infantry, 
as  follows:  1  captain,  1  first  lieutenant,  1  second  lieutenant,  1  first  sergeant, 
1  quartermaster  sergeant,  2  cooks,  2  musicians,  1  mechanic,  1  horseshoer ;  total 
enlisted,  8. 

Firjit  section;  machine-gun  detachment. — 4  sergeants,  8  corporals,  60  privates: 
total  enlisted,  81. 

Second  section;  scon  In  and  orderlies. — 1  sergeant,  2  corporals.  21  privates; 
total  enlisted  men,  24. 


ORGANIZATION    OF   THE   LAND   FORCES. 


39 


Third  section;  transportation  section. — 1  sergeant,  25  privates;  total  en- 
listed men,  26.1 

Total  commissioned,  headquarters  company,  3;  total  enlisted,  139. 

The  three  officers  of  the  headquarters  company  may  be  provided  without 
increasing  the  present  commissioned  strength  of  the  regiment.  As  will  be  seen 
in  the  organization  of  the  battalion  and  regimental  staffs,  three  officers  are 
released  from  staff  duty.  This  gives  a  captain  and  two  lieutenants  for  the 
headquarters  company. 

THE    REGIMENTAL    BAND. 

The  present  authorized  strength  of  the  band  is  28  enlisted.  No  change  is 
recommended.  • 

THE   INFANTRY  REGIMENT. 

With  the  changes  above  proposed  the  war  strength  of  the  Infantry  regiment 
would  be  as  follows: 


Commis- 
sioned. 

Enlisted. 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1  assistant  supply  officer  (lieutenant)                                                      

1 

1 

1 

2 

2 

1  band                                   

28 

1  headquarters  company                                             

3 

139 

42 

1,803 

Total                                                                                        

51 

1,975 

The  above  table  gives  the  approximate  organization  of  the  infantry  regiment. 
The  details  of  organization  will  be  definitely  and  precisely  determined  in  the 
experimental  infjintry  regiment  to  be  assembled  in  the  Central  Division  during 
the  present  summer. 

2.  THE  INFANTRY  BRIGADE  AND  THE  DIVISION. 

In  the  Field  Service  Regulations  the  Infantry  division  comprises  three 
brigades  of  three  regiments  each.  The  total  Infantry  strength  in  this  division 
is  13,500  (1,500  enlisted  por  regiment),  and  the  total  number  of  effective  rifle- 
men is  10,890.  Nine  regiments  of  the  size  proposed  in  this  report  will  give  a 
total  enlisted  strength  of  17,775  and  15,084  effective  riflemen.  As  the  larger 
regiment  is  justified  on  grounds  of  economy,  the  practical  question  arises  as 
to  whether  we  should  retain  nine  regiments  in  the  division  or  propose  a  new 
division  organization.  A  division  of  two  brigades  of  three  regiments  each  would 
give  a  total  Infantry  strength  of  11,850,  or  10,056  effective  rifles.  But  this 
organization  would  sncrifice  tactical,  advantages  inherent  in  the  three  brigades. 
In  the  attack  of  the  division  there  are  generally  three  subdivisions — the 
frontal  attack,  the  enveloping  attack,  and  the  reserve.  In  a  three-brigade 
division  there  is  a  general  officer  for  each  subdivision,  even  though  the  forces 
assigned  to  the  several  tasks  are  not  kept  equal. 


1  The  relation  of  those  men  to  such  service  corps  as  may  be  established  in  the  future 
requires  careful  consideration. 


40  ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND  FORCES. 

Another  consideration  which  determines  the  strength  of  the  division  is  the 
road  space.  In  Europe,  where  the  roads  are  excellent,  an  army  corps  of  two 
divisions,  each  comprising  12,000  infantry,  is  found  to  be  the  maximum  force 
that  can  deploy  from  column  in  time  to  bring  all  of  its  troops  into  battle  on 
the  same  day.  The  same  corps  could  not  complete  its  deployment  from  a  single 
road  in  the  average  American  terrain  until  it  was  too  late  for  the  effective 
employment  of  a  part  of  the  force.  The  road  space  of  the  Field  Service  Regula- 
tions division  is  so  great  that  two  divisions  could  not  effectively  deploy  from  the 
same  road  in  this  manner;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  if  one  such  division  is 
assigned  to  one  road,  the  road  capacity  is  not  fully  utilized.  But  if  we  retain 
the  nine-regiment  division  and  increase  the  regimental  strength  from  1,500  men 
to  1,975,  we  increase  the  number  of  effective  rifles  by  38  per  cent  without  in- 
creasing the  road  space  by  more  than  16  per  cent*  We,  therefore,  find  that  a 
division  of  three  brigades  of  three  regiments  each,  with  1,975  enlisted  men  per 
regiment,  is  a  more  economical  organization  than  the  division  described  in 
the  Field  Service  Regulations,  and  is  better  adapted  to  American  terrains. 
The  proportions  of  Cavalry,  Field  Artillery,  and  special  troops  will  now  be 
considered  on  the  assumption  that  the  division  is  to  comprise  three  Infantry 
brigades  of  three  regiments  each,  and  that  each  regiment  is  to  have  an  enlisted 
strength  of  approximately  1,975. 

3.  CAVALRY. 

As  far  as  Cavalry  action  of  the  future  is  concerned,  the  organization  of  this 
arm  must  facilitate  (a)  quick  and  powerful  dismounted  fire  action  and  (1)) 
equally  quick  and  powerful  mounted  shock  action.  At  the  same  time  the  organi- 
zation must  be  so  flexible  that  it  will  permit  the  assignment  of  proper  units  as 
divisional  Cavalary — first,  to  meet  the  requirements  of  a  division  as  part  of  a 
higher  tactical  organization  and,  second,  with  a  division  or  smaller  unit  acting 
alone.  In  addition,  the  organization  must  be  adapted  to  the  formation  of 
Cavalry  brigades  and  divisions. 

The  amount  of  Cavalry  assigned  any  particular  command  will  depend  upon 
many  considerations,  such  as  the  nature  of  the  particular  mission,  the  character 
of  the  terrain,  and  the  composition  of  the  enemy's  forces. 

Of  the  Cavalry  so  assigned,  the  nature  of  the  operations  may  require  a  mini- 
mum number  of  units  as  divisional  Cavalry  and  a  maximum  number  as 
independent  Cavalry. 

Not  only  must  the  organization  of  the  Cavalry  regiment  be  so  flexible  as  to 
meet  all  these  requirements,  but  the  organization  decided  upon  must  possess  a 
high  degree  of  mobility,  and  must  be  adaptable  to  varying  tactical  situations. 

The  present  Cavalry  regiment  has  a  total  war  strength  of  approximately 
1,200  enlisted  men.  As  now  organized  it  is  so  flexible  that  it  can  be  formed  to 
meet  almost  any  particular  tactical  situation.  A  squadron  of  four  troops  can 
be  detached  and  the  remainder  will  form  an  appropriate  command  for  a  colonel. 
If  a  detachment  of  three  troops  is  all  that  is  required,  the  remaining  troops  can 
be  handled  as  three  squadrons  of  three  troops  each.  If  it  becomes  necessary 
for  the  regiment  to  operate  in  two  equal  parts  each  part  can  consist  of  six 
troops  organized  into  two  squadrons. 

The  same  number  of  troopers  might  be  organized  into  a  brigade  of  two  regi- 
ments, each  of  six  troops  of  100  men,  or  each  of  four  troops  of  150  men.  A 
regiment  of  three  squadrons  of  three  troops,  each  of  100  men,  and  with  a  depot 
troop,  has  also  been  proposed. 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE  LAND  FORCES.  41 

The  regiment  now  authorized  by  law  has  the  following  maximum  strength: 


Commis- 
sioned. 

Veteri- 
narian. 

Enlisted. 

Officers  (including  chaplain) 

51 

Veterinarians 

2 

Noncommissioned  staff  officers 

8 

Band  

28 

12  troops  (organized  as  3  squadrons)  

1,200 

Total 

51 

2 

1,236 

It  is  believed  that  the  President  should  be  authorized  to  add  an  additional 
or  headquarters  troop  analogous  to  that  proposed  for  the  Infantry  regiment 
and  officered  in  the  same  manner.  If  the  maximum  authorized  strength  of  the 
headquarters  troop  is  placed  as  that  of  the  Cavalry  troop  now  authorized,  its 
actual  strength  can  be  determined  by  service  requirements  as  determined  experi- 
mentally. The  headquarters  troop  should  comprise  a  demolition  section  in  lieu 
of  the  scout  section  of  the  infantry  headquarters  company. 

The  band  might  be  dispensed  with  and  a  trumpet  corps  organized  with  the 
trumpeters  of  the  troops. 

With  the  larger  regiment  and  the  road  space  required  for  it,  a  brigade  should 
normally  consist  of  two  regiments  and  a  division  of  three  such  brigades,  the 
proper  auxiliary  and  special  troops  being  added. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  there  has  been  much  discussion  throughout  the 
service  on  the  subject  of  the  organization  of  the  cavalry  regiment  it  is  recom- 
mended that  thorough  practical  experiments  be  undertaken  to  enable  the  Gen- 
eral Staff  to  try  out  and  decide  upon  the  organization  best  adapted  to  meet  the 
special  requirements  of  this  arm. 

Peace  strength  of  the  Cavalry. — The  permissible  peace  strength  of  Cavalry 
depends  on  the  means  of  expansion.  If  reserves  are  available  the  troops  may 
be  kept  at  the  minimum  peace  strength  consistent  with  proper  instruction.  If 
such  reserves  are  not  available  a  low  peace  strength  will  involve  a  low  war 
strength  or  serious  deterioration  in  the  early  stages  of  a  campaign.  On  the 
outbreak  of  war,  the  Cavalry  will  probably  be  used  in  initial  strategic  opera- 
tions, and  it  is  therefore  very  important  that  it  should  be  capable  of  full  activity 
without  delay,  from  the  very  outset. 

4.  FIELD  ARTILLERY. 

The  types  of  Field  Artillery  are  classified  as  "horse,"  "  light,"  "  mountain," 
and  "  heavy." 

Horse  batteries  are  armed  with  the  3-inch  gun. 

Light  batteries  are  armed  with  the  3-inch  gun  or  the  3.8-inch  howitzer. 

Mountain  batteries  are  armed  with  the  2.95  howitzer  (to  be  replaced  by  the 
3-inch  howitzer). 

Heavy  batteries  are  armed  with  the  4.7  howitzer,  the  4.7  gun,  or  the  6-inch 
howitzer. 

The  4.7-inch  howitzer,  drawn  by  8  horses,  has  very  considerable  mobility  and 
is  really  intermediate  between  the  light  and  heavy  calibers. 

Horse  batteries  are  assigned  for  service  with  the  Cavalry. 

Light  or  mountain  batteries  and  4.7-inch  howitzer  batteries  are  assigned  for 
service  with  Infantry  divisions. 

Heavy  batteries  (4.7-inch  gun  and  6-inch  howitzer)  are  assigned  as  Army 
Artillery. 


42 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND  FORCES. 


The  organization  of  regiments  must  vary  to  fit  the  requirements  of  the  par- 
ticular types  of  guns  or  howitzers  to  be  served.  Hence  legal  enactments  gov- 
erning the  organization  of  the  Field  Artillery  should  be  worded  so  as  to  fix  the 
maximum  allowable  establishment  and  leave  it  to  the  President  to  vary  the 
strength  of  regiments,  battalions,  and  batteries  to  meet  the  necessities  of 
service. 

The  proposed  maximum  strengths  of  regiments,  battalions,  and  batteries  at 
war  strength  are  shown  below.  The  numbers  of  officers,  noncommissioned 
officers,  mechanics,  trumpeters,  cooks,  and  privates  of  any  particular  unit  may, 
under  the  system  suggested  above,  be  varied  as  circumstances  require,  provided 
they  are  kept  below  the  maximum  allowed. 

FIELD    BATTERY.1 

1  captain,  3  lieutenants  ( first *or  second),  1  first  sergeant,  1  quartermaster 
sergeant,  1  stable  sergeant,  8  sergeants,  16  corporals,  1  chief  mechanic,  7 
mechanics,  3  trumpeters,  3  cooks,  149  privates ;  total  commissioned,  4 ;  total 
enlisted,  190. 

Field  Artillery  battalion.2 


Commis- 
sioned. 

Enlisted. 

Major                                                         

1 

1 

Lieutenant  (supply  officer)  

1 

1 

Quartermaster  sergeant  

Scouts  and  signal  detail,  mounted  orderlies  and  wagoner: 
Corporals     ...          

4 

Privates                                           

10 

1 

Batteries                                

12 

570 

Total  '.  

15 

587 

l-'ict<J  Arli/lcri/  rc</i»icnl.:' 


Commis- 
sioned. 

Veteri- 
narians. 

Enlisted. 

Colonel                                                           

1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 

Captain  (adjutant)                              

Captain  (supply  ollicer) 

Captain  (ordnance  officer)  

2 

Sergeant  major                                      

1 
1 
1 
2 
1 

2 
2 
12 
3 
29 
1,761 

Commissary  sergeant        .                

Scouts  and  signal  detail,  mounted  orderlies  and  wagoner: 
Sergeants                  

Corporals                                            

Privates 

Mechanics                            

Band 

Battalions  

45 

Total         

51 

2 

1,815 

1  The  strength  hero  given  is  the  maximum  and  is  required  for  heavy  batteries  only.     The 
strength  for  batteries  of  all  other  types  will  be  less  than  the  maximum  strength. 

2  The  enlisted  strengths  given  are  for  battalions  and  regiments  of  heavy  field  artillery. 
The  strengths  for  other  types  will  be  less  than  the  maximum  and  will  be  based  on  actual 
requirements. 

3  The  enlisted  strengths  given  are  for  battalions  and  regiments  of  heavy  field  artillery. 
The  strengths  for  other  types  will  be  less  than  the  maximum  and  will  be  based  on  actual 
requirements. 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND  FORCES.  43 

The  proposed  normal  assignment  of  Field  Artillery  to  units  of  the  other  arms 
is  as  follows : 
For  each  division  : 1 
Brigade — 

1  regiment  of  3  battalions — 

1  battalion  of  3  batteries  of  four  3-inch  guns 12 

1  battalion  of  3  batteries  of  four  3-inch  guns 12 

1  battalion  of  2  batteries  of  four  3.8-inch  howitzers 8 

1  regiment  of  3  .battalions — 

1  battalion  of  3  batteries  of  four  3-inch  guns 12 

1  battalion  of  3  batteries  of  four  3-inch  guns 12 

1  battalion  of  2  batteries  of  four  4.7-inch  howitzers 8 

1  ammunition  column  of  2  battalions. 

For  each  field  army  in  addition  to  the  divisional  artillery : 
1  regiment  of  2  battalions — 

1  battalion  of  2  batteries  of  four  4.7-inch  guns 8 

1  battalion  of  2  batteries  of  four  6-inch  howitzers 8 

1  ammunition  column  of  1  battalion. 
For  each  Cavalry  division : 

1  regiment  of  3  battalions  of  2  batteries  of  4  guns  each 24 

1  ammunition  column  of  1  battalion. 

The  approximate  war  strengths  proposed  for  each  of  the  regiments  above 
referred  to  are : 

Divisional  artillery,  1  regiment,  47  officers2  and  1,438  men;  1  regiment  47 2 
officers  and  1,480  men. 

Army  Artillery,  1  regiment,  28 2  officers  and  854  men. 
Horse  Artillery,  1  regiment,  39  2  officers  and  1,1GO  men. 

Thus  the  proposed  maximum  legal  strength  is  not  closely  approached  in  any 
case.  On  the  other  hand,  the  maximum  strength  of  batteries  is  very  closely 
approached  in  the  case  of  Heavy  Artillery.  As  the  exact  combinations  of  bat- 
teries into  battalions  and  regiments  which  it  may  be  necessary  to  make  in  the 
future  can  not  be  foreseen  the  law  should  show  merely  the  superior  limit  and 
leave  to  the  Executive  the  power  to  utilize  the  available  strength  in  the  most 
useful  way. 

5.  AMMUNITION  SERVICE. 

The  personnel  of  this  service  is  charged  with  receiving  ammunition  from  the 
line  of  communication  troops,  transporting  it  up  to  the  neighborhood  of  the 
combatant  troops,  and  distributing  it  to  the  various  combat  trains  of  Infantry, 
Cavalry,  and  Field  Artillery. 

To  insure  the  combatant  troops  deployed  over  a  wide  territory  being  promptly 
and  regularly  supplied  with  ammunition,  an  effective  organization  of  this 
service  is  requisite.  It  will  be  necessary  to  establish  close  commnncation 
with  the  various  commanders  so  as  to  learn  what  supplies  are  needed,  to  recon- 
noiter  the  country  and  find  the  best  avenues  of  approach,  to  regulate  the  move- 
ments of  elements  of  the  train  so  as  to  meet  the  varying  needs  of  different 
parts  of  the  line  of  battle,  and  to  maintain  sure  communication  between  all 

1  The  number  of  Infantry  rifles  in  the  division  is  increased  by   .°>8  per   cent   and  the 
number  of  guns  by  33&  per  cent.     The  proposed  divisional  artillery  comprises  48  field 
guns  and  16  field  howitzers. 

2  The   number   of  officers   here    given   are   based   on   the    proposed   number   of   gun,   or 
howitzer   batteries,    in   each   regiment.     The   difference  between   these   numbers    and   the 
total    commissioned   strength,    51,    is    the   number   available    in   each    case   for   duty   with 
ammunition  columns  and  other  special  Artillery  service. 


44  ORGANIZATION   OP  THE  LAND  FORCES. 

the  elements  of  the  train  and  with  the  supply  depots.  With  a  view  to  coordi- 
nating all  these  various  duties  and  activities,  it  is  proposed  to  charge  the  Field 
Artillery  with  this  service  and  provide  the  necessary  staff  and  organizations 
for  the  purpose. 

To  this  end  the  law  should  empower  the  President  to  raise  ammunition  bat- 
talions, in  the  proportion  of  one  per  authorized  Field  Artillery  regiment,  whose 
maximum  authorized  strength  should  be  that  of  a  Field  Artillery  battalion.  A 
certain  personnel  should  be  provided  in  each  regiment  as  constituting  the 
nucleus  of  this  ammunition  service,  the  same  to  be  transferred  to  the  appro- 
priate divisional  or  Army  ammunition  column  on  mobilization.  No  other  trans- 
fers should  be  made  from  the  regiments;  the  additional  personnel  should  be 
secured  from  reservists  or  by  recruitment.  To  organize  promptly  an  efficient 
ammunition  service  according  'to  this  plan  a  satisfactorily  working  reserve 
system  must  be  in  existence. 

The  regiments  of  divisional  artillery,  as  proposed  above,  have  only  two  bat- 
teries in  the  howitzer  battalion.  The  third  batteries  of  the  howitzer  battalions 
may  be  designated  as  the  nucleus  of  the  divisional  ammunition  service,  their 
personnel  to  be  transferred  to  the  ammunition  column  on  mobilization.  In  the 
heavy  artillery  and  the  horse  artillery  the  third  battery  of  each  battalion  may 
similarly  be  designated  as  the  nucleus  of  the  appropriate  ammunition  column. 

In  Appendix  II  hereto  attached  the  organization  of  the  Field  Artillery  and 
of  the  ammunition  service  is  discussed  in  greater  detail. 

Peace  strength  of  Artillery. — The  permissible  peace  strength  of  Artillery  de- 
pends on  the  means  of  expansion.  If  reserves  are  available  the  batteries  may 
be  kept  at  the  minimum  peace  strength  consistent  with  proper  instruction. 
Much  of  the  Artillery  personnel  in  times  of  war  is  employed  in  the  transporta- 
tion and  distribution  of  ammunition.  With  adequate  reserves  this  service  may 
be  kept  at  greatly  reduced  strength  without  loss  of  efficiency. 

6.  COMPONENTS  OF  THE  DIVISION  AND  THE  FIELD  ARMY. 

Based  upon  the  organization  of  Infantry.  Cavalry,  and  field  Artillery  above 
indicated,  the  complete  division  should  comprise  the  following  units: 
Division  headquarters. 
3  Infantry  brigades  of  3  regiments  each. 
1  regiment  of  Cavalry. 
1  brigade  of  Field  Artillery  (2  regiments). 

*  1  pioneer  battalion  of  Engineers. 

*  1  field  company  of  Signal  troops. 

*  Sanitary  troops  organized  as  field  hospitals  and  ambulance  companies. 

*  1  ammunition  column. 

*  1  supply  train. 

*  1  pack  train. 

EXTRA-DIVISIONAL  TROOPS. 

In  addition  to  the  organizations  comprised  in  the  divisions  the  following  addi- 
tional units  should  be  available  for  assignment  to  each  field  army  of  three 
divisions : 

Cavalry:  Three  or  more  brigades  to  be  employed  as  independent  Cavalry 
brigades;  or  two  or  more  Cavalry  brigades  may  be  combined  with  proper 
auxiliaries  to  form  a  Cavalry  division.1 

1  This  provision  of  extra-divisional  Cavalry  applies  to  a  field  army  comprising  the 
regular  troops  and  regarded  as  available  at  any  time  as  an  expeditionary  force.  The 
quota  for  additional  field  armies  of  Volunteers  or  other  citizen  soldiery  should  be  not  more 
than  1  Cavalry  brigade  to  each  three  divisions. 


ORGANIZATION    OF   THE   LAND   FORCES.  45 

1  brigade  of  Infantry. 

1  regiment  of  Heavy  Artillery. 

*1  ponton  battalion  of  Engineers  (bridge  train). 

*1  field  army  company  of  Signal  troops  (including  wireless  detachments). 

*  1  base  line  telegraph  company  of  Signal  troops. 

*  1  aeroplane  company  or  detachment. 

*  1  supply  train. 

*  1  ammunition  column. 

*  Sanitary  troops  (additional  field  hospitals  and  ambulance  companies,  with 
the  elements  of  the  evacuation  service). 

The  organizations  marked  (*)  above  have  been  tentatively  outlined  in  the 
Field  Service  Regulations  of  1910.  But  as  changes  are  recommended  in  the 
fundamental  units  of  Infantry  and  Field  Artillery,  it  will  be  necessary  to  re- 
vise the  organization  of  these  auxiliaries  to  conform  to  the  changes  proposed 
in  the  combatant  elements  of  the  division.  If  the  general  policy  of  organiza- 
tion proposed  in  this  report  be  approved,  it  is  recommended  that  the  General 
Staff  be  instructed  to  recommend  a  reorganization  of  the  auxiliary  services 
within  the  division  in  conformity  with  the  following  general  principles : 

(a)  The  divisions  should  habitually  include  the  normal  proportions  of  the 
three  combatant  arms  and  the  special  troops — that  is,  there  should  be  a  safe 
minimum  of  auxilaries  determined  by  average  conditions. 

(&)  In  addition  to  the  divisions  there  should  be  a  proper  reservoir  of  extra- 
divisional  troops. 

(c)  When  it  is  desired  to  form  an  expeditionary  force  for  any  particular 
purpose,  a  field  army  should  be  organized  by  taking  two  or  more  divisions  and 
adding  the  Army  headquarters  and  such  extra-divisional  auxiliaries  as  may 
be  appropriate  for  the  particular  terrain  and  mission. 

(d)  If  one  division  is  approximately  sufficient  for  the  particular  expedition, 
the  normal  proportions  can  be  modified,  if  necessary,  by  attaching  such  addi- 
tional auxiliaries  as  may  be  required,  or  by  detaching  such  auxiliaries  as  may 
be  redundant  in  the  particular  situation. 

(e)  The  proportions  of  auxiliaries  in  field  armies  and  expeditionary  forces 
should  depend  upon  the  mission  of  the  particular  force,  the  terrain  in  which 
it  is  to  operate,  and  the  character  of  opposition  expected.    Appropriate  and  suffi- 
cient auxiliaries  aid  the  fighting  power  of  the  force,  but  redundant  auxiliaries 
reduce  its  mobility,  increase  the  difficulties  of  supply  and  administration,  dis- 
turb the  balance  of  the  fighting  team,  and  actually  weaken  the  force  by  re- 
quiring additional  measures  for  the  security  of  the  surplus  units  which  in  this 
case  become  burdensome  impedimenta. 

(/)  The  auxiliaries  in  the  division  should,  therefore,  be  only  those  that  will 
always  be  required  in  it.  Exceptional  units  or  exceptional  proportions  should 
be  attached  from  the  extra-divisional  reservoir  when  needed. 

In  addition  to  the  tactical  reasons  for  the  proposed  policy  which  are  given 
in  paragraph  (e)  above,  there  is  an  important  economic  principle  involved.  If 
the  division  includes  all  of  the  auxiliary  units  which  are  required  for  every 
possible  contingency,  it  will  include  many  noncombatants  and  much  impedi- 
menta which  it  will  not  require  for  normal  contingencies.  These  extra  or  re- 
serve units  must  of  course  be  available  when  needed,  but  it  is  more  economical 
to  retain  them  in  rear  of  the  Army  as  a  reserve  where  they  can  be  forwarded 
to  such  divisions  as  may  temporarily  require  them.  But  these  extra  units  will 
never  be  required  at  the  same  time  by  all  of  the  divisions  of  a  field  army.  They 
should  normally  be  in  the  rear  of  the  field  army  where  the  field  army  com- 
mander can  forward  them  to  the  division  or  divisions  which  may  require  them 
at  any  particular  time.  Sound  economic  principle  requires  that  the  maximum 


46  ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND   FORCES. 

fighting  power  should  be  developed  for  any  sum  that  may  be  appropriated  for 
military  purposes.  This  requires  the  maximum  possible  investment  in  com- 
batant troops  and  the  minimum  possible  investment  in  noncombatant  troops. 
The  cost  of  noncombatant  auxiliaries  can  be  reduced  to  a  minimum  by  con- 
centrating them  so  far  as  practicable  in  an  extra-divisional  reserve.  To  give 
each  division  tlie  full  quota  required  for  all  contingencies  will  increase  the  cost 
of  the  whole  field  army  and  will  reduce  the  mobility  and  fighting  efficiency  of 
the  several  divisions. 

VII. 
THE  RELATION  OF  PROMOTION  TO  ORGANIZATION. 

The  organization  of  the  Army  should  be  determined  by  strategical,  political, 
and  economic  considerations,  with  the  sole  view  of  serving  the  public  interest. 
In  the  past,  however,  questions  of  relative  promotion  have  largely  influenced 
the  result.  Proper  promotion  of  the  officers  is  essential  in  any  military  system, 
and  parity  of  promotion  under  similar  conditions  is  necessary  if  we  are  to  have 
an  effective  force.  Human  nature  is  such  that  all  officers  desire  their  share  of 
promotion.  The  result  has  been,  however,  that  these  questions  of  relative  pro- 
motion have  affected  the  proper  consideration  of  all  questions  of  organization. 
If  an  effort  is  made  to  secure  an  increase  deemed  necessary  in  any  one  arm, 
officers  of  the  other  arms  are  liable  to  oppose  it  unless  by  other  increases,  per- 
haps necessary  and  perhaps  not,  a  parity  of  promotion  is  received.  While,  there- 
fore, the  question  of  promotion  and  rank  is  one  that  all  officers  are  rightly  in- 
terested in,  it  has  interfered,  and  will  continue  to  interfere,  with  any  scientific 
and  economical  reorganization  plans.  It  is  therefore  considered  an  absolutely 
necessary  preliminary  to  any  reorganization  of  the  mobile  Army  to  place  pro- 
motion on  an  equitable  basis  independent  of  organization. 

In  order  to  accomplish  this  result  in  the  simplest  and  most  equitable  manner, 
and  with  a  minimum  disturbance  of  existing  conditions,  it  is  suggested  that  the 
following  rules  governing  rank  and  promotion  should  be  incorporated  in  the 
military  law  of  the  United  States: 

1.  Rank  and  eligibility  to  command  in  any  grade  of  the  Army  below  that  of 
brigadier  general  shall  be  determined  by  length  of  continuous  commissioned 
service  as  an  officer  of  the  Regular  Army.  The  date  of  commencement  of  con- 
tinuous service  in  the  case  of  any  officer  shall  be  the  date  of  rank  given  in  his 
first  commission,  and  it  shall  be  known  as  the  '"date  of  precedence."  In  each 
p;rade  below  that  of  brigadier  general  all  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  shall  be 
arranged  in  the  order  of  their  dates  of  precedence,  and  those  originally  ap- 
pointed with  the  same  date  of  rank  in  the  order  of  precedence  at  the  time 
of  their  appointments:  Provided,  That  the  Secretary  of  War  shall  assign  con- 
structive dates  of  precedence  to  all  officers  of  the  following  classes  who  occupy 
anomalous  positions  on  the  lineal  lists  of  their  several  arms. 

(a)  Those  officers  of  Cavalry,  Field  Artillery,  Coast  Artillery,  and  Infantry 
who  were  appointed  under  the  act  of  February  2,  1901.  and  who  had  served  as 
commissioned  officers  in  the  Regular  Army  or  Volunteers  prior  to  such  appoint- 
ment. 

(&)  Those  officers  who  have  lost  rank  by  reason  of  the  sentence  of  court- 
martial  or  as  the  result  of  examination  for  promotion. 

(c)  Those  officers  who  have  voluntarily  transferred  from  one  arm  of  the 
line  to  another  or  from  a  staff  department  to  an  arm  of  the  line. 

Each  officer  of  class  (a)  above  excepted  shall  be  assigned  a  constructive  date 
of  precedence  which  will  place  him  in  the  same  position  relative  to  officers  of 


ORGANIZATION    OF    THE   LAND   FOECES.  47 

his  own  arm  or  corps  as  he  now  occupies  on  the  lineal  list  of  his  arm  or  corps, 
and  with  reference  to  officers  of  other  arms  or  corps  whose  dates  of  precedence 
may  lie  between  that  of  the  officer  next  above  him  and  the  officer  next  below 
him  in  his  own  arm  or  corps,  he  shall  take  precedence  in  accordance  with  total 
length  of  commissioned  service  in  the  Regular  Army  and  Volunteers,  and  his 
constructive  date  of  precedence  shall  be  fixed  accordingly ;  and  for  this  pur- 
pose the  date  of  acceptance  of  commission  shall  be  regarded  as  the  date  of 
commencement  of  service  of  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  and  of  staff  officers 
of  volunteers  appointed  by  the  President,  and  the  date  of  muster  into  service 
shall  be  regarded  as  the  date  of  commencement  of  service  of  line  officers  of 
volunteers. 

Each  officer  of  class  (6)  and  (c)  above  excepted  shall  be  assigned  a  construc- 
tive date  of  precedence  which  will  place  his  position  fdr  rank  and  eligibility  to 
command  next  below  the  officer  who  immediately  precedes  him  on  the  lineal 
list  of  his  own  arm  or  corps  on  the  date  of  the  passage  of  the  act. 

2.  The  order  of  promotion  in  each  arm,  department,  or  corps  shall  remain  as 
now  provided  by  law,  subject  to  the  exception  described  in  .paragraph  3  below, 
which  applies  to  original  vacancies  in  the  Cavalry,  Field  Artillery,  and  In- 
fantry. 

3.  Whenever  any  part  of  the  Infantry,   Cavalry,   or   Field  Artillery  is  in- 
creased or  the  number  of  officers  in  any  of  these  arms  is  increased  the  original 
vacancies  above  the  grade  of  second  lieutenant  due  to  the  increase  shall  be 
filled  from  the  next  lower  grade  in  the  three  arms,  the  number  of  officers  pro- 
moted from  each  arm  to  be  proportional  to  the  number  of  officers  of  that 
grade  in  the  three  arms  as  nearly  as  may  be  practicable:  Provided,  That  the 
order  of  promotion  in  any  arm  shall  be  in  the  order  of  the  lineal  list  of  that 
arm,  as  now  provided  by  law:  Provided  further,  That,  so  far  as  practicable, 
officers  shall  be  promoted  in  their  own  arm :  Provided  further,  That  when  any 
officer  is  nominated  for  promotion  into  an  arm  other  than  his  own  he  may 
waive  such  promotion,  and  in  this  case  the  vacancy  shall  pass  consecutively  to 
the  officers  next  below  him  in  the  lineal  list  of  his  own  arm :  And  provided  also, 
That  whenever  any  officer  is  promoted  to  another  arm  under  the  provisions  of 
this  rule  his  position  for  subsequent  promotion  in  that  arm  shall  be  fixed  by 
his  position  on  the  list  for  rank  and  eligibility  to  command  -is  determined  by 
the  date  of  precedence  defined  in  paragraph  1  above. 

4.  Whenever  any  part  of  the  Infantry,  Cavalry,  or  Field  Artillery  is  reduced 
or  the  total  number  of  officers  in  one  or  more  of  the  three  arms  is  reduced 
the  surplus  officers  should  not  be  absorbed  in  the  arm  or  arms  in  which  the 
reduction  occurs,  but  should  be  prorated  for  absorption  throughout  the  three 
arms:  Provided,  That  whenever  any  officer  is  transferred  to  another  arm  under 
the  provisions  of  this  rule  his  lineal  position  for  promotion  in  that  arm  shall 
be  fixed  by  his  position  on  the  list  for  rank  and  eligibility  to  command  as  de- 
termined by  the  date  of  precedence  defined  in  paragraph  1  above. 

COMMENTS   ON    THE   PROPOSED    RULES    FOR    RELATIVE   RANK   AND    PROMOTION. 

Rule  1. — This  rule  does  not  affect  promotion  in  any  way,  but  provides  that 
all  officers  shall  take  precedence  in  their  respective  grades  in  the  order  of  their 
actual  seniority,  and  not  according  to  the  date  of  last  commission.  Oi>  July 

23  last  Capt.  W .   of  the  Cavalry,  was  promoted  to  the  grade  of  major 

after  23  years  1  month  and  12  days  of  commissioned  service.     Maj.   W 

is  junior  in  rank  to  Maj.  R ,  of  the  Medical  Corps,  who,  on  the  date  of 

Maj.   W 's  promotion,   had  served  9  years  8  months  and  23  days.     Maj. 


48  OKGANIZATION    OF   THE   LAND   FORCES. 

R 's  seniority  is  based  on  the  fact  that  his  commission  as  major  antedates 

that  of  Maj.  W by  9  days,  and  this  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  Maj. 

W had  served  as  a  commissioned  officer  more  than  twice  as  long  as  Maj. 

R .  The  proposed  rule  would  not  expedite  Maj.  W 's  promotion,  not 

would  it  retard  that  of  Maj.  R .  It  would  simply  provide  that  after  arriving 

in  the  same  grade  their  precedence  should  depend  upon  actual  seniority.  Maj. 

R -'s  rapid  promotion  has  been  due  to  special  provisions  of  law,  under  which 

medical  officers  enter  the  Army  with  the  grade  of  first  lieutenant  and  are  pro- 
moted to  the  grade  of  captain  in  five  years  after  first  commission.  (The  period 
is  now  three  years.)  These  provisions  are  designed  to  compensate  for  the  fact 
that  such  officers  must  acquire  a  special  professional  education  before  they  can 
enter  the  Army.  The  proposed  rule  for  relative  rank  would  not  interfere  with 
such  special  rules  of  promotion,  but  would  simply  provide  that  after  arriving 
in  the  same  grade  officers  should  take  precedence  in  the  order  of  actual  seniority. 

Among  Maj.  W 's*  seniors  under  the  present  rule  of  precedence  is  Maj. 

C ,  of  the  Coast  Artillery,  whose  seniority  is  based  on  the  fact  that  he 

was  promoted  to  tUe  grade  of  major  16  days  before  Maj.  W 's  promotion, 

notwithstanding  the  fact  that  he  was  actually  Maj.  W 's  junior  as  a  com- 
missioned officer  by  nine  years. 

The  difference  in  length  of  service  in  this  case  is  due  to  the  fact  that  under 
present  conditions  promotion  in  the  cavalry  is  relatively  slow,  while  promo- 
tion in  the  Coast  Artillery  is  relatively  rapid.  The  proposed  rule  of  seniority 
would  not  affect  promotion  in  either  arm,  but  would  simply  tend  to  adjust  rela- 
tive rank  on  an  equitable  basis  when  officers  arrive  in  the  same  grade.  Rela- 
tive rank  determines  the  right  to  command,  the  right  to  choice  of  quarters,  and 
precedence  on  boards  and  other  duty,  where  officers  of  the  different  arms  are 
required  to  serve  together.  Among  officers  in  the  same  grade  seniority  for  the 
purposes  above  indicated  should  be  determined  by  actual  seniority. 

Rule  3. — This  rule  applies  only  to  the  Cavalry,  Infantry,  and  Field  Artil- 
lery. These  are  the  combatant  arms  of  the  mobile  army,  and  the  rule  is  pro- 
posed in  order  to  eliminate  all  questions  of  individual  promotion  from  the 
problem  of  reorganization  of  the  mobile  army.  With  this  rule  in  effect  it  is 
expected  that  questions  of  legislation  affecting  the  mobile  army  can  be  consid- 
ered purely  on  their  merits  from  the  standpoint  of  the  public  interest. 

The  application  of  the  foregoing  principles  will  tend  to  correct  the  present 
arbitrary  inequalities  in  relative  rank  and  promotion  in  the  several  branches 
of  the  Army.  But  it  does  not  constitute  a  final  solution  of  the  promotion, 
question. 

At  present  there  is  no  sufficient  incentive  to  efficiency.  The  laggard  and  the 
hard-working,  enthusiastic  officer  are  advanced  with  equal  steps  and  according 
to  one  cast-iron  rule  of  promotion.  It  is  important,  on  the  one  hand,  to  provide 
means  for  disposing  of  officers  who,  for  one  reason  or  another,  have  lost  their 
usefulness;  and  it  is  necessary,  on  the  other  hand,  to  insure  officers  .of  ability 
arriving  at  command  rank  at  a  time  of  life  when  their  usefulness  is  at  a  maxi- 
mum. In  either  case  action  should  be  based  upon  the  officer's  record  of 
achievement. 

The  Essentials  necessary  to  the  ultimate  solution  of  this  problem  are: 

1.  To  put  the  Army  on  such  an  improved  basis  of  organization  and  training 
that  a  common  doctrine  as  to  standards  of  military  efficiency  may  be  recog- 
nized throughout  the  service  and  applied  to  the  professional  records  of  all 
officers. 

2.  To  provide  positive  and  equitable  means  for  advancing,  retarding,  or  elimi- 
nating officers  according  to  their  several  merits. 


ORGANIZATION    OF   THE   LAND   FORCES.  49 

The  difficulties  of  a  practical  solution  of  this  problem  are  recognized.  The 
matter  should  be  made  the  subject  of  most  careful  and  deliberate  study  in  the 
future,  and  no  step  should  be  taken  without  adequate  safeguards  against  the 
intrusion  of  favoritism  and  other  abuses. 

VIII. 

AN    INITIAL    TACTICAL    ORGANIZATION    FOR    THE    MOBILE    ARMY, 
WITH  A  PROGRAM  OF  GRADUAL  EXPANSION  INTO  A  FIELD  ARMY. 

1.  THE  TROOPS  AVAILABLE  AFTER  PROVIDING  FOR  THE  FOREIGN  GARRISONS  AND 
THE  POLICY  OF  ORGANIZATION  PROPOSED. 

It  was  shown  in  Chapter  II  of  this  report  that  after  the  minimum  require- 
ments of  the  foreign  garrisons  have  been  provided  for,  the  following  organiza- 
tions of  the  mobile  Army  will  remain  in  the  United  States :  16  regiments  of  Infan- 
try, 11§  regiments  of  Cavalry,  2  regiments  of  Field  and  Mountain  Artillery,  1 
regiment  of  Horse  Artillery,  8  companies  of  Engineers,  2  field  companies  of 
signal  troops,  4  companies  of  signal  troops  (other  than  field  companies),  1  field 
hospital,  1  ambulance  company. 

It  is  important  that  this  force  should  receive  a  tactical  organization  as  a 
mobile  army,  even  though  it  should  remain  incomplete.  It  is  also  important 
that  organization  tables  should  indicate  the  successive  increments  by  means  of 
which  the  force  should  be  expanded  if  it  should  be  the  pleasure  of  Congress  to 
form  it  ultimately  into  a  well-balanced  field  army.  The  organization  should 
favor  the  prompt  mobilization  of  all  or  part  of  the  mobile  army  as  an  expedi- 
tionary force.  The  distribution  and  administration  should  also  be  adapted  to 
the  effective  use  of  the  Army  as  a  nucleus  for  the  organization  and  training  of 
national  guard  and  volunteer  forces. 

These  conditions  can  best  be  met  by  organizing  a  skeleton  or  nuclear  division 
in  each  of  the  three  territorial  departments.  After  providing  the  divisional  cav- 
nlry  for  each  division,  the  remaining  cavalry  should  be  formed  into  cavalry 
brigades  of  two  or  three  regiments  each.  When  the  tactical  organizations  thus 
formed  have  been  completed,  further  expansion  should  be  with  a  view  of  dividing 
the  central  territorial  region  into  two,  each  containing  a  complete  tactical 
division  with  the  proper  proportion  of  extra-divisional  troops.  In  considering 
the  details  of  this  organization  it  is  necessary  to  bear  in  mind  that  wm'le  an 
ultimate  segregation  of  the  mobile  army  into  actual  brigade  commands  is  con- 
templated under  the  policy  proposed  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  such  segregation 
can  not  be  accomplished  at  once,  and  during  the  period  of  transition  the  organi- 
zation must  be  such  as  to  meet  the  actual  distribution  of  the  mobile  Army.  The 
^essential  object  sought  is  to  provide  an  organization  in  peace  which  will  continue 
to  exist  in  war.  The  faulty  distribution  of  the  Army  increases  the  practical 
difficulties  of  the  problem,  but  can  not  be  accepted  as  an  argument  for  adopt- 
ing a  peace  organization  which  must  be  replaced  by  a  different  extemporized 
organization  on  the  outbreak  of  war, 

2.  THE  PROPOSED  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  SKELETON  FIELD  ARMY. 

The  proposed  organization  of  the  units  of  the  mobile  army  after  providing 
for  the  foreign  garrisons  is  shown  in  Table  I  which  follows.  The  num- 
ber of  organizations  shown  in  the  table  does  not  correspond  exactly  with  the 
numbers  now  present  in  the  United  States,  because  certain  regiments  to  be 
relieved  from  the  Philippines  have  not  returned  and  certain  other  organizations 
destined  for  Panama  and  Oahu  have  not  yet  been  dispatched  on  foreign  service. 
50043°— 12 4 


The  actual  number  of  organizations  within  the  United  States  and  within  the 
several  territorial  departments  are  therefore  subject  to  fluctuation  until  the 
foreign  garrisons  are  established. 

The  adoption  of  a  peace  organization  like  that  shown  in  Table  I  will  result 
in  great  decentralization.  If  it  should  be  desired  to  assemble  an  expeditionary 
force  at  some  place,  as  Galveston,  no  extemporization  would  be  necessary. 
None  of  the  divisions  are  complete,  but  a  full  division  could  be  assembled 
promptly  by  a  few  brief  orders  like  the  following : 

1.  To  the  commanding  general,  Central  Department,  "Assemble  the  Second 
Division  at  Galveston." 

2.  To    the    commanding    general,    Eastern    Department,    "  Send    the    First 
Brigade,  First  Division,  to  Galveston  for  duty  with  the  Second  Division." 

Such  simplicity  is  the  result  of  decentralization  and  would  be  possible  because 
there  is  no  difference,  except  as  to  strength,  between  the  proposed  peace  organi- 
zation and  the  war  organization.  The  preparation  of  mobilization  and  trans- 
portation plans  would  be  a  part  of  the  routine  duty  of  the  several  brigade  and 
division  commanders.  At  present  such  a  force  as  this  could  not  be  assembled 
without  complicated  and  difficult  extemporization,  and  when  assembled  each 
of  its  general  officers  would  be  a  stranger  to  his  command  and  its  problems  of 
administration. 

TABLE  I. — The  skeleton  field  army  «.v  orfwuizcd   iriMi   c.i'ixtinf/ 


First  division. 

Second  division. 

Third  division. 

Army  troops.1 

(To  be  stationed  in 

(To  be  stationed  in 

(To  be  stationed  in 

(For  the  formation  of 

the     Eastern    Depart- 

Central Department.) 

the  Western  Depart- 

a cavalry  division   or 

ment.) 

ment.) 

independent     cavalry 

First     Brigade.—  3     regi- 

First   Brigade.  —  3    regi- 

First  Brigade.—  3   regi- 

brigades, and  to  pro- 

ments of  infantry. 

ments  of  infantry. 

ments  of  infantry. 

vide      extra-divisiona! 

Second   Brigade.  —  1   regi- 

Second Brigade.—  3  regi- 

Second Brigade.—  3  regi- 

auxiliaries.) 

ment  of  infantry. 

ments  of  infantry. 

ments  of  infantry. 

Cavalry.—  9       regiments 

Divisional      Artillery.—  I 

Divisional    Artillery.—  \ 

Divisional      Artillery.  — 

(formed  in  brigade  in 

battalion  of  field  artil- 

regiment of  field  artil- 

Headquarters, 1  bat- 

spections of  2  or  3  regi- 

lery. 

lery. 

talion  of  field  artillery. 

ments). 

Divisional       Cavalry.  —  (1 

Divisional      Cavalry.—  I 

Divisional      Cavalry.  —  1 

Horse  Artillery.  —  1    regi- 

regiment less  1  squad- 

regiment. 

regiment. 

ment. 

ron.)  2 

Engineers.—  Provisional 

Engineers.—  Provisional 

Engineers.  —  Provisional 

Engineers.—  Provisio  n  a  1 
pioneer     battalion    (2 

pioneer   battalion    (2 
companies). 

pioneer    battalion    (2 
companies). 

ponton     battalion     (2 
companies)  . 

companies). 

Signal    troops.  —  1    field 

Signal    troops.—  1    field 

Signal     troops.  —  None 

Signal       troops.—  N  one 
available. 
Sanitary  troops.  —  No  field 
hospitals  or  ambulance 

company. 
Sanitary  troops.—  I  am- 
bulance company  and 
1  field  hospital. 

company.    - 
Sanitary   troops.—  No 
field  hospitals  or  am- 
bulauce  companies 

available. 
Sanitary  troops.  —  No  field 
hospitals  or  ambulance 
companies  available. 

companies  available. 

available. 

1  The  Army  troops  to  be  distributed  in  the  three  territorial  departments. 

2  1  squadron  at  Panama  to  be  taken  from  one  of  the  divisional  cavalry  regiments.    For  the  purposes  of 
of  this  table  it  is  assumed  that  this  squadron  is  taken  from  the  First  Division. 

NOTE. — In  minor  wars  where  the  command  of  the  sea  is  not  involved  or  in  a  more 
serious  war  after  the  command  of  the  sea  has  been  definitely  secured  by  our  Navy,  the 
troops  of  the  Coast  Artillery  may  be  counted  upon  to  reenforce  the  mobile  army.  In 
•order  to  meet  this  contingency  the  peace  organization  and  training  of  the  Coast  Artillery 
should  include  preparation  for  employment  as  auxiliary  organizations  of  siege  artillery, 
infantry,  and  other  services.  For  purposes  of  field  training  such  provisional  organizations 
as  may  be  formed  in  the  Eastern  Department  should  have  opportunities  for  field  train 
ing  with  the  First  Division.  The  provisional  organizations  formed  in  the  Western  De- 
partment should  likewise  train  with  the  Third  Division. 

3.  FIRST  INCREMENT  OF  THE  SKELETON  FIELD  ARMY. 

The  field  army  shown  in  Table  I  is  incomplete  in  every  particular,  but  it  is 
the  best  organization  that  can  be  effected  with  the  forces  available.  It  is  be- 
lieved that  the  first  increment  of  the  Army  that  Congress  may  authorize  should 
be  applied  in  such  a  way  as  to  give  the  three  skeleton  divisions  a  uniform  pro- 
portion of  the  several  arms.  Table  II  shows  the  improvement  in  the  organi- 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND   FORCES. 


51 


zation  that  would  result  from  adding  the  following  organizations  as  the  first 
future  increment  of  the  mobile  army: 

2  regiments  of  Infantry  (to  complete  second  brigade,  first  division). 

6  battalions  of  Field  Artillery  (one  to  each  regiment  now  existing)    (a). 

1  field  company  of  Signal  troops  with  sufficient  additional  personnel  to  form 
the  nucleus  of  the  field  army  aero  and  wireless  service  (&). 

5  field  hospitals  (c). 

5  ambulance  companies  (c). 

(a)  This  would  result  in  gaining  one  regiment  of  Field  Artillery  for  home 
service,  as  after  the  change  two  3-battalion  regiments  would  replace  three 
2-battalion  regiments  on  foreign  service. 

(&)  In  the  organization  of  the  Signal  Corps  every  effort  should  be  made  to 
utilize  as  many  as  possible  of  the  enlisted  men  now  employed  on  technical  duties 
and  who  are  not  included  in  field  companies  in  time  of  peace.  The  plans  for 
war  expansion  should  also  contemplate  the  fullest  use  of  civilian  aero  operators, 
telegraphers,  and  other  experts.  These  questions  should  be  considered  in  con- 
nection with  the  revision  of  the  field-service  regulations. 

(c)  Every  effort  should  be  made  to  provide  the  necessary  sanitary  units  for 
field  service,  but  as  much  of  their  personnel  as  possible  should  be  mobilized 
from  the  peace  personnel  on  duty  at  posts.  As  the  concentration  policy  pro- 
gresses a  greater  percentage  of  hospital-corps  men  will  be  released  from  post 
duty  on  mobilization.  The  plans  should  also  be  based  on  the  idea  of  a  war  ex- 
pansion through  the  absorption  of  civilians  whose  ordinary  occupations  are 
analogous  to  those  of  the  hospital  corps.  The  peace  strength  of  all  noncom- 
batant  troops  should  be  kept  at  a  minimum  consistent  with  proper  peace  service 
and  effective  war  expansion. 

TABLE  II. — TJic  skeleton  field  army  as  organized  after  the  first  increment. 


First  Division. 

Second  Division. 

Third  Division. 

Army  troops. 

First  brigade.—  3  regiments 

First    brigade.  —  3    regi- 

First   brigade.—  3    regi- 

(For the  formation  of 

of  infantry. 

ments  of  infantry. 

ments  of  infantry. 

a  cavalry  division  or 

Second    brigade.  —  3    regi- 

Second brigade.  —  3  regi- 

Second brigade.  —  3  regi- 

independent    cavalry 

ments  of  infantry. 
Divisional  artillery.—  1  reg- 

ments of  infantry. 
Divisional     artillery.  —  1 

ments  of  infantry. 
Divisional     artillery.  —  1 

brigades,  and  to  pro- 
vide   extra-  divisional 

iment. 

regiment. 

regiment. 

auxiliaries.) 

Divisional  cavalry.  —I  regi- 
ment (less  1  squadron)1 

Divisional      cavalry.—  1 
regiment. 

Divisional      cavalry.  —  1 
regiment. 

Cavalry.—  §    regiments 
(formed  in  brigade  in- 

Engineers. —  Provisional 

Engineers.  —  Provisional 

Engineers.  —  Provisional 

spections  of  2  or  3  regi- 

battalion (2  companies). 

battalion    (2    compa- 

battalion   (2    compa- 

ments). 

Signal  troops.  —  1  field  com- 

nies)' 

nies). 

Horse   artillery.—  I    regi- 

pany. 

Signal    troops.—  1    field 

Signal    troops.  —  1    field 

ment. 

Sanitary    troops.  —  2  field 
hospitals  and  2  ambu- 
lance companies. 
Ammunition  column? 

company. 
Sanitary  troops.  —  2  field 
hospitals  and  2  ambu- 
lance companies. 

company. 
Sanitary  troops.  —2  field 
hospitals  and  2  ambu- 
lance companies. 

Engineers.  —  P  r  o  visional 
battalion  (2  companies). 
Signal    droops.—  Nucleus 
of  field  army  units  in- 

Supply trains 

Ammunition  column? 

Ammunition  column? 

cluding  base  line,  aero 

Supply  train.3 

Supply  train.  * 

and  wireless  service.4 

Sanitary  troops.  —  The  field 

hospitals    and    ambu- 

lance   companies     as- 

signed to  the  divisions 

will  probably  meet  all 
requirements    at    this 

stage  of  development. 

»  See  Table  I. 

8  The  proposed  artillery  organization  furnishes  a  cadre  for  the  ammunition  column.  The  details  of 
expansion  will  depend  on  whether  reservists  are  provided.  If  not,  the  expansion  must  be  by  recruitment. 
In  either  event  detailed^plans  must  be  worked  out. 

8  The  cadre  of  the  supply  columns  should  be  furnished  by  such  service  corps  as  may  be  authorized.  The 
details  of  expansion  must  be  worked  out  in  connection  with  the  service  corps. 

4  The  details  of  organization  to  be  worked  out  by  the  General  Staff  with  the  Signal  Corps  during  the  revi- 
sion of  the  Field  Service  Regulations. 

4.  SUBSEQUENT  INCREMENTS  OF  THE  FIELD  ARMY. 

After  forming  the  balanced  skeleton  field  army  shown  in  Table  II,  the  next 
increments  should  successively  expand  the  skeleton  divisions  of  the  field  army 


52 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND   FORCES. 


into  complete  divisions.  The  second  increment,  necessary  to  complete  one  of 
the  divisions,  is  as  follows : 

1  brigade  of  Infantry   (3  regiments). 

1  regiment  of  Field  Artillery. 

1  pioneer  company  of  Engineers  (to  complete  the  divisional  battalion). 

1  or  more  additional  ambulance  companies  and  field  hospitals,  the  number  to 
depend  upon  a  determination  of  the  number  proper  for  the  division  and  the 
number  proper  for  the  extra-divisional  reservoir. 

The  third  and  fourth  increments  would  be  identical  with  the  second  incre- 
ment and  would  each  complete  another  division. 

The  fifth  increment  should  complete  the  quota  of  Army  troops  necessary  to 
furnish  an  auxiliary  division  if  the  whole  mobile  Army  should  be  employed  as 
a  field  army  or  expeditionary  force.  The  additional  units  are  as  follows : 

1  regiment  of  heavy  artillery  (a). 

1  brigade  of  Infantry  (3  regiments). 

1  company  of  Engineers  (to  complete  the  field  army  pontoon  battalion)  and 
appropriate  engineer  units  for  the  cavalry  division. 

Field  Army  Signal  units   (organization  completed). 

Sanitary  troops  (such  additional  ambulance  companies,  field  hospitals,  and 
evacuation  hospitals  as  may  be  found  necessary). 

XOTE. —  (a)  Until  a  regiment  of  field-army  heavy  artillery  can  be  provided 
one  or  more  batteries  or  battalions  of  the  divisional  artillery  will  be  equipped 
with  the  heavy  types. 

The  complete  field  army  with  three  divisions  and  army  auxiliary  troops  as 
it  would  be  organized  after  the  fifth  increment  is  shown  in  Table  III. 

TABLE  III. — The  field  army  with  three  divisions  and  Army  troops  complete  as 
organized  after  the  fifth  increment. 


First  division. 

Second  division. 

Third  division. 

Army  troops. 

First  brigade.—  3  regiments 
of  Infantry. 
Second    brigade.  —  3    regi- 

First   brigade.—  3    regi- 
ments of  Infantry. 
Second  brigade.—  3  regi- 

First,   brigade.—  3    regi- 
ments of  Infantry. 
Second  brigade.—  3  regi- 

(For the  formation  of 
a  Cavalry  division  or 
independent     Cavalry 

ments  of  Infantry. 
Third     brigade.—  3     regi- 

ments of  Infantry. 
Third    brigade.—  3  regi- 

ments of  Infantry. 
Third  brigade.—  3   regi- 

brigades,  and  to  pro- 
vide   extra  -  divisional 

ments  of  Infantry. 
Divisional    Artillery.—  1 
brigade  of  2  regiments. 
Divisional     Cavalry.  —  1 
regiment  (less  1  squad- 
ron).1 

ments  of  Infantry. 
Divisional    Artillery.  —  1 
brigade  of  2  regiments. 
Divisional     Cavalry.  —  1 
regiment. 
Engineers.—  I  ,  pioneer 

ments  of  Infantry. 
Divisional    Artillery.—  I 
brigade  of  2  regiments. 
Divisional     Cavalry.  —  1 
regiment. 
Engineers.  —  1    pioneer 

auxiliaries  for  expedi- 
tions   or    for    a    field 
army.) 
Cavalry.  —  9    regiments 
(formed  in  brigade  in- 
spections of  2  or  3  regi- 

Engineers.— I  pioneer  bat- 
talion (3  companies). 

'  battalion    (3    compa- 
nies). 

battalion    (3  •  compa- 
nies). 

ments). 
Horse  Artillery.  —  1   regi- 

Signal troops.—  I   field 
company. 

Signal  troops.—  1  field 
company. 

Signal  troops.—  1  field 
company. 

ment. 
Heavy   Artillery.  —  1  regi- 

Sanitary  troops.—  3   field 
hospitals  and  3  ambu- 
lance companies. 
A  mmunition  column. 
Supply  train. 

Sanitary  troops.  —  3  field 
hospitals  and  3  ambu- 
lance companies. 
A  mmunition  column. 
Supply  train. 

Sanitary  troops.  —  3  field 
hospitals  and  3  ambu- 
lance companies. 
A  mmunition  column. 
Supply  train. 

ment. 
Infantry.—  I  brigade. 
Engineers.  —  Field  Army 
battalion    and   proper 
additional  units  for  the 

cavalry  division. 

Signal    troops.—  Yield 

Army  units. 

Sanitary  troops.  —  To  in- 

clude additional  ambu- 

lance companies,  field 

hospitals,  and  evacua- 

tion service,  the  details 

to  be  worked  out  after 

investigation    as   to 

proper  distribution  be- 
tween    the     divisions 

and     the     extra-divi- 

sional   reservoir    with 

the  Army  troops. 

i  See  Table  I, 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND  FORCES. 


53 


With  the  sixth  increment  the  fourth  division  should  come  into  being,  and 
successive  increments  should  complete  it.  What  further  increments  may  be 
necessary  can  not  be  foretold,  but  it  is  certain  that  the  future  military  needs 
of  the  country,  as  they  are  understood  to-day,  can  not  be  met  by  a  mobile  force 
of  less  than  four  divisions,  and  this  is  the  goal  toward  which  all  effort  should 
be  directed. 

But  in  the  preparation  of  this  report  every  effort  has  been  made  to  separate 
the  question  of  organization  from  the  question  of  possible  increase.  Tactical 
organization  should  be  adopted  without  reference  to  possible  increases,  and 
such  increases  as  may  be  authorized  in  the  future  should  be  applied  to  the 
development  of  a  consistent  tactical  plan. 

5.  THE  NUMBER  OF  GENERAL  OFFICERS  REQUIRED  BY  THE  TACTICAL  ORGANIZATION. 

Brigadier  generals. — Modern  tactical  organization  requires  a  homogeneous 
unit  higher  than  the  regiment.  This  unit  is  the  brigade,  and  its  commander 
should  be  a  brigadier  general  selected  as  a  general  rule  from  the  arm  which  he 
commands.  The  number  of  brigadier  generals  of  the  mobile  army  should  there- 
fore be  based  on  the  number  of  regiments.  For  each  arm  there  should  be  at 
least  one  brigadier  general  for  each  three  regiments  or  major  fraction  thereof. 
With  the  present  strength  of  the  Army  the  quota  of  brigadier  generals  of  the 
mobile  army  should  therefore  be  as  follows : 


Regi- 
ments. 

Brigadier 
generals. 

Infantry 

30 

10 

Cavalry  
Field  Artillery  

15 
6 

5 
2 

Total  

51 

17 

This  number  of  brigadier  generals  is  based  on  the  present  peace  strength  of 
the  mobile  army  and  should  be  increased  in  proportion  to  future  increments  of 
the  Army.  In  time  of  war  there  should  be  a  brigadier  general  for  each  organ- 
ized brigade. 

The  number  of  brigadier  generals  required  for  the  Coast  Artillery  organiza- 
tion is  four,  viz,  one  for  each  Coast  Artillery  Inspection  and  one  as  chief  of 
Coast  Artillery. 

Major  generals. — The  number  of  major  generals  should  likewise  be  based 
upon  the  commands  appropriate  for  such  officers.  The  appropriate  peace  com- 
mands for  major  generals  are  as  follows: 

Territorial  departments  in  the  United  States B 

Philippine  Department 1 

Hawaiian  Department -1 

Panama  Department 1 


Total  major  generals f> 

In  time  of  war  there  should  be  a  major  general  for  each  organized  division. 

General  officers  required  for  duty  on  the  General  Staff  and  for  other  pur- 
poses.— The  number  of  general  officers  authorized  by  law  for  detail  to  the  Gen- 
eral Staff  should  be  in  addition  to  those  above  enumerated  for  assignment  to 
military  commands.  The  additional  general  officers  so  required  should  be  added 
in  the  grade  of  brigadier  general.  This  will  permit  the  assignment  of  general 


54  ORGANIZATION   OF   THE    LAND   FORCES. 

officers  of  either  grade  to  the  General  Staff  without  reducing  the  total  number 
available  as  military  commanders.  When  a  major  general  is  detached  from  his 
appropriate  command  for  detail  to  the  General  Staff,  the  brigadier  general 
assigned  to  the  military  command  so  vacated  should  have  the  temporary  rank, 
pay,  and  allowances  of  major  general  during  his  continuance  in  such  advanced 
command. 

6.  ADDITIONAL  OFFICERS  REQUIRED  FOR  DUTIES  OTHER  THAN  REGIMENTAL. 

When  additional  officers  are  required  for  duty  with  the  citizen  soldiery,  or 
for  other  military  duty  peculiarly  related  to  their  respective  arms  of  the  service, 
the  numbers  of  such  officers  allotted  to  each  arm  should  be  based  upon  the 
actual  requirements  of  the  arm  and  not  upon  a  pro  rata  between  the  several 
arms.  The  number  of  Infantry  officers  required  for  duty  with  the  National 
Guard  depends  upon  the  requirements  of  the  National  Guard  infantry.  Simi- 
larly the  number  of  Cavalry  officers  required  depends  upon  the  needs  of  the 
National  Guard  cavalry.  The  relative  numbers  required  from  the  two  arms 
has  no  relation  to  the  fact  that  the  regular  Infantry  comprises  twice  as  many 
officers  as  the  regular  Cavalry.  It  is  recommended,  therefore,  that  the  number 
of  such  additional  officers  as  may  be  authorized  for  purely  tactical  purposes 
in  the  future  be  based  npon  the  actual  needs  of  the  several  arms,  with  the 
understanding  that  the  original  vacancies  due  to  any  increase  in  the  number 
of  such  extra-regimental  officers  in  the  Infantry,  Cavalry,  or  Field  Artillery  be 
prorated  among  the  three  arms  according  to  the  principles  governing  the  filling 
of  original  vacancies  as  outlined  in  Chapter  VII  of  this  report. 

But  when  additional  officers  are  required  for  administrative  duties  not  pecu- 
liarly related  to  any  one  arm,  the  total  number  of  such  officers  should  be  pro- 
rated among  the  several  arms  as  at  present. 

Whenever  the  number  of  additional  officers  allotted  to  any  arm  is  increased  in 
any  manner,  the  grades  of  the  new  officers  should  be  so  allotted  as  to  keep  the 
ratios  between  the  numbers  of  officers  in  the  several  grades,  as  near  as  may  be, 
the  same  in  the  Cavalry,  Field  Artillery,  Coast  Artillery,  and  Infantry. 

IX. 
RAISING    AND    ORGANIZING    THE    NATIONAL    VOLUNTEER    FORCES. 

1.     LIMITATIONS  UPON  THE  AVAILABILITY  OF  THE  STATE  MILITIA  AS  A  NATIONAL 

FORCE. 

The  Constitution  provides  that  Congress  shall  have  power — 

to  provide  for  calling  forth  the  militia  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union,  sup- 
press insurrection,  and  repel  invasion. 

And  further — 

to  provide  for  organizing,  arming,  and  disciplining  the  militia  and  for  govern- 
ing such  part  of  them  as  may  be  employed  in  the  service  of  the  United  States, 
reserving  to  the  States,  respectively,  the  appointment  of  the  officers  and  the 
authority  of  training  the  militia  according  to  the  discipline  prescribed  by 
Congress. 

Under  these  provisions  Congress  passed  the  act  of  January  21,  1903,  com- 
monly known  as  the  Dick  bill.  This  act  superseded  practically  all  the  militia 
law  on  the  statute  books.  It  has  since  been  amended  by  the  act  of  May  27, 
1908,  and  the  act  of  April  21,  1910.  Under  the  provisions  of  these  laws  the 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND  FORCES.  55 

militia  lias  been  organized,  uniformed,  and  equipped,  and  the  President  is 
authorized  to  employ  the  organized  portion  for  the  three  purposes  specified  in 
the  Constitution.  Under  the  operation  of  these  laws  the  general  efficiency  of 
the  Organized  Militia  has  been  greatly  improved,  but  no  acts  of  Congress  can 
extend  the  scope  of  its  employment  as  militia  or  modify  the  restricted  funda- 
mental law  upon  which  the  whole  militia  structure  is  based. 

The  Regular  Army  is  organized  under  the  general  and  plenary  power  of 
Congress  "  to  raise  and  support  armies,"  and  it  can  be  used  both  at  home  and 
abroad  for  any  national  purpose.  The  militia  may  be  employed  to  support 
the  Regular  Army  for  the  limited  purposes  mentioned  in  the  Constitution,  but 
it  can  not  be  employed  for  the  varied  purposes  for  which  a  national  Army  may 
be  required — for  such  purposes  as  our  own  history  shows  it  is  likely  to  be 
needed. 

After  the  War  of  1812  it  seemed  to  be  accepted  as  a  settled  policy  that  under 
existing  constitutional  limitations  the  militia  should  not  be  regarded  as  avail- 
able for  general  military  purposes. 

In  the  Mexican  War  the  Regular  Army,  supported  by  a  Volunteer  Army  of 
national  troops,  achieved  a  series  of  victories  unmarred  by  a  single  defeat.  The 
battle  of  Buena  Vista,  fought  at  a  time  when  nearly  all  the  regular  troops  had 
been  dispatched  to  take  part  in  the  campaign  under  Gen.  Scott  against  the  City 
of  Mexico,  was  a  triumph  for  the  Volunteers.  A  force  of  some  12,000  militia 
was  called  out  for  three  months  in  the  first  stages  of  the  war,  but  they  were 
returned  to  their  homes  without  having  fired  a  shot. 

The  Civil  War  opened  with  a  call  for  75,000  militia  to  serve  for  three  months. 
The  disaster  which  ensued  at  Bull  Run  practically  put  an  end  to  the  use  of 
militia  during  the  war.  A  great  Volunteer  Army  of  citizen  soldiery  was  called 
into  being  which  prosecuted  the  war  as  a  national  force. 

After  the  Civil  War  there  was  a  great  development  of  Organized  Militia 
throughout  the  country.  Although  national  support  was  not  liberally  given,  it 
was  recognized  that  these  State  organizations  furnished  a  valuable  school  of 
military  training.  When  the  Spanish  War  broke  out  a  Volunteer  Army  was 
again  organized,  and  under  a  provision  of  the  law  existing  militia  organizations 
were  permitted  td  volunteer  as  complete  units.  These  volunteer  organizations 
were  created  under  the  power  of  Congress  to  raise  and  support  armies.  The 
militia  upon  volunteering  completely  lost  its  militia  status  as  far  as  the  Federal 
Government  was  concerned.  The  forces  thus  created  were  therefore  available 
for  general  military  purposes,  and  they  were  employed  in  Porto  Rico,  Cuba, 
and  the  Philippine  Islands. 

Under  the  legislation  of  1898  regiments  made  up  from  militia  organizations 
were  received  into  the  Federal  service  as  volunteers,  and  with  other  new  regi- 
ments of  volunteers  were  formed  into  brigades,  divisions,  and  Army  corps. 
When  a  regiment  or  smaller  organization  volunteered  as  a  body  the  governor 
of  the  State  was  authorized  to  appoint  the  militia  officers  of  these  units  into 
corresponding  grades  in  the  same  organizations  when  they  were  received  into 
the  service  of  the  United  States  as  part  of  the  Volunteer  Army ;  but  the  higher 
Army  units,  the  brigades,  divisions,  and  Army  corps,  were  Federal  units  organ- 
ized by  the  President  and  commanded  by  officers  under  his  commission.  Some 
of  these  general  officers  were  appointed  from  the  Regular  Army,  some  were 
distinguished  veterans  of  a  former  war,  and  some  were  appointed  from  the 
militia  officers  who  volunteered  from  the  States.  But  they  all  became  Federal 
officers  and  were  responsible  to  the  constitutional  Commander  in  Chief.  This 
was  in  harmony  with  the  national  policy  adopted  in  the  Mexican  War  and  con- 
tinued' throughout  the  War  of  1861-1865. 


56  ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND  FORCES. 

The  volunteer  act  of  1898  was  drawn  in  haste  and  contained  many  defects, 
but  in  these  two  particulars  it  was  based  on  our  national  experience  and  erected 
solidly  upon  the  Constitution.  It  called  for  an  army,  a  force  that  could  be  used 
at  home  or  abroad,  in  attack  or  defense,  and  for  general  military  purposes; 
it  therefore  did  not  attempt  to  use  a  force  which  the  Constitution  had  restricted 
to  three  limited  uses.  It  called  for  a  National  Army,  and  therefore  its  funda- 
mental army  units  were  Federal  units.  It  did  not  favor  repeating  the  folly  com- 
mitted in  1812,  when  we  attempted  to  conquer  Canada  with  groups  of  allied 
forces,  rather  than  with  a  cohesive  National  Army. 

The  volunteers  of  1898,  like  the  volunteers  of  1861,  were  citizen  soldiers,  but 
they  were  not  militia.  Our  Constitution  and  our  history  alike  confirm  the  dic- 
tum that  citizen  soldiers  may  be  employed  successfully  for  general  military 
purposes,  but  that  organized  as  militia  they  may  not. 

In  the  militia  legislation  of  1903  and  1908  we  have  departed  from  the  sound 
policy  based  on  the  experience  of  1812,  1846,  1861,  and  1898.  It  is  true  that  the 
Organized  Militia  of  to-day  is  a  more  highly  trained  force  than  the  militia  of 
our  early  history,  but  the  same  constitutional  limitations  as  to  use  and  control 
prevent  its  full  development  as  an  effective  national  force,  so  long  as  it  main- 
tains its  legal  character  as  militia. 

The  present  militia  policy  is  erected  on  the  theory  that  the  militia  may  be 
used  for  general  military  purposes  as  militia.  It  provides  that  it  shall  enter 
the  service  as  militia  and  remain  militia,  and  yet  contains  the  provision  that 
it  may  serve  either  within  or  without  the  territory  of  the  United  States.  With 
reference  to  this  provision  of  the  militia  law,  the  Attorney  General  writes  as 
follows  in  reply  to  a  question  from  the  Secretary  of  War: 

It  is  true  that  the  act  of  January  21,  1903,  as  amended  by  the  act  of  May  27, 
1908  (35  Stat.,  pt.  1,  399),  provides: 

"  That  whenever  the  President  calls  forth  the  Organized  Militia  of  any  State  or 
Territory,  or  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  to  be  employed  in  the  service  of  the 
United  States,  he  may  specify  in  his  call  the  period  for  which  such  service  is 
required,  and  the  militia  so  called  shall  continue  to  serve  during  the  term  so 
specified,  either  within  or  without  the  territory  of  the  United  States,  unless 
sooner  relieved  by  order  of  the  President." 

But  this  must  be  read  in  view  of  the  constitutional  power  of  Congress  to  call 
forth  the  militia  only  to  suppress  insurrection,  repel  invasion,  or  to  execute  the 
laws  of  the  Union.  Congress  can  not,  by  its  own  enactment,  enlarge  the  power 
conferred  upon  it  by  the  Constitution ;  and  if  this  provision  were  construed  to  au- 
thorize Congress  to  use  the  Organized  Militia  for  any  other  than  the  three  pur- 
poses specified  it  would  be  unconstitutional.  This  provision  applies  only  to  cases 
where,  under  the  Constitution,  said  militia  may  be  used  outside  of  our  own 
borders  and  was,  doubtless,  inserted  as  a  matter  of  precaution  and  to  prevent  the 
possible  recurrence  of  what  took  place  in  our  last  war  with  Great  Britain,  when 
portions  of  the  militia  refused  to  obey  orders  to  cross  the  Canadian  frontier. 

I  think  that  the  constitutional  provision  here  considered  not  only  affords  no 
warrant  for  the  use  of  the  militia  by  the  General  Government,  except  to  suppress 
insurrection,  repel  invasion,  or  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union,  but,  by  its 
careful  enumeration  of  the  three  occasions  or  purposes  for  which  the  militia  may 
be  used,  it  forbids  such  use  for  any  other  purpose. 

The  opinion  of  the  Attorney  General  in  full  is  attached  to  this  report  as 
Appendix  III. 

We  are  thus  brought  squarely  face  to  face  with  the  problem  of  how  we  are  to 
get  the  forces  which  we  may  need  for  purposes  more  general  than  those  to 
which  the  Constitution  restricts  the  use  of  militia.  And  this  raises  the  whole 
question  of  how  we  are  to  go  about  providing  for  the  great  national  volunteer 
force  which  in  time  of  stress  our  country  may  need. 

The  Constitution  provides  two  means  whereby  the  National  Government 
may  draw  upon  the  great  body  of  potential  national  volunteers :  directly  under 
the  power  to  raise  and  support  armies;  indirectly  under  the  militia  clause. 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND   FOECES.  57 

The  first  power  is  unrestricted,  the  second  definitely  restricted.  Such  troops 
as  may  be  raised  under  the  latter  power  must  undergo  a  change  of  status  before 
they  can  be  employed  for  general  military  purposes.  The  procedure  necessary 
for  developing  a  national  force  under  each  of  these  two  powers  is  discussed 
below. 

A.  UNDER    THE    POWER    TO    RAISE    AND     SUPPORT    ARMIES. 

The  "power  to  raise  and  support  armies"  is  construed  as  follows  in  Tnrble's 
Case,  13  Wallace,  408  : 

FIELD,  J.  Now,  among  the  powers  assigned  to  the  National  Government,  is 
the  power  "  to  raise  and  support  armies  "  and  the  power  "  to  provide  for  the 
government  and  regulation  of  the  land  and  naval  forces."  The  execution  of 
these  powers  falls  within  the  line  of  its  duties;  and  its  control  over  the  subject 
is  plenary  and  exclusive.  It  can  determine,  without  question  from  any  State 
authority,  how  the  armies  shall  be  raised,4  whether  by  voluntary  enlistment  or 
forced  draft,  the  age  at  which  the  soldier  shall  be  received  and  the  period  for 
which  he  shall  be  taken,  the  compensation  he  shall  be  allowed,  and  the  service 
to  which  he  shall  be  assigned.  And  it  can  provide  the  rules  for  the  government 
and  regulation  of  the  forces  after  they  are  raised,  define  what  shall  constitute 
military  offences,  and  prescribe  their  punishment.  No  interference  with  the 
execution  of  this  power  of  the  National  Government  in  the  formation,  organiza- 
tion, and  government  of  its  armies  by  any  State  officials  could  be  permitted 
without  greatly  impairing  the  efficiency,  if  it  did  not  utterly  destroy,  this  branch 
of  the  public  service. 

In  view  of  this  language  of  the  Supreme  Court  it  would  seem  that  Congress 
could  organize  a  company  or  a  battalion  or  a  regiment  of  citizen  soldiers  in 
every  congressional  district  if  it  chose  to  do  so.  It  could  limit  the  employment 
of  the  force  to  time  of  war'only,  or  to  other  contingencies  determined  by  itself. 
It  could  fix  the  period  of  instruction  at  10  days  a  year,  or  20  days  a  year,  or 
1  hour  per  week,  or  any  other  time  that  might  be  desirable.  It  could  regulate 
the  appointment  of  officers  and  provide  for  the  voluntary  transfer  of  officers 
and  enlisted  men  from  the  present  Organized  Militia  to  the  national  force.  It 
could  organize  battalions  and  regiments  of  the  three  arms  and  all  of  the 
auxiliaries  that  might  be  required  for  war  purposes,  and  could  combine  them 
into  properly  proportioned  divisions  and  field  armies.  It  could  organize  it 
definitely  as  a  territorial  army  uniformly  distributed  throughout  the  Union 
with  all  of  the  machinery  of  mobilization,  concentration,  and  supply  organized 
in  time  of  peace.  Congress  could  place  any  desired  limit  of  strength  upon  its 
national  army  of  citizen  soldiers,  or  it  could  adopt  the  logical  ideal  of  voluntary 
military  service,  and  provide  facilities  for  the  military  training  of  all  patriotic 
young  men  who  might  volunteer  to  receive  it. 

By  such  means  we  would  be  enabled  gradually  to  develop  our  military  re- 
sources according  to  a  definite  and  logical  plan.  Instead  of  trying  to  force 
upon  the  militia  two  duties  which  under  the  limitations  of  the  Constitution 
are  more  or  less  incompatible  we  would  recognize  things  as  they  are,  and 
provide  for  two  forces,  each  having  its  special  function.  This  would  afford 
obvious  advantages  to  all  concerned;  the  National  Government  would  know 
upon  what  forces  it  could  count;  the  States  could  proportion  their  forces  to 
local  needs;  and  individuals  would  have  the  choice  of  the  particular  kind  of 
service  they  preferred ;  that  is,  State  service  with  limited  war  liability,  or  war 
service  only,  under  the  National  Government. 

B.  UNDER    THE    MILITIA    CLAUSES    OF    THE   CONSTITUTION. 

But  while  a  national  citizen  soldiery  organized  "Under  the  Power  to  Raise 
and  Support  Armies  "  is  the  most  direct  and  the  most  complete  solution  of  our 
problem,  it  must  be  recognized  that  the  immediate  provision  of  such  a  force 


58  ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND   FOECES. 


involves  serious  practical  difficulties.  It  is  unquestionably  true  that  the 
present  Organized  Militia  can  not  be  employed  for  general  military  purposes, 
and  that  under  the  present  law  it  can  not  be  effectively  trained  for  war  as  a 
homogeneous  national  force.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  a  force  actually  in  being 
and  one  composed  largely  of  officers  and  men  who  have  volunteered  for  mili- 
tary training  because  they  desire  to  serve  as  soldiers  in  the  event  of  war.  The 
Organized  Militia  in  short  constitutes  an  existing  organization.  As  it  stands 
it  is  unsuited  for  national  military  uses ;  the  question  is,  can  this  impediment  be 
removed?  » 

Congress  may  organize  and  discipline  the  militia,  but  must  leave  to  the  States 
the  appointment  of  its  officers  and  the  authority  to  train  the  force  according 
to  the  discipline  prescribed  by  Congress.  Congress  is  also  authorized  to  gor.crn 
the  militia  when  it  is  actually  in  the  service  of  the  United  States.  Congress 
may,  therefore,  prescribe  any  peace  organization,  discipline,  or  system  of  train- 
ing for  the  militia  which  does  not  deprive  the  States  of  the  following  reserved 
powers : 

1.  To  appoint  the  officers. 

2.  To  train  the  forces  according  to  the  discipline  prescribed  by  Congress. 

3.  To  govern  the  militia  when  not  actually  in  the  service  of  the  United  States. 

The  practical  question  then  is,  can  Congress,  under  these  limitations,  con- 
vert the  Organized  Militia  into  an  effective  military  force  and  utilize  it  for 
general  war  purposes. 

It  is  believed,  that  the  modified  militia  pay  bill  recently  prepared  by  the 
Secretary  of  War,  after  consultation  with  the  National  Militia  Board,  furnishes 
the  basis  for  a  practical  solution  of  this  problem.  (A  copy  of  the  bill  is 
hereto  attached  as  Appendix  IV.j 

The  bill  provides  that  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  National  Guard  who 
conform  to  certain  standards  of  efficiency  to  be  prescribed  by  the  Secretary  of 
War  shall  be  entitled  to  Federal  pay.  In  order  to  be  entitled  to  pay  a  man 
must  be  qualified  for  military  service  under  the  standards  to  be  prescribed  by 
the  Federal  Government,  and  he  must  likewise  be  a  member  of  a  military  com- 
mand of  standard  organization,  strength,  and  efficiency. 

The  bill  also  provides  that  all  organizations  and  individuals  receiving  such 
pay  may,  in  certain  emergencies  and  with  the  consent  of  Congress,  be  trans- 
ferred to  and  incorporated  with  the  Army  of  the  United  States,  and  when  so 
transferred  such  organizations  and  individuals  shall  be  subject  to  the  laws 
and  regulations  governing  the  Armies  of  the  United  States. 

It  is  believed  that  such  militia  organizations  as  qualify  for  pay  under  the 
terms  of  the  bill  would  be  available  for  general  military  uses,  because  when 
transferred  to  and  incorporated  with  the  Army  of  the  United  States  they  would 
cease  to  be  militia  and  would  be  as  fully  under  the  control  of  Congress  as  is 
the  Regular  Army.  It  is  obvious  that  no  individual  or  organization  of  the 
militia  should  be  the  recipient  of  pay  from  the  Federal  Government  unless  he 
or  it  is  fully  available  for  general  military  purposes.  It  is  also  believed  that 
the  enactment  of  the  bill  would  give  the  Federal  Government  an  effective  influ- 
ence over  the  organization,  training,  and  discipline  of  the  Organized  Militia 
without  invading  the  constitutional  powers  of  the  States. 

The  power  to  appoint  officers  would  still  be  reserved  to  the  States,  but  only 
those  appointees  would  receive  Federal  pay  who  are  found  fit  to  perform  a 
definite  Federal  function  and  who  are  obligated  to  perform  that  function.  The 
power  to  train  the  militia  would  be  reserved  to  the  States,  but  Federal  pay 
would  go  only  to  that  part  of  the  militia  which  is  actually  trained  and  prepared 
for  incorporation  in  the  organized  war  army  of  the  Nation.  Under  this  policy 
the  Government  would  not  extend  its  influence  over  all  of  the  militia  in  a  State, 


ORGANIZATION    OF    THE   LAND   FORCES.  59 

but  only  over  that  portion  which  voluntarily  engages  to  form  a  part  of  the 
national  war  army  of  citizen  soldiery,  and  even  over  that  portion  the  Federal 
influence  would  be  indirect  and  without  encroachment  upon  the  powers  reserved 
to  the  States  by  the  Constitution. 

A  militiaman  transferred  to  the  Army  of  the  United  States  under  the  provi- 
sions of  the  proposed  bill  should  be  required  to  serve  until  the  expiration  of  his 
term  of  service  or  until  a  man  could  be  trained  to  replace  him  in  the  event  his 
term  of  enlistment  expired  soon  after  his  transfer.  The  bill  should  therefore 
give  the  Federal  Government  the  right  to  extend  the  term  of  enlistment  of  any 
man  so  transferred  for  a  period  of  not  to  exceed  12  months ;  without  some  such 
provision  the  force  created  would  begin  to  melt  away  on  the  day  it  was 
mobilized.  (See  also  Sec.  11,  Chap.  5.) 

Whether  the  operation  of  the  bill  will  result  in  developing  the  militia  of  the 
States  into  a  thoroughly  efficient,  well-organized  national  force  sufficient  for  all 
military  purposes  can  be  determined  only  by  experience.  In  view  of  the  im- 
portance, as  stated  above,  of  using  for  war  this  available  military  asset,  it  is 
considered  that  a  trial  should  be  made  and  from  experience  gained  a  final 
satisfactory  solution  obtained. 

2.  ESTABLISHMENT   OF   DIVISION   DISTRICTS  AS  A  MEANS   FOB   SYSTEMATICALLY 
RAISING  AND.  ORGANIZING  THE  VOLUNTEER  FORCES. 

While  the  peace  organization  of  the  national  citizen  soldiery  can  not  be 
indicated  in  detail  until  its  legal  status  is  more  definitely  .settled,  it  is  possible 
to  point  out  some  of  the  objects  of  peace  organization  and  the  general  relation 
of  such  organization  to  mobilization  and  preparation  for  war.  As  the  war 
organization  of  any  army  involves  the  establishment  of  divisions  and  field 
armies,  and  as  these  complex  units  can  not  be  extemporized  on  the  outbreak  of 
war,  it  may  be  accepted  that  the  Army  of  citizen  soldiery  should  be  made  up 
of  definitely  organized  divisions  with  the  auxiliaries  necessary  to  form  com- 
plete field  armies.  Assuming  that  future  legislation  will  provide  for  changing 
the  status  of  the  organized  militia  from  a  militia  force  of  limited  uses  to  a 
national  force  available  for  general  military  purposes,  it  will  be  possible  to  in- 
dicate a  division  organization  based  on  the  units  now  existing  in  the  National 
Guard.  An  illustration  may  thus  be  made  in  a  concrete  way  of  the  general 
objects  to  be  attained. 

The  present  strength  of  the  National  Guard  is  as  follows : 

Infantry,  139  regiments,  8  separate  battalions,  and  8  separate  companies. 

Cavalry,  74  troops. 

Field  Artillery,  48  batteries. 

Engineers,  22  companies. 

Coast  Artillery,  120  companies. 

It  will  be  seen  that  we  have  the  Infantry  organizations  for  approximately 
16  divisions,  the  Cavalry  organizations  for  approximately  6  divisions,  the  Field 
Artillery  for  approximately  3  divisions,  and  the  Engineer  contingent  for  7 
divisions. 

As  we  have  here  the  Infantry  organizations  for  16  divisions,  it  will  be  as- 
sumed for  purposes  of  illustration  that  our  problem  is  to  complete  these  divi- 
sions. For  this  purpose  the  territory  of  the  United  States  should  be  divided 
into  division  districts,  and  it  should  be  the  policy  of  the  Government  to  form* 
a  complete  division  in  each  division  district  by  filling  up  the  Infantry  regi- 
ments and  by  encouraging  the  organization  of  the  Artillery,  Cavalry,  and  other 
divisional  components  which  are  now  lacking. 


60  OKGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND   FOKCES. 

To  each  of  these  division  districts  should  be  assigned  a  General  Staff  officer, 
with  the  necessary  number  of  inspector  instructors  detailed  from  the  Regular 
Army,  whose  function  it  should  be  to  arrange  for  the  many  details  of  organiza- 
tion which  should  be  planned  in  peace  and  not  left  to  extemporization  in  time 
of  war.  Among  the  duties  of  this  division  staff  would  be  the  preparation  of 
plans  of  mobilization  in  conformity  with  general  plans  prepared  in  the  War 
College.  Problems  of  supply  could  also  be  worked  out  in  advance  and  plans 
for  the  transportation  of  a  division  or  a  part  of  it  to  any  point  of  concentra- 
tion could  be  prepared  by  trained  officers  on  the  ground  The  division  staff 
would  also  be  able  to  keep  the  War  Department  advised  of  the  needs  of  the 
district  and  would  act  as  the  agent  of  the  War  Department  in  the  gradual 
development  of  the  lacking  components  of  the  division.  The  General  Staff 
officer  would  also  coordinate  the  efforts  of  the  inspector  instructors  on  duty 
with  the  several  regiments  and  battalions  so  that,  through  him,  the  general  war 
policy  of  the  Nation  could  be  transmitted  to  the  units  organized  in  the  several 
States. 

These  division  districts  would  not  only  facilitate  the  development  of  the 
organized  army  of  citizen  soldiery  and  simplify  its  mobilization  in  war,  but  the 
division  districts  would  continue  to  be  useful,  even  after  the  troops  havo 
gone  to  the  front.  The  organization  provided  for  the  district  in  peace  would 
prepare  regimental  depots  for  recruits  and  reservists  in  war,  and  if  it  should 
be  necessary  to  augment  the  peace  force  by  new  levies  of  volunteers  the  division 
districts  would  furnish  the  machinery  for  the  raising,  organization,  administra- 
tion, and  supply  of  such  volunteer  forces. 

Taking  the  National  Guard  force  as  it  exists  to-day,  we  find  that  most  of  the 
individual  units  are  far  below  their  proper  war  strength,  and  that  the  infantry 
of  the  National  Guard  is  not  provided  with  the  proper  proportion  of  cavalry, 
field  artillery,  and  special  troops  required  to  form  divisions.  Efforts  are  being 
made  to  correct  these  conditions,  and  it  is  believed  that  the  organization  of 
definite  division  districts  would  facilitate  this  reform. 

An  examination  of  the  problem  indicates  that  there  are  two  reasons  why  the 
mounted  troops  have  not  been  developed  as  rapidly  as  the  infantry.  The  first 
reason  seems  to  be  that,  under  our  National  Guard  system,  the  troops  are  pri- 
marily State  troops,  and  are  presumably  organized  by  the  States  in  order  to 
meet  State  requirements.  It  is  obvious  that  the  States  will  rarely  have  as 
much  use  for  cavalry  or  field  artillery  as  they  have  for  infantry ;  and  even 
if  they  need  these  forces,  they  will  not  need  them  in  the  proportion  required 
for  national  purposes  under  conditions  of  modern  warfare. 

The  second  reason  lies  in  the  fact  that  cavalry  and  field  artillery  are  more 
expensive  to  raise  than  infantry,  and  under  present  conditions  Federal  appro- 
priations are  not  based  on  a  recognition  of  this  fact.  For  the  minimum  require- 
ments of  instruction,  a  battery  of  field  artillery  or  a  squadron  of  cavalry  must 
have  a  certain  proportion  of  mounts,  and  under  present  conditions  these 
animals  must  either  be  provided  by  the  organizations  or  must  be  obtained  at 
the  charge  of  the  State.  The  development  of  divisions  in  the  National  Guard, 
therefore,  requires  that  the  United  States  should  furnish  not  only  the  necessary 
war  material,  but  also  an  allotment  for  the  purchase  or  hire  of  a  certain  num- 
ber of  animals  for  the  cavalry  and  field  artillery.  If  the  organized  citizen 
.soldiery  is  to  be  counted  on  in  war,  its  field  artillery  and  cavalry  must  be 
organized  in  time  of  peace  and  must  have  the  same  facilities  for  training  as 
the  infantry. 

The  only  other  solution  of  the  problem  is  to  maintain  the  cavalry  and  field 
artillery  organizations  in  the  permanent  establishment  of  the  Regular  Army. 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND   FORCES.  61 

This  solution,  however,  is  not  permissible  economically,  and  in  view  of  English 
experience  with  her  territorial  army,  does  not  appear  to  be  necessary.  To 
maintain  the  divisional  cavalry  and  field  artillery  of  the  National  Guard  on 
the  permanent  establishment  of  the  Regular  Army  would  cost  upward  of 
$2,000,000  per  year  for  each  division  of  the  National  'Guard,  while  the  same 
forces  could  be  economically  maintained  on  a  National  Guard  basis  if  less  than 
one- tenth  of  that  amount  were  allotted  to  cover  cost  of  providing  and  main- 
taining a  small  quota  of  mounts  to  permit  proper  training. 

It  should,  therefore,  be  the  policy  of  the  Government  to  develop  the  army 
of  citizen  soldiers  in  peace  as  an  army  of  complete  divisions,  each  division  to 
contain  its  proper  proportion  of  infantry,  cavalry,  field  artillery,  engineers, 
signal  troops,  and  sanitary  troops.  ' 

A  correct  organization  of  the  military  establishment  will  involve  the  organi 
zation  of  the  Regular  Mobile  Army  into  a  force  of  complete  tactical  divisions, 
and  a  similar  policy  should  apply  to  the  force  of  citizen  soldiers.  It  is  true 
that,  on  the  adoption  of  the  policy,  both  the  regular  force  and  the  one  com- 
posed of  citizen  soldiers  would  be  incomplete ;  but  the  completion  of  the  organi- 
zation would  furnish  a  goal  for  future  administration,  and  legislation.  The  at- 
tainment of  the  ideal  might  be  a  question  of  years  and  during  the  transition 
period,  practical  makeshifts  would  be  necessary  as  emergencies  arise.  If  a 
war  should  come  before  the  divisions  were  complete  it  might  be  necessary  to 
form  a  number  of  divisions  by  the  consolidation  of  a  greater  number  of  in- 
complete divisions,  but  even  this  would  involve  less  extemporization  than 
would  be  necessary  under  present  conditions.  Or  on  the  outbreak  of  war,  if 
sufficient  time  should  be  available,  the  divisions  might  be  completed  by  organ- 
izing new  volunteer  units  to  fill  the  gaps  in  the  division  organization.  The 
existence  of  definite  division  districts  would  facilitate  the  organzation  of  such 
forces.  It  would  be  understood  that  one  of  the  peace  problems  of  the  incom- 
plete divisions  would  be  the  preparation  of  plans  for  the  completion  of  its 
organization  in  event  of  sudden  emergency.  Such  new  volunteers  would  be 
a  logical  expansion  of  the  peace  organization. 

The  fact  that  the  present  National  Guard  force  lacks  many  of  the  units 
that  would  be  necessary  to  convert  it  into  a  well-balanced  war  force  is  one 
of  the  principal  arguments  for  legislation  like  that  proposed  in  the  volunteer 
bill  now  pending  in  the  Senate  (see  Appendix  I). 

For  the  purposes  of  the  foregoing  discussion,  divisional  troops  only  have 
been  considered.  In  working  out  a  final  plan  the  field  army  auxiliaries  of 
cavalry,  field  artillery,  and  special  troops,  and  the  coast  artillery  reserves,  must 
also  be  provided  for. 

The  complete  organization  of  the  mobile  land  forces  of  the  United  States  will, 
therefore,  include  three  distinct  forces. 

1.  A  regular  army  organized  in  divisions  and  cavalry  brigades  and  ready  for 
immediate  use  as  an  expeditionary  force  or  for  other  purposes  for  which  the 
citizen  soldiery  is  not  available,  or  for  employment  in  the  first  stages  of  war 
while  the  citizen  soldiery  is  mobilizing  and  concentrating. 

2.  An  army  of  national  citizen  soldiers  organized  in  peace  in  complete  divi- 
sions and  prepared  to  reenforce  the  Regular  Army  in  time  of  war. 

3.  An  army  of  volunteers  to  be  organized  under  prearranged  plans  when 
greater  forces  are  required  than  can  be  furnished  by  the  Regular  Army  and 
the  organized  citizen  soldiery. 

The  peace  establishment  of  the  Regular  Army  with  the  organized  division 
districts  of  the  National  Guard  should  include  the  machinery  for  the  recruiting 
organization,  and  mobilization  of  this  great  third  line  of  the  national  defense. 


62  ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND   FORCES. 

X. 

CONSIDERATIONS  DETERMINING  THE  STRENGTH,  COMPOSITION, 
AND  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  LAND  FORCES  OF  THE  UNITED 
STATES. 

1.  Political  conditions  affecting  our  country  >have  changed  very  materially 
in  the  past  20  years,  but  it  can  hardly  be  said  that  the  development  of  our  land 
forces  has  kept  pace  with  these  changing  conditions.  Until  quite  recently  our 
people  have  been  almost  wholly  occupied  with  the  task  of  overrunning  our 
continental  possessions  and  taking  full  possession  of  them.  The  Regular  Army 
has  been  the  forerunner  of  this  movement,  and  has  been  organized,  distributed, 
and  trained  for  the  requirements  thus  involved.  This  has  kept  the  bulk  of  the 
Regular  Army  scattered  in  small  units  in  our  western  country.  Conquest 
and  settlement  have  been  fairly  completed  now,  however,  and  the  civil  author- 
ities are  capable  of  maintaining  orderly  conditions  as  well  in  one  part  of  our 
country  as  in  another.  If  domestic  questions  were  still  the  only  ones  that  claimed 
serious  attention  it  would  seem  that  to  deal  with  such  questions  only  the 
Army  should  be  distributed  more  equitably  with  respect  to  density  of  population. 

But  gradually  our  external  problems  have  been  assuming  larger  and  larger 
proportions.  While  we  were  expanding  other  nations  have  been  doing  the  like, 
and  within  the  past  few  years  it  is  found  that  practically  the  whole  earth  is 
now  divided  up  among  the  principal  nations  and  held  by  them  either  as  actual 
possessions  or  as  spheres  of  influence.  Hitherto  the  interests  of  nations  or  of 
small  groups  of  nations  have  been  more  or  less  local.  But  due  to  this  world- 
wide expansion  the  contact  between  great  nations  and  races  has  already  become 
close.  It  tends  to  become  continually  closer,  due  to  the  increase  of  population 
and  national  needs,  and  due  especially  to  the  vastly  increased  facilities  for 
intercommunication.  With  this  close  contact  thus  so  recently  established 
comes  a  competition,  commercial,  national,  and  racial,  whose  ultimate  serious- 
ness current  events  already  enable  us  to  gauge.  Since  our  conflict  with  Spain 
in  1898  practically  all  of  the  principal  nations  of  the  earth  have  either  been 
actively  engaged  in  war  or  else  brought  to  the  verge  of  actual  war.  The  evi- 
dence is  clear  that  the  nations  and  races  capable  of  maintaining  and  protecting 
.themselves  are  the  only  ones  who  can  flourish  in  this  world  competition. 

We  have  been  drawn  from  our  state  of  isolation  and  are  inevitably  involved 
in  this  competition.  We  must  consider  what  preparation  we  will  niako  to 
meet  this  change  in  our  national  situation.  It  may  be  said  that  we  claim  the 
undisturbed  enjoyment  of  our  possessions  at  home  and  the  protection  of  our 
interests  abroad.  Our  military  requirements  may  then  be  summed  up  as  fol- 
lows: (1)  To  secure  our  home  country  from  invasion;  (2)  to  protect  our 
foreign  interests;  (3)  to  maintain  domestic  peace  and  good  order.  Our  forces 
should  be  proportioned,  organized,  and  trained  to  meet  these  requirements. 

2.  ESTIMATE  OF  THE  LAND  FORCES  NEEDED  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES. 

Our  requirements  in  the  way  of  land  forces  are  certain  to  change  as  the  years 
go  on,  but  in  the  light  of  present-day  conditions  it  is  estimated  that  at  the  out- 
break of  war  with  a  first-class  power  we  should  be  capable  of  mobilizing  at  once 
in  the  United  States  an  effective  force  of  460,000  mobile  troops  and  42.000  Coast 
Artillery ;  that  this  is  the  minimum  number  of  first-line  troops  necessary ;  and 
that  to  augment  this  force  and  replace  its  losses  we  should  have  plans  made  for 
raising  immediately  an  additional  force  of  800.000  men. 


ORGANIZATION    OF   THE   LAND   FORCES.  63 

To  meet  requirements  less  vital  than  n  great  national  'war — as  for  example, 
the  sending  of  expeditionary  forces  to  protect  certain  foreign  interests — it  may 
be  presumed  that  we  would  draw  upon  the  forces  thus  enumerated;  and  as  in 
the  light  of  our  recent  experiences  we  can  not  possibly  foretell  to  what  places 
expeditions  may  have  to  be  sent  nor  what  numbers  will  be  required,  all  of  these 
forces  should  be  available  for  service  anywhere. 

3.  REGULAR  AND  VOLUNTEER  TROOPS. 

The  Regular  Army  contingent  of  this  total  mobile  force  at  home  should  be 
sufficient  to  provide  an  expeditionary  force  capable  of  acting  with  the  utmost 
promptness  and  decision,  and  sufficient  to  furnish  a  training  nucleus  for  the 
volunteer  troops  in  peace  arid  a  stiffening  element  in  war.  To  meet  conditions 
we  can  now  foresee  it  is  believed  the  Regular  Army  should  comprise  four  com- 
plete divisions  and  that  it  should  furnish  as  extradivisional  troops,  a  division 
of  Cavalry  and  the  quota  of  Heavy  Field  Artillery,  Engineers,  Signal,  and 
sanitary  troops  appropriate  for  one  field  army.  On  this  basis  the  regular  con- 
tingent of  mobile  troops  within  the  United  States  proper  when  raised  to  war 
strength,  would  comprise  about  112,000  men.  The  remaining  348,000  mobile 
troops  would  be  made  up  of  citizen  soldiers  organized  in  divisions  and  in  field 
army  auxiliaries.  Each  group  of  three  division  districts  should  furnish  three 
complete  divisions  of  citizen  soldiers  and  the  extradivisional  troops  considered 
appropriate  for  a  field  army  of  three  divisions.  On  this  basis  the  quota  of 
348,000  citizen  soldiers  might  be  raised  from  12  division  districts1  and  they 
would  be  the  equivalent  of  4  normal  type  field  armies.  The  regular  and  volun- 
teer contingents  taken  together  would  then  represent  5  field  armies,  but  the 
exact  number  in  which  the  various  divisions  and  auxiliaries  would  actually  be 
combined  to  make  up  field  armies  would  depend  entirely  upon  the  necessities 
of  the  campaign  in  view. 

The  regular  contingent  of  Coast  Artillery  troops  in  the  United  States  should 
comprise  26,500  men  when  on  war  footing,  leaving  21,000  to  be  furnished  by 
the  citizen  soldiery.  These  figures  are  based  on  a  complete  regular  personnel 
for  mine  companies  and  50  per  cent  personnel  of  regulars  for  gun  companies 
for  authorized  armament. 

XI. 
A  COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE. 

0 

As  war  is  but  a  phase  of  international  politics,  so  military  policy  is  but  a 
phase  of  international  policy.  In  its  broadest  sense  the  organization  of  the  land 
forces  is  but  a  part  of  the  national  war  organization,  which  includes  the  organi- 
zation of  the  sea  forces  and  of  all  other  national  resources. 

A  scientific  solution  of  our  military  problem  must  include  a  determination  and 
definition  of  national  policy,  and  the  provision  of  sufficient  military  and  naval 
forces  to  support  that  policy  against  such  adverse  interests  as  may  develop 
from  time  to  time.  As  several  departments  of  the  Government  are  concerned 
in  the  settlement  of  this  question,  it  is  obvious  that  a  sound  policy  must  be 
predicated  upon  a  comprehensive  view  of  the  whole  problem  with  the  view  of 
coordinating  and  balancing  its  several  elements. 

*As  indicated  in  Chapter  IX  the  detailed  organization  of  the  citizen  soldiery  will  depend 
upon  the  .extent  to  which  the  present  organized  militia  can  be  utilized  for  general  military 
purposes.  The  organization  of  12  divisions,  with  the  extra  divisional  troops  for  four  field 
armies  and  with  the  necessary  Coast  Artillery  companies,  will  absorb  all  of  the  units  now 
organized  in  the  National  Guard, 


64  ORGANIZATION    OF   THE   LAND   FORCES. 

Iii  order  to  formulate  a  comprehensive  policy  for  the  consideration  of  Con- 
gress, it  is  believed  that  there  should  be  a  council  of  national  defense  similar 
to  the  one  proposed  in  H.  R.  1309.  The  function  of  this  council,  as  defined  in 
the  bill,  is  to  "  report  to  the  President,  for  transmission  to  Congress,  a  general 
policy  of  national  defense  and  such  recommendation  of  measures  relating 
thereto  as  it  shall  deem  necessary  and  expedient" 

The  members  of  the  council,  as  provided  in  the  bill,  are  as  follows : 

The  President  of  the  United  States  (ex  officio  president  of  the  council). 

The  Secretary  of  State  (to  preside  in  the  absence  of  the  President). 

The  Secretary  of  War. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

The  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Appropriations  of  the  Senate. 

The  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Senate. 

The  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  of  the  Senate. 

The  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs  of  the  Senate. 

The  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Appropriations  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives. 

The  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives. 

The  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives. 

The  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives. 

The  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  Army. 

An  officer  of  the  Navy  not  below  the  rank  of  captain,  to  be  selected  by  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

The  president  of  the  Army  War  College. 

The  president  of  the  Navy  War  College. 

It  would  seem  that  through  the  agency  of  this  council  the  problem  of  na- 
tional defense  should  receive  the  joint  consideration  of  all  of  the  branches  of  the 
Government  which  are  responsible  for  its  ultimate  solution. 


APPENDIX  I. 

S.  2518. 

A  BILL  TO  PROVIDE  FOR  RAISING  THE  VOLUNTEER  FORCES  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES  IN  TIME  OF  ACTUAL  OR  THREATENED  WAR. 

Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United 
States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  The  land  forces  of  the  United  States 
shall  consist  of  the  Regular  Army,  the  Militia,  and  such  volunteer  forces  as 
Congress  may  authorize. 

SEC.  2.  That  the  volunteer  forces  shall  be  raised  and  organized  as  in  this 
act  provided,  only  during  the  existence  of  war,  or  while  war  is  imminent,  and 
only  after  Congress  has  or  shall  have  authorized  the  President  to  raise  such  a 
force:  Provided,  That  the  term  of  enlistment  in  the  volunteer  forces  shall  be 
the  same  as  that  for  the  Regular  Army,  and  all  officers  and  enlisted  men  com- 
posing such  volunteer  forces  shall  be  mustered  out  of  the  service  of  the  United 
States  as  soon  as  practicable  after  the  President  shall  have  issued  a  proclama- 
tion announcing  the  termination  of  the  war  or  the  passing  of  the  emergency. 

SEC.  3.  That  when  volunteer  forces  are  to  be  raised  the  President  shall  issue 
his  proclamation,  stating  the  number  of  men  desired  for  each  arm,  corps,  and 
department,  within  such  limits  as  may  be  fixed  by  law,  and  the  Secretary  of 
War  shall  prescribe  such  rules  and  regulations,  not  inconsistent  with  the  terms 
of  this  act,  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  examining,  organizing,  and 
receiving  into  the  service  the  men  called  for:  Provided,  That  the  power  to  or- 
ganize shall  include  the  power  to  provide  the  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  all 
grades  and  classes,  including  trained  nurses,  male  and  female,  that  may  be 
necessary  in  the  various  arms,  corps,  and  departments:  Provided  further,  That 
all  enlisted  men  received  into  the  service  in  the  volunteer  forces  shall,  as  far 
as  practicable,  be  taken  from  the  several  States  and  Territories  and  the  District 
of  Columbia,  in  proportion  to  their  respective  populations:  Provided  further, 
That  when  the  raising  of  a  volunteer  force  shall  have  been  authorized  by 
Congress,  and  after  the  Organized  Militia  of  any  arm  or  class  shall  have  been 
called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States,  volunteers  of  that  particular  arm 
or  class  may  be  raised  and  accepted  into  said  service  in  accordance  with  the 
terms  of  this  act  regardless  of  the  extent  to  which  other  arms  or  classes  of  said 
.militia  shall  have  been  called  into  said  service. 

SEC.  4.  That  the  volunteer  forces  shall  be  subject  to  the  laws,  orders,  and 
regulations  governing  the  Regular  Army  ir  so  far  as  such  laws,  orders,  and 
regulations  are  applicable  to  officers  or  enlisted  men  whose  permanent  retention 
in  the  military  service,  either  on  the  active  list  or  on  the  retired  list,  is  not 
contemplated  by  existing  law;  and  no  distinction  shall  be  made  between  the 
Regular  Army  and  the  volunteer  forces  in  respect  to  the  conferring  upon 
officers  or  enlisted  men  of  brevet  rank,  medals  of  honor,  certificates  of  merit, 
or  other  rewards  for  distinguished  service:  Provided,  That  officers  of  the 
volunteer  forces  shall  be  competent  to  sit  upon  courts-martial  for  the  trial 
of  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  Regular  Army  and  of  the  National  Guard,  or 
Organized  Militia,  when  the  latter  has  been  called  into  the  service  of  the  United 
States ;  that  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  shall  be  competent  to  sit  upon  courts- 
martial  for  the  trial  of  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  volunteer  forces  and  of  the 
National  Guard,  or  Organized  Militia,  when  the  latter  has  been  called  into  the 
service  of  the  United  States,  unless  objection  be  made  by  the  accused,  and  that 
no  distinction  shall  be  made  between  the  Regular  Army  and  the  volunteer 
forces  in  respect  to  the  eligibility  of  any  regular  or  volunteer  officer  for  service 
in  any  court  of  inquiry  or  military  commission :  Provided  further,  That  the 
organization  of  all  units  of  the  line  and  of  the  signal  troops  of  the  volunteer 
forces  shall  be  the  same  as  that  prescribed  by  law  and  regulations  for  the 
corresponding  units  of  the  Regular  Army:  Provided  further,  That  when  mili- 

50043°— 12 5  65 


66  OKGANIZATION    OF   THE   LAND   FOKCES. 

tary  conditions  so  require,  the  President  may  organize  the  land  forces  of  the 
United  States  into  brigades  and  divisions  and  such  higher  units  as  he  may 
deem  necessary,  and  the  composition  of  units  higher  than  the  regiment  shall  be 
as  he  may  prescribe:  Provided  further,  That  to  each  regiment  of  infantry, 
cavalry,  and  artillery,  and  to  each  battalion  of  engineers  and  signal  troops  or- 
ganized under  this  act,  there  shall  be  attached  the  same  personnel  of  the 
Medical  Department  as  are  attached  to  like  organizations  of  the  Regular  Army : 
Provided  further,  That  the  organization  of  the  coast  defenses,  of  machine-gun 
detachments,  establishments  of  the  Medical  Department,  remount  depots,  mili- 
tary trains,  secret-service  agencies,  military  prisons,  lines  of  communication, 
including  their  supply  depots,  and  of  other  adjuncts  that  may  be  necessary  in 
the  prosecution  of  war,  and  the  organization  of  which  is  not  otherwise  pro- 
vided for  by  law,  shall  be  as  the  President  may  from  time  to  time  direct. 

SEC.  5.  That  the  President  is  authorized,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent 
of  the  Senate,  to  appoint  all  officers  required  by  this  act ;  the  number  and  grade 
of  such  officers  not  to  exceed  the  number  and  grade  of  like  officers  provided  for 
a  like  force  of  the  Regular  Army :  Provided,  That  all  appointments  below  the 
grade  of  brigadier  general  in  the  line  of  the  volunteer  forces  shall  be  by 
commission  in  an  arm  of  the  service  and  not  by  commission  in  any  par- 
ticular regiment;  and  officers  in  each  arm  of  the  service  shall  be  assigned 
to  regiments,  and  transferred  from  one  regiment  to  another,  as  the  interests  of 
the  service  may  require,  by  orders  from  the  Secretary  of  War:  Provided 
further,  That  no  officer  above  the  grade  of  colonel  shall  be  appointed  under 
the  provisions  of  this  act. 

SEC.  6.  That  to  provide  the  staff  officers  that  will  be  necessary  in  the  various 
staff  corps  and  departments  in  time  of  war  or  while  war  is  imminent,  and  that 
are  not  otherwise  provided  for  in  this  act,  the  President  is  authorized  to  ap- 
point, by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  such  number  of  volun- 
teer staff  officers  of  the  proper  grades  for  such  corps  and  departments  as  he 
may  find  necessary:.  Provided,  That  the  total  number  of  such  officers  so  ap- 
pointed, including  all  such  officers  of  the  National  Guard  called  into  the 
service  of  the  United  States,  shall  not  exceed  the  ratio  of  one  officer  to  two 
hundred  enlisted  men  for  all  National  Guard  and  volunteer  forces  called  into 
the  service  of  the  United  States :  Provided  further,  That  the  number  of  officers 
appointed  in  each  grade  in  such  staff  corps  and  departments  shall  not  exceed 
in  each  staff  corps  or  department  the  proportionate  strength  of  the  correspond- 
ing grade  as  established  by  law  for  like  staff  corps  and  departments  of  the 
Regular  Army :  Provided  further,  That  the  President  may  appoint,  by  and  with 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  volunteer  chaplains  at  the  rate  of  one 
for  each  regiment  of  volunteer  infantry,  cavalry,  and  field  artillery,  and  one 
for  every  twelve  companies  of  volunteer  coast  artillery  raised,  with  rank  cor- 
responding to  that  established  by  law  for  chaplains  in  the  Regular  Army. 

SEC.  7.  That  in  appointing  the  volunteer  officers  authorized  by  this  act 
the  President  may  select  them  from  the  Regular  Army,  from  those  duly  quali- 
fied and  registered  pursuant  to  section  twenty-three  of  the  act  of  Congress 
approved  January  twenty-first,  nineteen  hundred  and  three,  from  the  National* 
Guard  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  and,  upon  the  recommendation  of  the 
various  governors,  from  the  National  Guard  of  the  several  States  and  Terri- 
tories in  proportion,  as  far  as  practicable,  to  their  respective  populations,  and 
as  near  as  may  be  from  the  localities  from  which  the  troops  were  recruited, 
and  from  the  country  at  large :  Provided,  That  in  appointments  from  the 
country  at  large  preference  shall  be  given  those  who  have  had  honorable 
service  in  the  Regular  Army,  the  National  Guard,  or  the  volunteer  forces,  or 
who  have  been  graduated  from  educational  institutions  in  which  military 
instruction  is  compulsory :  Provided  further,  That  at  the  same  time,  not  to 
exceed  one  Regular  Army  Officer  shall  hold  a  volunteer  commission  in  any  one 
battalion  of  volunteer  engineers  or  signal  troops,  or  in  any  one  battalion  of 
volunteer  field  artillery;  and  not  to  exceed  four  Regular  Army  officers  shall 
hold  commissions  in  any  one  regiment  of  volunteer  cavalry,  'field  artillery, 
or  infantry,  or  in  any  twelve  companies  of  coast  artillery,  including  their  field 
and  staff,  at  the  same  time :  And  provided  further,  That  Regular  Army  officers 
appointed  as  officers  of  Volunteers  under  this  act  shall  not  thereby  vacate 
their  Regular  Army  commissions  or  be  prejudiced  in  their  relative  or  lineal 
standing  therein. 

SEC.  8.  That  the  temporary  vacancies  created  in  any  grade  not  above  that 
of  colonel  among  the  commissioned  personnel  of  any  arin,  staff  corps,  or  de- 
partment of  the  Regular  Army,  through  appointments  of  officers  thereof  to 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE  LAND  FORCES.  67 

higher  volunteer  rank,  shall  be  filled  by  temporary  promotion  according  to 
seniority  in  rank  from  officers  holding  commissions  in  the  next  lower  grade 
in  said  arm,  staff  corps,  or  department;  and  all  temporary  vacancies  created 
in  any  grade  by  temporary  promotions  shall  in  like  manner  be  filled  from, 
and  thus  create  temporary  vacancies  in,  the  next  lower  grade ;  and  the  vacancies 
that  remain  thereafter  in  said  arm,  staff  corps,  or  department  that  can  not 
be  filled  by  temporary  promotions,  as  prescribed  in  this  section,  may  be  filled 
by  the  temporary  appointment  of  officers  of  such  number  and  grade  or  grades 
as  shall  maintain  said  arm,  corps,  or  department  at  the  full  commissioned 
strength  authorized  by  law :  Provided,  That  in  the  staff  corps  and  depart- 
ments subject  to  the  provisions  of  sections  twenty-six  and  twenty-seven  of 
the  act  of  Congress,  approved  February  second,  nineteen  hundred  and  one,  and 
acts  amendatory  thereto,  temporary  vacancies  that  can  not  be  filled  by  tem- 
porary promotions,  as  hereinbefore  prescribed,  shall  be  filled  by  temporary 
details  made  in  the  manner  prescribed  in  said  sections  twenty-six  and  twenty- 
seven  and  acts  amendatory  thereto,  and  the  resulting  temporary  vacancies  in 
ihe  branches  of  the  Army  from  which  the  details  are  so  made  shall  be  filled 
as  hereinbefore  in  this  section  prescribed:  'Provided  further,  That  officers 
temporarily  promoted  or  appointed  under  the  terms  of  this  section  shall  be 
so  promoted  or  appointed  by  the  President,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  con- 
sent of  the  Senate,  for  terms  that  shall  not  extend  beyond  the  termination  of 
the  war  or  the  passing  of  the  existing  emergency  as  defined  by  the  President's 
proclamation,  whereupon  the  said  officers  shall  be  discharged  from  the  posi- 
tions held  by  them  under  their  temporary  promotions  or  appointments  and 
officers  detailed  as  herein  authorized  shall  be  relieved  from  their  temporary 
details:  Provided  further,  That  officers  temporarily  promoted  under  the  pro- 
visions of  this  section  shall  not  vacate  their  permanent  commissions  nor  be 
prejudiced  in  their  lineal  or  relative  standing  in  the  Regular  Army. 

SEC.  9.  That  all  returns  and  muster  rolls  of  organizations  of  the  volunteer 
forces  and  of  militia  organizations  while  in  the  service  of  the  United  States 
shall  be  rendered  to  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army,  and  upon  the  muster 
out  of  such  organizations  the  records  pertaining  to  them  shall  be  transferred 
to  and  filed  in  The  Adjutant  General's  Office.  And  regimental  and  all  other 
medical  officers  serving  with  volunteer  troops,  or  with  militia  organizations 
in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  in  the  field  or  elsewhere,  shall  keep  a  daily 
record  of  all  soldiers  reported  sick  or  wounded,  as  shown  by  the  morning  calls 
or  reports,  and  shall  deposit  such  reports,  with  other  reports  provided  for  in 
this  section,  in  The  Adjutant  General's  Office,  as  provided  for  herein  for  other 
reports,  returns,  and  muster  rolls. 

SEC.  10.  That  in  time  of  war  all  organizations  of  the  land  forces  shall  be  re- 
cruited and  maintained  as  near  their  prescribed  strength  as  practicable.  For 
this  purpose  the  necessary  rendezvous  and  depots  shall  be  established  by  the 
Secretary  of  War  for  the  enlistment  and  training  of  all  recruits,  and  in  order 
that  officers  may  be  available  for  recruiting  duty  the  President  is  authorized, 
by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  to  appoint  officers  of 
Volunteers  of  the  proper  arm  of  the  service,  additional  to  those  elsewhere 
herein  authorized,  in  numbers  not  to  exceed  at  the  rate  of  one  major,  four 
captains,  five  first  lieutenants,  and  five  second  lieutenants  for  each  organized 
regiment  of  Cavalry,  Field  Artillery,  or  Infantry,  each  three  battalions  of 
Engineers,  or  each  twelve  companies  of  Coast  Artillery;  that  for  purposes  of 
instruction  and  discipline  the  troops  at  recruit  depots  herein  authorized  may 
be  organized  into  companies  and  battalions,  at  the  discretion  of  the  Secretary 
of  War,  with  noncommissioned  officers  and  privates  of  such  grades  and  numbers 
as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  President.  The  recruit  rendezvous  and  recruit 
depots  herein  prescribed  shall  be  under  the  direct  control  of  the  Secretary  of 
War,  and  shall  render  their  reports  and  returns  to  The  Adjutant  General  of 
the  Army:  Provided,  That  to  maintain  the  National  Guard  organizations  in 
the  service  of  the  United  States  at  their  maximum  strength  the  recruiting 
rendezvous  and  depots  in  any  State  or  Territory  may,  at  the  request  of  the 
governor  thereof,  enlist  and  train  recruits  for  the  National  Guard  organizations 
in  the  service  of  the  United  States  from  that  State. 

SEC.  11.  That,  in  the  organization  of  the  recruiting  system,  the  President  is 
authorized  to  employ  retired  officers,  noncommissioned  officers,  and  privates 
of  the  Regular  Army,  either  with  their  rank  on  the  retired  list  or,  in  the  case 
of  enlisted  men,  with  increased  noncommissioned  rank :  or  he  may,  by  and 
with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  appoint  and  employ  retired  officers" 
below  the  grade  of  colonel,  with  increased  volunteer  commissioned  rank  not 


68  OKGANLZATION  OF   THE   LAND  FOKCES. 

to  exceed  one  grade  above  that  held  by  them  upon  the  retired  list,  or  retired 
enlisted  men  with  volunteer  commissioned  rank  not  above  the  grade  of  first 
lieutenant :  Provided,  That  retired  officers  and  enlisted  men  while  thus  em- 
ployed shall  not  be  eligible  for  transfer  to  the  field  units,  but  shall  receive 
the  full  pay  and  allowances  of  the  respective  grades  in  which  they  are  serv- 
ing, whether  volunteer  or  regular,  in  lieu  of  their  retired  pay  and  allowances : 
Provided  further,  That  upon  the  termination  of  the  duty  or,  in  case  of  those 
given  volunteer  rank,  upon  muster  out  as  volunteers,  the  officers  and  men  shall 
revert  to  their  retired  status. 

SEC.  12.  That,  except  as  otherwise  specifically  prescribed  by  law,  all  officers 
provided  for  in  this  act  are  subject  to  such  assignments  of  duty  and  such 
transfers  as  the  President  may  direct:  Provided,  That  medical  officers  of 
ATolunteers  when  detailed  as  consulting  surgeons  shall  not  exercise  command 
over  the  hospitals  to  which  they  may  be  assigned  for  duty,  except  that  by 
virtue  of  their  commissions  they  may  command  all  enlisted  men :  Provided 
further,  That  medical  inspectors  shall  be  detailed  for  duty  with  each  army, 
army  corps,  and  division,  and  for  the  base  and  lines  of  communications,  and 
that  no  officer  shall  be  detailed  for  duty  as  a  medical  inspector  except  he  be 
experienced  in  military  sanitation. 

SEC.  13.  That  all  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  volunteer  forces  shall  be 
in  all  respects  on  the  same  footing  as  to  pay,  allowances,  and  pensions 
as  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  corresponding  grades  in  the  Regular  Army : 
Provided,  That  enlisted  men  in  the  Quartermaster's  Department  and  Sub- 
sistence Department  of  the  volunteer  forces  shall  receive  the  same  pay  and 
allowances  as  enlisted  men  of  corresponding  grades  in  the  Engineer  Corps. 

SEC.  14.  That  the  commander  of  a  division  or  higher  military  unit  is  au- 
thorized to  appoint,  from  time  to  time,  military  boards  of  not  less  than  three 
nor  more  than  five  officers  of  the  volunteer  forces  to  examine  into  the  capacity, 
qualifications,  conduct,  and  efficiency  of  any  commissioned  officer  of  said  forces 
within  his  command:  Provided,  That  each  member  of  the  board  ehall  be 
superior  in  rank  to  the  officer  whose  qualifications  are  to  be  inquired  into : 
Provided  further,  That  if  the  report  of  such  board  is  adverse  to  the  con- 
tinuance of  any  officer,  and  if  the  report  be  approved  by  the  President,  such 
officer  shall  be  discharged  from  service  in  the  volunteer  forces,  at  the  discre- 
tion of  the  President,  with  one  month's  pay  and  allowances. 

SEC.  15.  That  the  act  approved  April  twenty-second,  eighteen  hundred  and 
ninety-eight,  entitled  "An  act  to  provide  for  temporarily  increasing  the  military 
establishment  of  the  United  States  in  time  of  war,  and  for  other  purposes," 
is  hereby  repealed,  and  all  other  laws  or  parts  of  laws  inconsistent  with  the 
provisions  of  this  act  are,  to  the  extent  of  such  inconsistency  only,  hereby 
repealed. 


MILITIA  AND  VOLUNTEERS  AND  METHODS   OF  APPOINTING  THEIR 

OFFICERS. 

MEMORANDUM  SUBMITTED  BY  SENATOR  DU  PONT  TO  THE  SENATE  COMMITTEE  ON 
MILITARY  AFFAIRS  CONCERNING  THE  BILL  (S.  2518)  FOR  RAISING  THE  VOLUN- 
TEER FORCES  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  IN  TIME  OF  ACTUAL  OR  THREATENED  WAR. 

The  land  forces  of  the  United  States  are  divided  into  three  separate  and  dis- 
tinct classes,  consisting — 

(A)  Of  the  Regular  Army,  which  is  the  military  establishment  maintained 
during  both  peace  and  war,  under  the  provisions  of  Article  I,  section  8,  of  the 
Constitution,  giving  Congress  power  to  raise  and  support  armies,  and  to  make 
rules  for  the  government  and  regulation  of  the  same. 

(B)  Of  the  militia  of  the  different  States  and  Territories  and  of  the  District 
of  Columbia,  when  called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States,  under  the  pro- 
visions of  Article  I,  section  8,  of  the  Constitution,  giving  Congress  power  to  pro- 
vide for  calling  forth  the  militia  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union,  suppress 
insurrections,  and  repel  invasions. 

(C)  Of  such  volunteer  forces  as  Congress  shall  authorize  to  be  raised,  under 
the  provisions  of  Article  I,  section  8,  of  the  Constitution,  giving  Congress  power 
to  raise  and  support  armies,  and  to  make  rules  for  the  government  and  regula- 
tion of  the  same. 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE  LAND  FORCES.  69 

MILITIA. 

Under  the  acts  of  Congress  approved  May  8,  1792,  July  17,  1862,  and  March 
2,  1867,  the  militia  of  the  different  States,  Territories,  and  District  of  Columbia 
is  composed  of  all  able-bodied  citizens  between  the  ages  of  18  and  45 ;  but  under 
the  provisions  of  the  act  of  Congress  approved  January  21,  1903,  known  as  the 
Dick  law,  and  amendments  thereto,  the  militia,  as  above  constituted,  is  classi- 
fied under  two  heads : 

First.  The  Organized  Militia,  often  styled  the  National  Guard,  consisting  of 
officers  commissioned  by  the  governors  of  the  respective  States  and  Territories 
and  in  the  District  of  Columbia  by  the  President  and  of  enlisted  men  who  have 
engaged  to  serve  for  such  specified  periods  as  may  be  determined  by  the  laws 
of  the  different  States  and  Territories.  In  the  District  of  Columbia  these 
periods  are  determined  by  the  United  States  statutes. 

Second.  The  reserve  militia,  consisting  of  the  whole  body  of  the  militia  not 
regularly  enlisted,  organized,  and  uniformed. 

The  governors  have  power  to  call  out  the  militia  for  service  within  their  respec- 
tive States  and  Territories,  and  Congress  has  power  under  section  8,  Article  I, 
of  the  Constitution,  to  call  out  the  militia  of  the  respective  States  and  Territo- 
ries to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union,  suppress  insurrections,  and  repel  invasions. 

Congress,  by  the  statute  of  1795,  made  it  lawful  for  the  President  to  call  out 
such  numbers  of  the  militia  as  he  may  deem  necessary,  and  when  properly 
mustered  into  the  United  States  service  such  numbers  as  may  be  called  out 
become  a  part  of  the  land  forces  of  the  United  States.  It  is  evident,  however, 
that  it  is  not  practicable  for  the  President  to  call  out  such  portions  of  the 
militia  as  do  not  possess  a  military  organization.  While  the  President  has 
authority  to  determine  the  period  for  which  the  militia  is  to  be  called  into  the 
service  of  the  United  States,  under  the  statutes  he  can  not  detain  any  officer 
or  enlisted  man  beyond  the  term  of  his  existing  State  commission  or  enlistment; 
and,  except  in  the  case  of  the  militia  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  he  can  not 
make  any  appointments  or  promotions  of  commissioned  officers  of  the  Organ- 
ized Militia  of  the  States  and  Territories  when  called  into  the  service  of  the 
United  States,  the  authority  to  make  such  appointments  being  expressly  re- 
served to  the  respective  States  under  section  8  of  Article  I  of  the  Constitution 
and  given  by  statute  to  the  governors  of  Territories. 

VOLUNTEERS. 

In  general  terms  the  word  "  volunteer  "  applies  to  a  man  who  voluntarily 
engages  in  the  military  service  of  the  United  States,  or  of  some  particular 
State  or  Territory,  and  differentiates  him  from  a  man  who  is  drafted  com- 
pulsorily  into  the  military  service — a  power  which  Congress  has  the  right  to 
exercise  and  did  exercise  during  the  Civil  War.  In  this  sense  the  term  "  vol- 
unteer "  is  just  as  much  applicable  to  the  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the 
Regular  Army  as  to  the  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  so-called  volunteer 
troops.  It  is  equally  applicable  to  the  Organized  Militia  so  far  as  concerns 
their  relations  to  their  respective  States  and  Territories,  but  when  called  into 
the  national  service  by  the  President  they  are  in  no  sense  Volunteers  so  far  as 
the  United  States  is  concerned. 

To  avoid  confusion,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  term  "  volunteers,"  as  ap- 
plied technically  to  one  of  the  three  classes  into  which  our  land  forces  are 
divided,  is  used  in  a  special  or  restricted  sense  and  includes  only  the  troops 
which  have  been  raised  and  maintained  for  limited  periods  under  authority  of 
Congress  as  adjuncts  to  the  Regular  Army  in  times  of  actual  or  threatened 
war,  or  other  emergency. 

So  far  as  the  constitutional  authority  for  their  creation  is  concerned,  the 
regular  and  the  so-called  volunteer  forces  are  upon  an  identical  footing,  but 
are  differentiated  by  the  fact  that  the  former  are  permanent  and  the  latter 
temporary. 

The  term  "  volunteers,"  as  appled  to  military  organizations,  appears  for  the 
first  time  in  the  act  of  May  28,  1798,  which  empowered  the  President  to  accept 
any  company  .or  companies  of  Volunteers  who  might  associate  and  offer  them- 
selves for  the  service.  This  act  authorized  the  President  to  appoint  the  com- 
missioned officers  of  such  company  or  companies,  and  the  act  of  June  22,  1798, 
empowered  him  to  organize  the  companies  into  legions,  regiments,  or  battalions, 
and  to  appoint  field  officers  for  the  same. 


70  ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND  FORCES. 

It  will  be  noted  that  as  the  States  or  Territories  are  not  mentioned  in  the 
act  of  May,  1798,  the  companies  of  Volunteers  to  be  raised  under  its  provisions 
were  not  in  any  sense  State  organizations,  but  could  be  taken  from  the  country 
at  large. 

Volunteers  are  next  mentioned  in  the  act  of  March  2,  1799,  which  empowered 
the  President  to  accept  23  regiments  of  such  troops  to  be  employed  in  the  same 
manner  as  the  militia,  and  to  appoint,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of 
the  Senate,  the  volunteer  field  officers. 

In  1803,  when  difficulties  arose  with  Spain,  the  President  was  authorized  by 
the  act  of  March  3  of  that  year  to  require  the  executives  of  such  of  the  States 
as  he  might  deem  expedient  to  organize,  arm,  equip,  and  hold  in  readiness 
to  march  at  a  moment's  warning,  detachments  of  militia,  not  exceeding  in  all 
80,000  men;  and  the  second  section  of  this  statute  gave  the  President  power  to 
authorize  the  State  executives  to  accept  as  part  of  such  detachments  any  corps 
of  Volunteers,  the  officers  of  whom  were  to  be  appointed  by  the  State  authorities. 

The  acts  of  February  24,  1807,  and  March  30,  1808,  when  trouble  was  antici- 
pated with  England,  were  practically  repetitions  of  the  statute  of  1803,  except 
that  the  number  of  men  to  be  called  out  were  not  to  exceed  30,000  and  100,000, 
respectively,  including  corps  of  Volunteers. 

The  act  of  February  6,  1812,  was  largely  a  reenactment  of  the  statute  of 
1807,  except  that  the  number  of  Volunteers  was  not  to  exceed  50,000  men  ;  but 
the  act  of  July  6  of  the  same  year  repealed  this  statute  so  far  as  the  appoint- 
ment of  officers  was  concerned  and  empowered  the  President  to  appoint  and 
commission  them,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate. 

The  act  of  February  24,  1814,  reenacted  the  legislation  of  1812,  except  that 
the  President  was  authorized  to  receive  such  proportion  of  Volunteers  "  as 
in  his  judgment  the  public  service  may  require,"  who  were  to  serve  for  five 
years,  or  during  the  war;  and  about  a  month  later  the  act  of  March  30,  1814, 
empowered  the  President,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  to 
make  all  necessary  appointments  of  officers  and  to  fill  all  vacancies.  During 
the  following  year  there  was  still  further  legislation  in  regard  to  Volunteers. 
Sections  3  and  4  of  the  act  approved  January  27,  1815,  empowered  the  Presi- 
dent to  receive  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  any  Volunteers  who  might 
offer  their  services,  not  to  exceed  40,000  men,  and  required  that  the  officers- 
should  be  commissioned  by  the  President. 

Passing  now  to  the  Florida  War,  the  act  of  May  23,  1836,  authorized  the 
President  to  accept  the  services  of  not  exceeding  10,000  Volunteers,  the  officers 
to  be  appointed  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  law  in  the  several  States  and 
Territories  to  which  such  Volunteers  belonged,  and  practically  the  same  legis- 
lation was  reenacted  on  March  3,  1839,  when  50,000  Volunteers  were  authorized 
at  the  time  of  the  dispute  with  Great  Britain  in  regard  to  the  Maine  boundary 
line,  and  again  on  May  13,  1846,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Mexican  War,  50,000 
Volunteers  were  likewise  authorized.  It  is  to  be  observed,  however,  that  the 
act  of  March  3,  1847,  empowered  the  President  to  organize  the  Volunteers  who 
might  reenlist  into  companies,  battalions,  and  regiments,  and  to  commission 
the  officers  of  the  same. 

Under  the  act  of  April  7,  1858,  a  regiment  of  Volunteers  was  organized  for 
the  defense  and  protection  of  the  Texas  frontier,  and  two  regiments  to  quell 
the  disturbances  in  Utah,  the  officers  of  the  three  regiments  to  be  appointed 
in  the  manner  prescribed  by  law  in  the  several  States  and  Territories,  except 
the  regimental  quartermasters  and  commissaries,  who  were  detailed  from  the 
Regular  Army. 

During  the  Civil  War  the  first  legislation  in  regard  to  Volunteers,  enacted  on 
the  22d  of  July,  1861,  made  a  radical  departure  from  either  of  the  previous 
methods  of  appointing  volunteer  officers,  inasmuch  as  it  provided  that  the  com- 
pany officers  were  to  be  elected  by  the  men,  and  the  field  officers  by  the  company 
officers;  but  the  act  of  the  6th  of  August  following  rescinded  this  and  pre- 
scribed that  the  vacancies  among  the  commissioned  officers  of  volunteer  regi- 
ments were  to  be  filled  by  the  State  governors. 

Under  the  act  of  July  17,  1862,  colored  troops  were  first  organized  in  South 
Carolina  and  Louisiana,  and  later  in  many  other  places  to  the  number  of  nearly 
100,000  men.  While  the  officers  in  most  instances  were  not  named  directly  by 
the  President,  they  were  appointed,  after  passing  careful  examinations,  by  the 
Adjutant  General  and  other  officials  under  his  authority. 

On  April  28,  1863,  an  invalid  corps  was  organized  for  garrison  duty,  made 
up  of  officers  and  enlisted  men  who  had  been  wounded  or  otherwise  disabled 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND  FORCES.  71 

for  active  field  service,  the  officers,  after  passing  satisfactory  examinations,  be- 
ing appointed  by  the  President,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Senate.  About  the  same  time  six  regiments  and  one  company  of  United  States 
Volunteers  were  organized,  the  officers  being  all  appointed  by  the  Secretary  of 
War  after  passing  examinations;  and  on  the  20th  of  May,  1864,  a  regiment  of 
veteran  volunteer  engineers  was  raised  in  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  the 
officers  being  appointed  by  the  President  upon  the  recommendation  of  the  com- 
mander of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

The  last  act  relating  to  Volunteers  during  the  Civil  War  was  that  of  Novem- 
ber 28,  1864,  which  created  a  new  Volunteer  Army  corps,  consisting  of  not  less 
than  20,000  men,  and  known  as  the  United  States  Veteran  Volunteers,  the  officers 
being  appointed  by  the  Secretary  of  War  after  rigid  examination. 

The  first  legislation  in  regard  to  Volunteers  passed  during  the  Spanish  Wai- 
was  that  of  April  22,  1898,  which  gave  the  appointment  of  all  regimental  and 
company  officers  to  the  governors  of  the  States  in  which  their  respective  organi- 
zations were  raised,  except  that  the  President  was  authorized  to  organize  not 
exceeding  3,000  men  possessing  special  qualifications,  and  to  appoint  the 
officers  of  the  same.  The  act  of  May  11  of  that  year  provided  for  a  volunteer 
brigade  of  engineers  and  a  force  of  10,000  immunes,  all  of  the  officers  to  be 
appointed  by  the  President,  with  the  consent  of  the  Senate. 

The  latest  legislation  on  the  statute  books  in  regard  to  Volunteers  is  that 
of  March  2,  1899,  which  authorized  the  raising  from  the  country  at  large  of 
a  force  not  exceeding  35,000  men  for  service  in  the  Philippine  insurrection, 
and  provided  that  the  officers  should  be  appointed  by  the  President  by  and 
with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate.  It  is  admitted  by  all  that  the 
troops  mustered  into  the  service  under  the  provisions  of  this  act  became  the 
best  disciplined  and  best  instructed,  and  were  therefore  the  most  efficient 
and  most  economical  body  of  Volunteers  that  have  ever  formed  a  part  of 
our  national  land  forces. 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  foregoing  that  there  has  been  no  uniform  rule 
in  the  method  of  appointing  officers  of  the  volunteer  forces,  and  that  the 
'egislation  has  often  conferred  this  power  wholly  or  in  part  upon  the  Presi- 
dent, while  at  other  times  it  has  been  vested  in  the  governors  of  the  States 
and  Territories. 

In  all  but  two  States  of  the  Union  militia  officers  below  the  rank  of  major 
:ire  elected  by  the  men  and  the  field  officers  by  the  company  officers.  When 
the  appointment  of  volunteer  officers  has  been  left  to  the  State  and  Territorial 
executives,  the  usual  practice  has  been — and  particularly  during  the  Spanish 
War — to  make  nearly  all  such  appointments,  and  promotions  as  well,  on 
analogous  lines,  the  practical  result  being  that  the  volunteer  officers  are  elected 
by  those  whom  they  are  to  command.  It  is  needless  to  point  out  that  the 
appointment  and  promotion  of  officers  on  these  lines  is  not  only  wholly  wrong 
In  principle  but  most  pernicious  in  results,  radically  affecting,  as  it  does,  the 
discipline  and  efficiency  of  the  troops  and  enormously  increasing  the  expense 
to  the  Government  by  making  it  necessary  to  emply  at  least  twice  as  large 
a  number  in  order  to  secure  the  same  result.  In  defense  of  this  bad  system 
it  is  claimed  that  the  men  would  come  forward  more  readily  and  in  greater 
numbers,  but  when  we  consider  the  vast  population  from  which  the  Volunteers 
can  be  drawn  it  is  believed  that  this  argument  has  but  little  weight.  Within 
three  months  after  the  declaration  of  war  with  Spain  no  less  than  56,258 
men  had  enlisted  in  the  Regular  Army.  If  in  1898  such  a  large  number  of 
men  were  willing  to  enlist  in  the  Regular  Army  with  its  reputation  for  strict 
discipline  and  where  the  men  have  no  voice  whatever  in  the  selection  of  their 
officers,  should  another  war  occur  it  would  seem  reasonable  to  suppose  (tak- 
ing into  consideration  the  large  increase  of  our  population)  that  the  necessary 
men  would  be  forthcoming  for  the  volunteer  regiments,  even  if  the  appointment 
of  the  officers  were  vested  in  the  President.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  in  1899, 
although  the  climate  was  very  hot  and  unhealthy  and  the  seat  of  war  was  at 
the  other  end  of  the  world,  there  was  no  difficulty  whatever  experienced  in 
raising  from  the  country  at  large  35.000  Volunteers  for  service  in  the  Philip- 
pines, the  officers  being  all  appointed  by  the  President 

Even  if  the  contention  above  referred  to  were  true,  it  is  submitted  that,  in 
the  judgment  of  all  military  experts,  volunteer  troops  in  which  the  officers  are 
elected  by  those  under  them  would  not  be  as  efficient  as  a  much  lesser  number 
organized  under  the  system  proposed  in  the  bill,  under  which  the  President 
appoints  the  officers  subject  to  the  restrictions  and  limitations  therein  con- 
tained, and  this,  too,  with  an  immense  dimunition  in  the  expense  of  the  war. 


APPENDIX   II. 

ORGANIZATION  OF  FIELD  ARTILLERY— ORGANIZATION* OF  THE  AM- 
MUNITION SERVICE  OF  DIVISIONS  AND  ARMIES. 

The  proposed  organization  of  the  Field  Artillery  is : 
For  each  division : 

1  regiment  of  3  battalions : 

1  battalion  of  3  batteries  of  four  3-inch  guns 12 

1  battalion  of  3  batteries  of  four  3-inch  guns 12 

1  battalion  of  2  batteries  of  four  3.8-inch  howitzers 

1  regiment  of  3  battalions : 

1  battalion  of  3  batteries  of  four  3-inch  guns 12 

1  battalion  of  3  batteries  of  four  3-inch  guns 12 

1  battalion  of  2  batteries  of  four  4.7-inch  howitzers 8 

1  ammunition  column  of  2  battalions. 

For  each  field  army  in  addition  to  the  divisional  Artillery : 

1  regiment  of  2  battalions : 

1  battalion  of  2  batteries  of  four  4.7  inch  guns 

1  battalion  of  2  batteries  of  four  6-inch  howitzers 8 

1  ammunition  column  of  1  battalion. 

For  each  Cavalry  division : 

1  regiment  of  3  battalions  of  2  batteries  of  four  guns  each,  caliber  3-inch_         24 
1  ammunition  column  of  1  battalion. 

The  normal  organization  to  be  prescribed  for  the  Field  Artillery  pertaining 
to  divisions  and  field  armies  is  complicated  by  the  facts  that  several  different 
calibers  must  be  provided;  that  they  must  be  provided  in  proper  proportion, 
and  that  the  various  calibers  must  be  grouped  in  organizations  best  adapted  to 
employment  in  war  and  training  in  peace. 

The  choice  of  the  proper  organization  for  the  divisional  Artillery  affords  the 
principal  difficulty.  For  the  total  number  of  Infantry  and  Cavalry  in  the 
division  it  is  estimated  that  the  total  number  of  field  pieces  to  be  provided  is 
about  60.  It  is  regarded  as  necessary  to  have  a  certain  number  of  howitzers 
included  in  this  number,  and  it  is  regarded  as  desirable  for  purposes  of  training 
in  peace  and  employment  in  war  to  group  the  various  elements  in  definite  regi- 
mental organizations. 

After  study  of  various  combinations,  the  solution  proposed  above  is  regarded 
as  best  meeting  the  needs  of  our  service.  Each  regiment  is  given  a  fair  pro- 
portion of  howitzers,  and  no  more.  With  its  three  battalions — 2  gun  and  3 
howitzer — the  regiment  is  capable  of  meeting  a  variety  of  requirements  in 
war  and  is  well  adapted  to  illustrating  the  varied  uses  of  artillery  during  com- 
bined instruction  with  the  other  arms  in  the  various  parts  of  the  country  in 
time  of  peace.  Each  division  is  provided  with  a  reduced  number  of  both  types 
of  the  fairly  mobile  howitzers  (3.8-inch  and  4.7-inch).  This  distribution  is 
preferred  to  that  of  assigning  one  particular  type  to  each  division,  since  it  may 
be  impossible  to  foretell  which  division  of  a  field  army  will  need  certain  types 
most.  It  is,  indeed,  quite  possible  .that  all  divisions,  when  deployed,  will  have 
use  for  a  limited  number  of  howitzers  of  both  types. 

The  organization  proposed  for  the  horse  Artillery  is  adapted  to  providing  a 
two-battery  battalion  for  each  Cavalry  brigade,  which  is  believed  to  be  the 
proper  quota.  If  desirable,  the  third  battery  in  each  battalion  may  form  the 
nucleus  for  .ammunition  service. 

As  for  the  Army  Artillery,  two  batteries  of  4.7-inch  guns  and  two  batteries 
of  6-inch  howitzers  are  regarded  as  the  proper  quota  for  the  normal  type  field 
army  of  three  divisions.  The  third  battery  in  each  battalion  may  similarly  be 
utilized  as  the  nucleus  of  the  ammunition  service. 

72 


OKGANI2ATION   OF   THE  LAND  FORCES. 


73 


The  strength  and  composition  of  batteries,  battalions,  and  regiments  of  Field 
Artillery  are  determined  by  the  characteristics  of  the  particular  types  to  be 
served,  and  hence  it  is  not  possible  to  provide  a  homogeneous  organization. 
The  organization,  as  prescribed  in  legal  enactments,  should  hence  be  flexible, 
so  as  to  permit  varying  the  types  assigned  for  any  particular  service  to  meet 
the  requirements  of  the  case  and  so  as  to  permit  a  gradual  evolution  in  normal 
organization,  as  our  experience  with  the  various  types  and  calibers  of  guns 
becomes  more  extensive.  The  law  covering  the  organization  of  Field  Artillery 
should  accordingly  be  worded  so  as  to  indicate  the  maximum  number  of  bri- 
gades, regiments,  and  ammunition  battalions  allowable,  the  maximum  number 
of  battalions  and  batteries  in  each,  and  the  maximum  strength  of  each  unit, 
and  leave  it  to  the  President  to  fix  within  this  limit  the  strength  of  regiments, 
battalions,  and  batteries. 

The  existing  law  permits  the  desired  flexibility,  with  the  exception  that  it 
fixes  the  minimum  strength.  If  the  law  prescribed  the  maximum  strength  of 
a  regiment  of  Field  Artillery  as  three  battalions  of  three  batteries  each  and 
indicated  only  the  total  maximum  number  of  officers  and  enlisted  men,  then  the 
President  could  vary  the  organization  of  any  particular  regiment  to  meet  the 
needs  of  service. 

AMMUNITION  SERVICE. 

The  proposed  organization  of  the  divisional  ammunition  service  is  as  follows: 


Officers. 

Veterina- 
rians. 

Men. 

Vehicles. 

Animals. 

First  Battalion: 
Staff                                                        

2 

1 

9 

12 

Gun  ammunition  company 

3 

149 

27 

182 

Howitzer  ammunition  company  

3 

163 

28 

211 

Infantry  ammunition  company 

4 

145 

59 

266 

Total                                                            .  .  . 

12 

1 

466 

114 

671 

Second  Battalion: 
Staff 

2 

1 

9 

12 

Artillery  train  company  

5 

181 

56 

345 

Infantry  train  company 

4 

145 

59 

296 

Total                                  

11 

1 

335 

115 

653 

Divisional  ammunition  service: 
Staff 

2 

1 

8 

11 

Grand  total 

25 

3 

809 

229 

1,335 

STAFF     OF     AN     AMMUNITION     OR     TKAIN 
BATTALION  I 


1  major. 

1  lieutenant. 

1  veterinarian. 

1  sergeant-major. 

3 

3 


STAFF 


OF      HEADQUARTERS      DIVISIONAL 
AMMUNITION    SERVICE  I 


1  colonel  or  lieutenant  colonel. 
1  lieutenant. 

1  veterinarian. 

3  sergeants,|agents  and  scouts. 
3  corporals,/ 

2  privates    (horseholders    and    order- 

lies). 


sergeants,  laentg  and  scouts< 
corporals,  J 

2  privates    (horseholders    and    order- 
lies). 

The  complement  proposed  for  the  Army  ammunition  service  is  a  battalion  of 
two  batteries;  the  staff  of  the  battalion  to  be  similar  to  that  of  a  divisional 
ammunition  battalion ;  the  strength  of  each  company  to  be  the  same  as  that  of 
the  howitzer  ammunition  company  given  above. 

If  it  is  deemed  desirable  to  provide  a  separate  ammunition  service  for  the 
cavalry  division,  the  complement  for  this  duty  should  comprise  a  battalion  of 
three  companies  each  having  the  strength  of  the  gun  ammunition  company 
given  above. 

For  economic  reasons  it  is  not  considered  desirable  to  maintain  complete 
ammunition  organizations  in  time  of  peace.  A  peace  nucleus  must  be  provided 
and  all  plans  carefully  worked  out  for  securing  the  personnel  necessary  for 
passing  to  the  war  basis.  To  organize  at  once  an  effective  service  there  must 
be  a  proper  reserve  system. 

For  the  divisional  ammunition  service,  a  lieutenant  colonel  of  one  of  the 
Artillery  regiments  should  be  designated  as  chief  of  the  service  and  should  be 


74  ORGANIZATION  OF   THE   LAND  FORCES. 

charged,  in  peace,  with  the  detailed  preparations  for  passing  to  the  enlarged 
war  footing.  The  third  batteries  of  the  two  howitzer  battalions  of  the  division 
should  constitute  the  nucleus  of  the  ammunition  service.  All  the  officers  and 
a  limited  number  of  enlisted  men  of  these  batteries  should  be  maintained  in 
peace ;  they  may  be  employed  on  militia  or  other  duty,  but  should  be  assembled 
at  maneuver  camps  periodically  for  practicing,  on  a  reduced  basis,  their  appro- 
priate duties  in  the  ammunition  service.  On  mobilization,  the  captains  of  these 
two  skeleton  batteries  should  be  given  temporary  commissions  as  majors ;  the  six 
lieutenants  should  be  given  temporary  commissions  as  captains.  A  major  would 
thus  be  provided  to  command  each  battalion,  and  captains  would  be  provided 
to  command  the  three  companies  of  the  first  battalion  and  the  two  companies 
of  the  second  battalion.  The  extra  captain  would  be  staff  officer  for  the  lieu- 
tenant colonel.  The  remainder  of  the  officers  would  be  reserve  officers,  desig- 
nated in  time  of  peace  for  their  particular  positions.  There  should  be  enough 
enlisted  men  in  the  two  skeletonized  howitzer  batteries  to  provide  a  staff  ser- 
geant for  the  lieutenant  colonel  and  each  of  the  two  majors  and  at  least  six 
noncommissioned  officers  for  each  ammunition  or  train  company,  thus  making 
a  total  of  33  men  for  the  two  companies. 

An  effort  should  be  made  to  enroll  reservists  and  volunteers  in  the  particu- 
lar district  in  which  the  division  is  serving  to  make  up  the  remainder  of  the 
enlisted  strength. 

For  the  Army  ammunition  service  the  lieutenant  colonel  of  the  Heavy  Artil- 
lery regiment  should  command  the  battalion,  and  the  skeletonized  batteries 
should  have,  on  the  peace  basis,  a  nucleus  of  officers  and  men. 

Similar  arrangements  may  be  made  for  the  ammunition  service  of  a  Cavalry 
division. 

DETAILS  OF  DIVISIONAL  SERVICE. 

FIELD  ARTILLERY. 

The  experience  of  recent  wars  seems  to  indicate  that  for  the  light  field  piece 
(3-inch)  there  must  be  maintained  on  wheels,  in  front  of  the  advance  supply 
depot,  approximately  500  rounds  per  gun. 

The  supply  to  be  thus  maintained  for  the  howitzer  and  other  heavier  calibers 
is  not  so  well  established.  In  an  important  engagement  their  expenditure  will 
be  great  also,  but  as  each  wheeled  vehicle  can  carry  but  a  very  limited  number 
of  these  heavier  projectiles,  and  the  number  of  such  vehicles  must  be  kept  down 
to  the  very  minimum  in  order  to  reduce  length  of  trains,  it  is  evidently  im- 
practicable to  keep  anything  like  500  pounds  per  gun  on  wheels  for  these  cali- 
bers. Similarly,  the  number  to  be  so  maintained  on  pack  mules  for  the 
mountain  howitzers  must  be  less  than  500. 

The  number  to  be  maintained  on  wheels  or  packs  for  the  different  calibers 
is  estimated  as  follows : 

Rounds. 

For  the  3-inch  rifle 464 

For  the  3-inch  mountain  howitzer 290 

For  the  3.8-inch  howitzer 312 

For  the  4.7-inch  howitzer 180 

As  for  the  distribution  of  the  foregoing  ammunition,  the  best  practice  seems 
to  be  to  keep  with  the  guns  and  their  combat  trains  a  number  sufficiently  large 
to  give  them  a  reasonable  insurance  against  exhaustion  of  ammunition  before 
resupply  commences  and  to  keep  in  the  ammunition  column  the  remaining 
amount  as  a  rolling  reserve  to  be  served  out  to  the  various  battalions  and 
batteries  in  accordance  with  their  expenditures. 

On  the  basis  of  3  caissons  or  17  pack  mules  per  gun  the  following  are  the 
amounts  to  be  kept  with  the  guns  and  their  combat  trains: 

Rounds  per  gun. 

For  the  3-inch  gun__ 358 

For  the  3-inch  mountain  howitzer 170 

For  the  3.8-inch  howitzer 168 

For  the  4.7-inch  howitzer 90 

The  following,  then,  remain  to  be  carried  in  the  ammunition  columns : 

Rounds  per  gun. 
For  the  3-inch  gun 106 

For  the  3-inch  mountain  howitzer 120 

For  the  3.8-inch  howitzer 144 

For  the  4.7-inch  howitzer 90 


OKGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND   FORCES. 


75 


Such  being  the  amounts  of  ammunition  to  be  carried  by  the  divisional  am- 
munition column,  we  may  decide  what  the  composition  and  organization  of  this 
column  should  be. 

The  function  of  the  column  is  to  receive  ammunition  from  the  line  of  com- 
munication troops  and  transfer  it  to  the  combat  trains  of  the  batteries.  The 
distance  to  be  covered  in  making  this  transfer  may  vary  very  considerably. 
The  average  distance  to  be  traversed  may  be  assumed  as  one-half  day's  march ; 
this  on  the  assumption  that  the  advance  supply  depot  will  be  located  one  day's 
march  in  rear  of  the  combatant  troops  and  that  the  line  of  communication 
troops  will  feed  subdepots  for  each  division  a  half  day's  march  farther  on.  A 
day's  march  may  be  taken  as  18  miles ;  hence  we  have  9  miles  as  the  distance 
the  division  train  will  have  to  cover  on  the  above  hypothesis.  If  the  distance 
is  greater  or  less  than  this  the  amount  of  ammunition  that  can  be  delivered 
at  the  front  each  day  will  be  proportionately  diminished  or  increased. 

The  routes  to  be  followed  in  transporting  ammunition  by  the  divisional  train 
may  be  illustrated  graphically  as  shown  in  the  following  diagram : 


aub-de,pot. 


LJUdva^ce/  Supply 


76 


ORGANIZATION  OF   THE  LAND  FORCES. 


The  first  portion  of  the  travel  from  the  divisional  subbase  toward  the  front 
will  be  on  some  already  existing  road,  or  on  one  which  will  have  to  be  immedi- 
ately blazed  out  for  all  the  divisional  supply  trains.  On  approaching  the 
conbatant  troops,  however,  some  point  on  this  route  will  have  to  be  selected 
from  which  elements  of  the  column  can  be  sent  to  the  different  combat  trains. 
This  point  may  be  termed  "  the  distributing  point."  From  here  the  vehicles 
will  have  to  move  often  across  country  to  reach  the  vicinity  of  the  combat 
trains.  Each  element  will  move  up  to  a  convenient  point  to  which  empty 
caissons  from  the  combat  trains  may  be  sent  to  be  refilled.  It  may  be  assumed 
that  these  points  are  ordinarily  about  1  mile  in  rear  of  the  fighting  line,  and 
that  the  distance  to  be  covered  from  distributing  point  will  be  3  or  4  miles. 

The  procedure  above  outlined  seems  to  be  the  one  that  would  naturally  be 
followed  in  the  average  case.  It  suggests  two  things  as  to  the  organization  and 
composition  of  the  divisional  train: 

1.  That  the  train  should  be  divided  into  two  echelons :  The  first  to  hare  the 
duty  of  transporting  ammunition  from  the  distributing  point  to  the  various 
combat  trains;  the  second  to  have  the  duty  of  bringing  ammunition  up  the 
road  to  the  distributing  point. 

2.  That  ammunition  should  be  carried  in  caissons  in  the  first  echelon,  since 
all  sorts  of  country  may  have  to  be  negotiated ;  while  for  the  second  echelon 
Army  wagons  or  motor  trucks  should  be  used,  inasmuch  as  a  great  saving  in 
men,  animals,  and  length  of  train  is  thus  insured,  and  inasmuch  as  wagons 
or  trucks  would  be  entirely  suitable  for  the  work  to  be  done. 

The  foregoing  may  be  accepted  as  fundamental  considerations  determining 
the  organization  of  division  trains.  Both  Echelons  should  be  capable  of  ready 
subdivision  so  that  full  subdivisions  may  be  moving  to  the  front  while  empty 
ones  are  moving  to  the  rear  to  be  filled.  When  the  line  occupied  by  the 
division  is  very  extended,  it  may  be  desirable  at  times  to  split  the  leading 
echelon  m  two  and  send  each  part  to  establish  a  distributing  point  for  supplying 
its  part  of  the  line. 

The  second  Echelon  should  have  a  section  .comprising  the  reserve  of  men, 
horses,  materiel,  and  equipment  and  also  the  personnel  and  equipment  for 
making  minor  repairs. 

Reverting  now  to  the  amount  of  ammunition  to  be  carried  by  the  divisional 
ammunition  column  and  accepting  the  fact  that,  so  far  as  practicable,  the 
total  amount  should  be  about  equally  divided  between  the  two  echelons,  we  have 
the  following: 


First 
e'chelon. 

Second 
e'chelon. 

53 

53 

3-inch  mountain  howitzer                              .        

40 

80 

3  8-inch  howitzer 

72 

72 

4.7-inch  howitzer  

45 

45 

From  these  figures  we  may  now  deduce  the  number  of  caissons,  wagons,  and 
packs  to  carry  the  amount  of  ammunition  required  in  each  echelon  of  the 
divisional  ammunition  column: 


' 

First 
Echelon- 
Caissons 
or  packs. 

Second 
e'chelon  — 
Wagons. 

3-inch  gun 

24 

25 

3-inch  mountain  howitzer                                              

144 

25 

3.8-inch  howitzer 

12 

10 

4.7-inch  howitzer 

12 

13 

It  thus  appears  that  the  first  echelon  of  a  divisional  ammunition  column 
must  have — 

24  caissons  for  3-inch  ammunition. 
12  caissons  for  3.8-inch  ammunition. 
12  caissons  for  4.7-inch  ammunition. 


OEGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND   FORCES.  77 

It  is  proposed  to  organize  these  into  a  gun  ammunition  company  of  24  caissons 
and  a  howitzer  ammunition  company  of  24  caissons,  each  as  shown  in  tables 
appended  hereto. 

The  second  echelon  requires  25  wagons  for  3-inch,  10  for  3.8-inch,  and  13  for 
4.7-mch  ammunition,  or  a  total  of  48  wagons. 

It  is  proposed  to  organize  these  into  an  Artillery  train  company,  as  shown 
in  table  herewith.  If  it  is  found  that  motor  trucks  can  be  substituted  for 
wagons,  then  the  number  of  vehicles  will  be  reduced  and  the  personnel  will 
be  correspondingly  reduced.  Attached  to  the  second  Echelon  is  the  reserve 
section  comprising  spare  men,  animals,  materiel,  and  repair  outfits. 

If  mountain  guns  are  assigned  to  a  division,  the  composition  of  the  ammu- 
nition trains  will  depend  upon  whether  these  guns  constitute  the  only  guns  of  the 
division  or  are  only  a  portion  of  the  divisional  Artillery.  The  mountain  am- 
munition company  shown  in  the  table  attached  will  transport  40  rounds  per 
gun  for  36  guns,  or  60  per  gun  for  24  guns.  One  company  will  suffice  if  only 
one  regiment  of  the  Artillery  brigade  is  armed  with  mountain  guns,  but  two 
must  be  taken  if  both  regiments  are  so  armed.  If  battalions  of  other  calibers 
are  present,  suitable  sections  of  their  ammunition  columns  must  be  taken.  The 
figures  in  tables,  just  above,  are  computed  on  the  assumption  that  one  full  regi- 
ment of  36  guns  accompanies  the  division.  In  such  a  case  the  other  Artillery 
ammunition  company  would  serve  the  ammunition  for  other  calibers. 

INFANTRY   AND   CAVALRY  AMMUNITION. 

The  amount  of  ammunition  to  be  carried  per  Infantry  and  Cavalry  rifle  is 
as  follows : 

90  rounds  per  rifle  with  each  man. 
120  rounds  per  rifle  in  combat  trains. 
120  rounds  per  rifle  in  divisional  trains. 

Men. 
In  a  division  there  will  be  9  regiments  of  Infantry  of  approximately 

2,000  men  each,  or 18,000 

One  regiment  of  Cavalry  of  1,200  men 1,  200 

Making  a  grand  total  of 19,200 

Multiply  by  120=2,304,000  rounds=number  of  rounds  in  divisional  train. 

For  the  machine  guns  it  is  estimated  that  there  should  be  17,500  rounds  per 
gun  with  the  mobile  troops;  4,800  rounds  per  gun  are  to  be  carried  with  the 
new  machine-gun  equipment,  thus  leaving  about  12,000  rounds  to  be  carried 
in  divisional  train.  There  are  6  machine  guns  for  each  of  the  10  regiments 
of  Infantry  and  Cavalry,  or  60  guns.  For  these  we  must  have  720,000  rounds. 
Hence,  we  have  for  the  total  in  the  divisional  train  2,304,000+720,000=3,024,000 
rounds. 

To  carry  this  amount  and  the  necessary  revolver  ammunition,  we  require 
104  wagons  for  ammunition  proper  and  4  for  other  stores,  or  108  in  all. 

It  is  proposed  to  organize  these  into:  An  Infantry  ammunition  company  of 
54  wagons  for  the  first  echelon;  an  Infantry  train  company  of  54  wagons  for* 
the  second  echelon;  the  details  of  organization  to  be  as  shown  in  tables  here- 
with. 

SUMMARY  OF  DIVISIONAL  SERVICE. 

According  to  the  foregoing  analysis,  the  divisional  ammunition  service  com- 
prises : 
First  battalion: 

1  gun  ammunition  company. 

1  howitzer  ammunition  company. 

1  Infantry  ammunition  company. 
Second  battalion : 

1  Artillery  train  company. 

1  Infantry  train  company. 

Each  of  these  battalions  should  be  commanded  by  a  major — the  battalion 
staff  being  as  shown  in  table  herewith. 

A  lieutenant  colonel  should  be  in  charge  of  the  entire  divisional  ammunition 
service,  his  function  being  to  carry  out  the  orders  of  the  division  commander 
as  to  resupply  of  ammunition,  and  to  coordinate  the  workings  of  all  the  different 
elements. 


78 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND   FORCES. 


ARMY  AMMUNITION  SERVICE. 

The  amount  of  ammunition  to  be  maintained  on  wheels  for  the  eight  4.7-inch 
guns  and  the  eight  6-inch  howitzers  of  the  Army  Artillery  should  be : 

Rounds 
per  gun. 

4.7-inch  guns 336 

6-inch  howitzers : 168 

The  amounts  carried  in  the  combat  train  are : 

4.7-inchguns 168 

6-inch  howitzers 84 

thus  leaving  for  the  ammunition  column : 

4.7-inchguns 168 

6-inch  howitzers 84 

For  these  heavy  calibers  it  is  considered  that  there  should  be  in  the  Army 
ammunition  column  3  caissons  per  gun;  the  first  echelon  to  comprise  1£  cais- 
sons per  gun  (that  is,  24  caissons  in  all),  drawn  by  horses;  the  second  echelon 
to  comprise  1£  caissons  per  gun  (that  is,  24  in  all),  drawn  by  horses  or  motors. 

Gun  ammunition  company. 


Bat- 
tery 
staff. 

First  platoon. 

Second  platoon. 

Sup- 
ply- 

Total. 

First. 

Sec- 
ond. 

Third. 

First. 

Sec- 
ond. 

Third. 

Captain                                                  

1 

1 
2 

Lieutenant  ..            

1 

1 

Total  commissioned  

1 

1 

1 

3 

First  sergeant 

1 





1 

== 

1 

1 

3 

8 
3 
2 
2 
3 
75 
48 
2 

Quartermaster  sergeant  

i 
i 
i 

""3" 

2 

S  table  sergeant 

Sergeants  

1 

1 

Corporals                                                    - 

2 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

Horseshoers  

Mechanics                                            

Trumpeters  

2 

Cooks                                                  

3 
3 

"'2 

Privates  drivers 

12 
8 

12 

8 

12 

8 

12 

8 

12 

8 

12 

8 

Privates,  cannoneers   

Wagoners 

Total  enlisted 

5 

22 

21 

4 

21 

4 

22 
4" 

21 

-—  ...  — 

4 

21 

_:_._    ••—  

4 

16 

149 

Caissons,  3-inch 

4 

..... 

2 

24 
1 
2 

Batterv  wagon  

Field  wagon  

Total  vehicles  

4 

24 
3 

4 

4 

4 

4 

4 

3 

27 

150 
24 

8 

Horses,  draft  

24 
1 

24 
1 

24 
3 

24 
1 

24 
1 

6 

8 
8 

Horses,  riding.  .  . 

6 

Mules 

Total  animals 

6 

27 

25 

25 

27 

25 

25 

22 

182 

OKGAN1ZATION   OF   THE   LAND   FOKCES. 
Howitzer  ammunition  company. 


79 


Bat- 
tery 
staff. 

First  platoon. 

Second  platoon. 

Sup- 
ply- 

Total. 

First 
sec- 
tion. 

Sec- 
ond 
sec- 
tion. 

Third 
sec- 
tion. 

First 
sec- 
tion. 

Sec- 
ond 
sec- 
tion. 

Third 
sec- 
tion. 

Captain  

1 

- 

1 

2 

Lieutenants  

1 

1 

Total  commissioned  . 

1 

1 

^^ 

\ 

3 

First  sergeant  

1 

1 

1 
1 
3 
8 
4 
2 
2 
3 

87 
48 
3 

Quartermaster  sergeant  

1 
1 
1 

Stable  sergeant  

Sergeants  

1 

1 
1 

..... 

..... 

Corporals 

2 

1 

1 

1 

Horseshoers  

4 
2 

Trumpeters        ...            

Musicians  

2 

Cooks  

3 
3 
"'3' 

Privates: 
Drivers 

12 

8 

12 

8 

12 

8 

16 

8 

16 
8 

16 

8 

Cannoneers         

Wagoners 

Total  enlisted  

5 

22 

21 

21 

26 

25 

25 

.18 

163 

Caissons: 
3  8-inch 

4 

4 

4 

12 
12 
1 
3 

4  7-inch 

4 

4 

4 

..... 
3 

Battery  wagon  ....             

Field  wagon 

Total  vehicles  

Horses: 
Draft 

24 

1 

32 
3 

28 

174 
25 
12 

24 
3 

24 
1 

32 
1 

32 
1 

6 
9 
12 

Hiding  

6 

Mules       

To*al  animals 

6 

27 

25 

25 

35 

33 

33 

27 

211 

80 


ORGANIZATION   OF  THE   LAND  FORCES. 
Mountain  ammunition  company. 


Bat- 
tery 
stafl. 

First  platoon. 

Second  platoon. 

Sup- 
ply- 

Total 

First. 

Sec- 
ond. 

Third. 

First. 

Sec- 
ond. 

Third. 

Csptain  ....           

1 

1 

2 

Lieutenants                                                 

1 

1 

Total  commissioned  

1 
1 

1 

1 

3 

First  sergeant  

= 

1 

1 
1 
3 

8 

4m 
•Jm 
2i 
3« 
41m 

1m 

Quartermaster  sergeant 

1 

1 
1 

'"4" 

2 

Stable  sergeant  

Sergeants 

1 

1 

Corporals           

2 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

Horseshoers                                             

Trumpeters        .             ..      .  

2 

Cooks 

3 
5 
1 
1 

Packers                     

6 

6 

(i 

6 

6 

6 

Packmaster 

Cargador             

Total  enlisted 

5 

8 
24 

7 

7 
24 

8 
24 

7 
24 

7 
24 

19 

68 

Packs: 
Ammunition  

24 

4 
20 

144 
4 
20 

Forage  and  stores                   * 

Supply  and  kit  

Total  packs 

24 

24 
6 
3 

24 

•- 

24 
6 
1 

24 

-j.        

24 
6 
1 

24 

24 
6 
3 

24 

24 

24 

168 

Mules: 
Pack  

1 

24 
6 
1 

24 
6 
1 

24 
16 
3 

168 
52 
19 

Riding 

Horses  

6 

Total  animals 

6 

33 

31 

31 

33 

31 

31 

43 

239 

ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND   FORCES. 


81 


ArtiUery  tram  company. 


ta 
ft 

First  platoon. 

Second  platoon. 

Third  platoon. 

Resen-e  and  sup- 
ply- 

H 

i1 

1. 
11 

^ 
S3 

fi 

fH 

1. 

1 

E 

H  § 

i. 

|I 

H 

!§ 

Jsp 

£ 

Second  sec- 
tion. 

•gl 
(H 

Captain 

1 

1 
4 

Lieutenants  

1 

i 

i 

1 

Total  commissioned  .  . 
First  sergeant  

1 

1 

1 

i 

i 

1  :•   '  ,    = 

= 

1 

5 



;  = 



1  —  — 

- 

i 
1 

1 

7 
16 
1 
6 
4 
2 
3 
79 
60 

Quartermaster  sergeant 

1 

1 
4 
5 
1 

6 

4 

Stable  sergeant  

Sergeants 

1 

i 
i 

..... 

'"i" 

1 
l 

Corporals  

2 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

Chief  mechanic            

2 

Cooks                        

3 
31 

60 

Drivers 

9 

8 

8 

4 

3 

3 

5 

4 

4 

Total  enlisted  

5 

11 

9 

9 

8 

6 

4 

4 

7 

5 

5 

116 

181 

25 
10 
13 
2 
6 
1 
4 

61 
208 

54 
43 
20 
20 

3-inch  wagons 

9 

8 

4 

3 

3 

4  7-inch  wagons 

5 

4 

4 

"""a 

6 
1 

4 

Battery  wagons 

Store  wagons 

3-inch  guns  and  limbers 

Total  vehicles  
Mules,  draft  

^^ 

9 
36~ 

8 

8 

4 

3 

— 

12 

3 

5 

20 

4 
16 

4 

13 
16 

54 
22 
20 
20 

32 

32 

16 

12 

16 

Horses: 
Draft 

Riding  

6 

3 

1 

1 

3 

1 

1 

3 

1 

1 

Spare  mules 

Total  animals 

23 

17 

6 

39 

33 

33 

19 

13 

13 

17 

132 

345 

50043°— 12 6 


82 


ORGANIZATION    OF   THE   LAND   FORCES. 


Infantry  ammunition  or  train  company. 


- 

Battery  staff. 

First  platoon. 

Second  platoon. 

Third  platoon. 

Reserve  and  sup- 
ply. 

1 

i 
8  , 

I* 

£ 

•o  fl 

^ 

JA 

M 
fr 

1. 

|| 

£ 

Second  sec- 
tion. 

1. 
SI 

2 
h 

i 

"w'+3 
§ 

Second  sec- 
tion. 

si 

2 

EH 

Captain 

1 

1 
3 

i 

i 

1 

Total  commissioned.  . 

1 
1 

i 

i 

1 

4 

1 

1 

1 
4 
11 
5 
2 
2 
3 
61 
54 

== 

— 

— 

Quartermaster  sergeant 

1 
1 
1 
...... 

2 

Stable  sergeant 

Sergeants 

i 

i 
i 

1 

Corporals             

2 

i 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

Trumpeters 

2 

Cooks 

3 

7 
54 

Privates  drivers 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

G 

Total  enlisted  

5 

8 

<F 

7 

7 

8 

7 

.      7 

8 

7 

7 

74 

145 

54 
1 
4 

Wagons      

6~ 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

G 

Battery  wagon 

1 

4 

Total  vehicles  

6 

6 
24 

6 
2T 

6 
24~ 

6 
24 

G 
24 

_«. 

24 

6 
24~~ 

6 
2T 

5 

59 
232 

3 
31 

Mules  draft 

24 

16 

3 
10 

Horses: 
Draft 

Riding  

6 

3 

1 

1 

3 

1 

1 

3 

1 

1 

Total  animals  

6 

27 

25 

25 

2? 

25 

25 

27 

25 

25 

29 

266 

An  infantry  train  company  has  30  spare  mules  in  addition  to  the  strength 
given  above. 


APPENDIX  III. 

(War.  Col.  Div.  G.  S.  3709-51.) 

DEPARTMENT  OF  JUSTICE, 
Washington,  February  11,  1912. 
THE  SECKETARY  OF  WAR. 

SIR:  I  have  the  honor  to  respond  to  your  note  of  the  8th  instant,  in  which 
you  ask  my  opinion  upon  the  following  question : 

"Whether  or  not,  under  existing  laws,  the  President  has  authority  to  call 
forth  the  Organized  Militia  of  the  States  and  send  it  into  a  foreign  country 
with  the  Regular  Army  as  a  part  of  an  army  of  occupation,  especially  should 
the  United  States  intervene  in  the  affairs  of  such  country  under  conditions 
short  of  actual  warfare?" 

From  very  early  times,  in  both  England  and  this  country,  the  militia  has 
always  been  considered  and  treated  as  a  military  body  quite  distinct  and  dif- 
ferent from  the  Regular  or  Standing  Army,  governed  by  different  laws  and 
rules,  and  equally  different  as  to  the  time,  place,  or  occasion  of  its  service. 
One  of  the  most  notable  points  of  difference  is  this :  While  the  latter  was  in 
the  continued  service  of  the  Government  and  might  be  called  into  active  service 
at  all  times  and  in  all  places  where  armed  force  is  required,  for  any  purpose, 
the  militia  could  be  called  into  the  actual  service  of  the  Government  only  in  a 
few  special  cases  provided  for  by  law.  Their  service  has  always  been  con- 
sidered as  of  a  rather  domestic  character,  for  the  protection  and  defense  of 
their  own  country  and  the  enforcement  of  its  laws. 

This  has  always  been  the  English  doctrine,  and  in  some  instances  acts  of 
Parliament  have  expressly  forbidden  the  use  of  the  militia  outside  of  the 
Kingdom. 

Our  ancestors  who  framed  and  adopted  our  Constitution  and  early  laws  got 
their  ideas  of  a  militia,  its  nature,  and  purposes  from  this,  and  must  be  taken 
to  have  intended  substantially  the  same  military  body,  with  the  same  limita- 
tions of  the  occasion  and  nature  of  their  service.  If  they  had  intended  to 
enlarge  this  they  would  have  said  so,  just  as  they  have  when  they  intended  to 
further  limit  or  restrict  the  occasion  or  nature  of  their  service. 

When  the  Constitution  gives  to  Congress  the  power  "  to  raise  and  support 
armies  "  and  to  provide  "  for  calling  forth  the  militia  to  execute  the  laws  of  the 
Union,  suppress  insurrections,  and  repel  invasions"  and  makes  the  President 
"  the  commander  in  chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy  of  the  United  States  and  the 
militia  of  the  several  States  when  called  into  the  actual  service  of  the  United 
States,"  it  is  speaking  of  two  different  bodies :  The  one  the  Regular  Army,  in  the 
continuous  service  of  the  Government,  and  liable  to  be  called  into  active  service 
at  any  time,  or  in  any  place  where  armed  force  is  required ;  and  the  other  a  body 
for  domestic  service,  and  liable  to  be  called  into  the  service  of  the  Government 
only  upon  the  particular  occasions  named  in  the  Constitution.  And  acts  of 
Congress  relating  to  the  Army  and  the  militia  must  have  the  same  construction. 

It  is  certain  that  it  is  only  upon  one  or  more  of  these  three  occasions— when 
it  is  necessary  to  suppress  insurrections,  repel  invasions,  or  to  execute  the  laws 
of  the  United  States — that  even  Congress  can  call  this  militia  into  the  service  of 
the  United  States,  or  authorize  it  to  be  done. 

As  "  insurrection  "  is  necessarily  internal  and  domestic,  within  the  territorial 
limits  of  the  nation,  this  portion  of  the  sentence  can  afford  no  warrant  for  send- 
ing the  militia  to  suppress  it  elsewhere.  And  even  if  an  insurrection  of  our  own 
citizens  were  set  on  foot  and  threateningly  maintained  in  a  foreign  jurisdiction 
and  upon  our  border,  to  send  an  armed  force  there  to  suppress  it  would  be  an 
act  of  war  which  the  President  can  not  rightfully  do. 

The  term  "  to  repel  invasion  "  may  be,  in  some  respects,  more  elastic  in  its 
meaning.  Thus,  if  the  militia  were  called  into  the  service  of  the  General  Gov- 
ernment to  repel  an  invasion  it  would  not  be  necessary  to  discontinue  their  use 
at  the  boundary  line,  but  they  might  (within  certain  limits,  at  least)  pursue  and 

83 


84  ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND   FOKCES. 

capture  the  invading  force,  even  beyond  that  line:  and  just  as  the  Regular 
Army  might  he  used  for  that  purpose.  This  may  well  be  held  to  be  within  the 
meaning  of  the  term  "  to  repel  invasion." 

Then,  too,  if  an  armed  force  were  assembled  upon  our  border,  so  near  and 
under  circumstances  which  plainly  indicated  hostility  and  an  intended  invasion, 
this  Government  might  attack  and  capture  or  defeat  such  forces,  using  either 
the  Regular  Army  or  the  militia  for  that  purpose.  This,  also,  would  be  but 
one  of  the  ways  of  repelling  an  invasion. 

But  this  is  quite  different  from  and  affords  no  warrant  for  sending  the 
militia  into  a  foreign  country  in  time  of  peace  and  when  no  invasion  is  made 
or  threatened. 

The  only  remaining  occasion  for  calling  out  the  militia  is  "  to  execute  the 
laws  of  the  Union."  But  this  certainly  means  to  execute  such  laws  where, 
and  only  where,  they  are  in  force  and  can  be  executed  or  enforced.  The  Con- 
stitution or  laws  of  the  United  States  have  no  extraterritorial  force,  and  can 
not  be  compulsorily  executed  beyond  or  outside  of  the  territorial  limits  of  the 
United  States. 

It  is  true  that  treaties  made  in  pursuance  of  the  Constitution  are,  equally 
with  acts  of  Congress,  the  supreme  law  of  the  land ;  but  their  observance,  out- 
side of  our  own  jurisdiction,  can  not  be  enforced  in  the  same  way.  The  ob- 
servance and  performance,  outside  of  our  own  jurisdiction,  of  treaty  stipulations 
and  obligations  are  left  much  to  the  honor,  good  faith,  and  comity  of  the  other 
contracting  party,  reenforced  at  times  by  a  regard  for  the  consequences  of  a 
breach.  We  can  not  send  either  the  Regular  Army  or  the  militia  into  a  foreign 
country  to  execute  such  treaties  or  our  laws.  Such  an  invasion  of  a  foreign 
country  would  be  an  act  of  war. 

Outside  of  our  own  limits  "  the  laws  of  the  Union  "  are  not  executed  by  armed 
force,  either  regular  or  militia. 

The  Constitution  had  already  given  to  Congress  the  unlimited  power  to 
declare  war  at  any  time  and  for  whatever  cause  it  chose.  It  did  not,  in  this 
provision,  attempt  the  useless  thing  of  giving  to  Congress  an  additional  power 
to  declare  war,  or  to  afford  an  additional  ground  for  doing  so. 

What  is  certainly  meant  by  this  provision  is  that  Congress  shall  have  power 
to  call  out  the  militia  in  aid  of  the  civil  power  for  the  peaceful  execution  of  the 
laws  of  the  Union,  wherever  such  laws  are  in  force,  and  may  be  compulsorily 
executed,  much  as  a  sheriff  may  call  upon  the  posse  comitatus  to  peacefully 
disperse  a  riot  or  execute  the  laws. 

Under  our  Constitution,  as  it  has  been  uniformly  construed  from  the  first, 
the  military  is  subordinate  and  subservient  to  the  civil  power,  and  it  can  be 
called  upon  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union  only  in  aid  of  the  civil  power,  and 
where  the  civil  power  has  jurisdiction  of  such  enforcement.  Even  the  Regular 
Army  can  be  thus  called  upon  only  on  such  occasions;  and,  certainly,  the 
militia  can  not  be  thus  called  upon  at  any  other. 

Then,  as  the  civil  power  is  without  force  in  a  foreign  country,  and  as  even 
the  Regular  Army  can  not  be  sent  into  another  country  to  there  execute  the 
laws  of  the  Union,  it  follows  that  the  Constitution  confers  no  power  to  send 
the  militia  into  a  foreign  country  for  the  purpose  stated  in  the  question  here 
considered.  On  the  contrary,  by  its  specific  enumeration  of  the  only  occasions 
for  calling  out  the  militia,  it  clearly  forbids  this. 

In  all  this  I  am  not  unmindful  that  nations  sometimes  do  make  hostile  dem- 
onstrations and  use  armed  force  to  compel  the  observance  by  another  nation 
of  its  treaty  obligations  and  sometimes  send  armed  forces  into  another  country 
to  protect  the  lives  and  rights  of  its  own  citizens  there. 

I  shall  briefly  notice  these  in  their  application  to  our  own  country,  its  Con- 
stitution, and  laws.  It  will  be  observed,  and  as  controlling  and  conclusive  of 
the  present  question,  that  in  case  of  a  hostile  demonstration  against  or  a 
forcible  attack  upon  another  nation  to  enforce  its  treaty  obligations  or  to  punish 
their  infraction  there  is  no  question  involved  of  executing  the  laws  of  the 
invading  nation,  for  such  laws  have  no  force  or  existence  there.  While  the 
Constitution  makes  itself  and  the  laws  and  treaties  in  pursuance  thereof  the 
supreme  law  of  the  land,  it  is  only  in  our  own  land  where  such  laws  are 
supreme  or  of  any  force.  As  to  the  other  contracting  party,  a  treaty  is  a  mere 
compact,  depending  for  its  observance  upon  the  good  faith,  comity,  or  other 
moral  considerations.  The  Constitution  can  not  make  itself  or  the  treaties  or 
laws  made  under  it  the  supreme  law  of  any  other  nation  or  give  to  either  any 
force  or  existence  beyond  our  own  borders.  So  that  when  an  armed  force  is 
used  to  compel  the  observance  of  treaty  obligations  or  to  punish  or  to  obtain 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND  FORCES.  85 

compensation  for  their  violation  there  is  no  question  of  executing  any  law  of 
the  Union,  for  there  is  no  such  law  there.  It  is  but  the  forcible  compelling  of 
the  observance  of  an  agreement  or  compensation  for  its  breach.  The  provision 
referred  to  does  not  warrant  the  use  of  the  militia  for  this  purpose. 

Just  so  it  is  when  in  troublous  times  an  army  of  occupation,  large  or  small, 
is  sent  into  a  foreign  country  to  protect  the  lives  and  the  rights  of  our  own 
citizens.  Here,  too,  no  law  of  the  Union  is  being  executed  by  such  invasion, 
for  no  law  of  the  Union  exists  or  can  be  enforced  there. 

While  it  is  the  duty  of  every  nation  to  afford  proper  protection  to  foreigners 
who  are  lawfully  within  its  borders,  yet  this  is  not  because  of  any  law  of  the 
nation  of  which  such  foreigners  are  subjects,  for  no  such  laws  exist  or  have 
any  force  there.  No  one  can  say  in  such  a  case  that  we  are  executing  or 
enforcing  any  law  of  the  Union.  We  are  but  aiding  or  compelling  the  foreign 
government  to  execute  its  own  laws  and  to  perform  its  own  duty.  As  no  law 
of  the  Union  is  being  executed  by  such  invasion,  the  militia  can  not  be  called 
out  under  this  provision  to  take  part  in  it.  As  no  law  of  the  Union  can  exist 
or  be  in  force  in  any  foreign  country,  the  militia  can  not  be  called  out  to  enforce 
any  such  law  there. 

The  plain  and  certain  meaning  and  effect  of  this  constitutional  provision 
are  to  confer  upon  Congress  the  power  to  call  out  the  militia  "  to  execute  the 
laws  of  the  Union  "  within  our  own  borders,  where,  and  where  only,  they  exist, 
have  any  force,  or  can  be  executed  by  anyone.  This  confers  no  power  to  send 
the  militia  into  a  foreign  country  to  execute  our  laws,  which  have  no  existence 
or  force  there,  and  can  not  be  there  executed. 

If  authority  is  needed  for  the  conclusion  here  reached,  the  following  may 
suffice : 

In  Ordronaux,  Constitutional  Legislation,  page  501,  it  is  said : 

"  The  Constitution  distinctly  enumerates  the  three  exclusive  purposes  for 
which  the  militia  may  be  called  into  service  of  the  United  States.  These  pur- 
poses are :  First,  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union ;  second,  to  suppress  insur- 
rection ;  and  third,  to  repel  invasions. 

"  These  three  occasions,  representing  necessities  of  a  strictly  domestic  char- 
acter, plainly  indicate  that  the  services  required  of  the  militia  can  be  rendered 
only  upon  the  soil  of  the  United  States  or  of  its  Territories  *  *  *.  In  the 
history  of  this  provision  of  the  Constitution  there  is  nothing  indicating  that  it 
was  even  contemplated  that  such  troops  should  be  employed  for  purposes  of 
offensive  warfare  outside  the  limits  of  the  United  States.  And  it  is  but  just  to 
infer  that  the  enumeration  of  the  specific  occasions  on  which  alone  the  militia 
can  be  called  into  the  service  of  the  General  Government,  was  intended  as  a 
distinct  limitation  upon  their  employment. 

"  Being  the  ministers  of  the  law  to  enforce  its  commands  they  can  only  be 
summoned  by  the  law-making  power  to  act  within  the  extent  of  its  jurisdiction 
and  in  the  manner  prescribed  by  the  Constitution.  They  can  not  consequently 
be  used  to  invade  the  territory  of  a  neighboring  country  or  to  enforce  any  public 
rights  abroad  *  *  * 

"  The  militia  of  the  States,  restricted  to  domestic  purposes  alone,  are  to  be 
distinguished  therefore  from  the  Army  proper  of  the  United  States,  which, 
whether  in  the  form  of  regular  troops  or  volunteers,  may  be  used  to  invade  a 
foreign  country  as  well  as  to  repel  the  attack  of  foreign  enemies." 

And  in  Von  Holtz,  Constitutional  Law,  page  170,  it  is  said,  "  the  militia  can  not 
be  taken  out  of  the  country." 

In  Kneedler  v.  Lane  (45  Pa.  St.,  238)  Judge  Strong,  speaking  for  the  court, 
said: 

"Apart  from  the  obligations  assumed  by  treaty  it  is  well  known  that  there  are 
many  other  cases  where  the  rights  of  a  nation  and  of  its  citizens  can  not  be 
protected  or  vindicated  within  its  own  boundaries.  But  the  power  conferred  by 
Congress  over  the  militia  is  insufficient  to  enable  the  fulfillment  of  the  demands 
of  such  treaties,  or  to  protect  the  rights  of  the  Government,  or  its  citizens,  in 
those  cases  in  which  protection  must  be  sought  beyond  the  territorial  limits  of 
the  country." 

And  see  Houston  v.  Moore  (5  Wheat.,  1)  and  Martin  i?.  Mott  (12  Wheat., 
19,  27). 

It  it  true  that  the  act  of  January  21,  1903,  as  amended  by  the  act  of  May  27, 
1908  (35  Stat,  pt.  1,  399),  provides: 

"  That  whenever  the  President  calls  forth  the  Organized  Militia  of  any  State, 
Territory,  or  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  to  be  employed  in  the  service  of  the 
United  States,  he  may  specify  in  his  call  the  period  for  which  such  service  is 


86  ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND  FOBCES. 

required,  and  the  militia  so  called  shall  continue  to  serve  during  the  term  so 
specified,  either  within  or  without  the  territory  of  the  United  States,  unless 
sooner  relieved  by  order  of  the  President." 

But  this  must  be  read  in  view  of  the  constitutional  power  of  Congress  to  call 
forth  the  militia  only  to  suppress  insurrection,  repel  invasions,  or  to  execute 
the  laws  of  the  Union.  Congress  can  not,  by  its  own  enactment,  enlarge  the 
power  conferred  upon  it  by  the  Constitution;  and  if  this  provision  were  con- 
strued to  authorize  Congress  to  use  the  Organized  Militia  for  any  other  than  the 
three  purposes  specified  it  would  be  unconstitutional.  This  provision  applies 
only  to  cases  where,  under  the  Constitution,  said  militia  may  be  used  outside  ol 
our  own  borders,  and  was,  doubtless,  inserted  as  a  matter  of  precaution,  and 
to  prevent  the  possible  recurrence  of  what  took  place  in  our  last  war  with 
Great  Britain,  when  portions  of  the  militia  refused  to  obey  orders  to  cross  the 
Canadian  frontier. 

I  think  that  the  constitutional  provision  here  considered  not  only  affords  no 
warrant  for  the  use  of  the  militia  by  the  General  Government,  except  to  sup- 
press insurrection,  repel  invasions,  or  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union,  but,  by 
its  careful  enumeration  of  the  three  occasions  or  purposes  for  which  the  militia 
may  be  used,  it  forbids  such  use  for  any  other  purpose;  and  your  question  is 
answered  in  the  negative. 

Respectfully,  GEO.  W.  WICKERSHAM, 

Attorney  General. 


APPENDIX  IV. 
A  BILL  To  further  increase  the  efficiency  of  the  Organized  Militia,  and  for  other  purposes. 

Be  it  enacted  ~by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United 
States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  That  under  such  regulations  as  the 
Secretary  of  War,  after  conference  with  the  National  Militia  Board,  shall 
prescribe,  commissioned  officers  on  the  active  list  belonging  to  organizations  of 
the  Organized  Militia  of  each  State,  Territory,  and  the  District  of  Columbia 
participating  in  the  apportionment  of  the  annual  appropriation  provided  by 
section  sixteen  hundred  and  sixty-one,  Revised  Statutes,  as  amended,  shall 
receive  compensation  for  their  services,  except  during  periods  of  service  for 
which  under  existing  law  or  the  provisions  of  section  five  of  this  act  they  may 
become  entitled  to  the  same  pay  as  officers  of  corresponding  grades  of  the 
Regular  Army,  at  the  rate  of  certain  percentages  of  the  pay  of  officers  of  like 
grade  in  the  Regular  Army,  not  including  longevity  pay,  as  now  provided  by 
law,  namely :  Five  per  centum  to  all  general  officers  commanding  a  division  pr 
brigade,  the  authorized  officers  constituting  the  division  staff  or  brigade  staff, 
including  authorized  officers  detailed  for  duty  therewith,  the  division  and 
brigade  inspectors  of  small  arms  practice,  if  any,  the  authorized  aids,  and 
chaplains;  twenty  per  centum  to  commanding  officers  of  companies,  troops, 
batteries,  and  ambulance  companies,  and  to  adjutants  and  quartermasters  of 
regiments,  independent  battalions  or  squadrons,  or  Coast  Artillery  districts: 
fifteen  per  centum  to  all  other  officers  belonging  to  regiments  or  smaller  tactical 
units  or  Coast  Artillery  districts,  including  medical  officers  detailed  or  assigned 
to  and  doing  duty  with  regiments  or  smaller  tactical  units  or  Coast  Artillery 
districts,  medical  officers  serving  with  field  hospitals,  and  veterinarians. 

SEC.  2.  That  under  such  regulations  as  the  Secretary  of  War,  after  conference 
with  the  National  Militia  Board,  shall  prescribe,  each  enlisted  man  on  the  active 
list  belonging  to  organizations  of  the  Organized  Militia  of  each  State,  Territory, 
and  the  District  of  Columbia  participating  in  the  apportionment  of  the  annual 
appropriation  provided  by  section  sixteen  hundred  and  sixty-one,  Revised  Stat- 
utes, as  amended,  shall  receive  compensation  for  his  services,  except  during 
periods  of  service  for  which  under  existing  law  or  the  provisions  of  section  five 
of  this  act  he  may  become  entitled  to  the  same  pay  as  an  enlisted  man  of  cor- 
responding grade  in  the  Regular  Army,  at  a  rate  equal  to  twenty-five  per  centum 
of  the  initial  pay  now  provided  by  law  for  enlisted  men  of  corresponding  grades 
of  the  Regular  Army :  Provided,  That  such  enlisted  man  shall  receive  the  com- 
pensation herein  provided  if  he  shall  have  attended  not  less  than  forty-five 
regular  drills  during  any  one  year,  and  a  proportionate  amount  for  attendance 
upon  a  lesser  number  of  such  drills,  not  less  than  twenty:  Provided  further, 
That  the  compensation  provided  herein  shall  be  computed  for  semiannual 
periods,  beginning  the  first  day  of  January  and  the  first  day  of  July  of  each 
year,  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  drills  attended ;  and  no  compensation  shall 
be  paid  to  any  enlisted  man  for  the  first  semiannual  period  of  any  year  unless 
he  shall  have  attended  during  said  period  at  least  twenty  drills,  but  any  lesser 
number  of  drills  attended  during  said  period  shall  be  reckoned  with  the  drills 
attended  during  the  second  semiannual  period  in  computing  the  compensation, 
if  any,  due  him  for  that  year:  Provided  further,  That  when  any  man  enters 
into  an  enlistment  other  than  an  immediate  reenlistment  he  shall  be  entitled  to 
proportional  compensation  for  that  year  if  during  the  remainder  of  the  year 
he  shall  attend  a  number  of  drills  whose  ratio  to  twenty  is  not  less  than  the 
ratio  of  the  part  of  the  year  so  served  to  the  whole  year ;  and  when  any  man's 
enlistment  shall  expire  the  compensation,  if  any,  to  which  he  may  be  entitled 
shall  be  determined  in  like  manner :  And  provided  further,  That  periods  of  any 
actual  military  duty  equivalent  to  the  drills  herein  prescribed,  except  those 
periods  of  service  for  which  under  existing  law  or  the  provisions  of  section  five 
of  this  act  members  of  the  Organized  Militia  may  become  entitled  to  the  same 
pay  as  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  corresponding  grades  in  the  Regular 

87 


88  ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND   FORCES. 

Army,  may  be  accepted  as  service  in  lieu  of  such  drills  when  so  provided  by  the 
Secretary  of  War. 

SEC.  3.  That  all  amounts  appropriated  for  the  purposes  of  this  act  shall  be  dis- 
bursed and  accounted  for  by  the  officers  and  agents  of  the  Pay  Department  of 
the  Army,  and  all  disbursements  under  the  provisions  of  the  two  preceding  sec- 
tions shall  be  made  as  soon  as  practicable  after  the  thirty-first  day  of  December 
and  the  thirtieth  day  of  June  of  each  year  upon  pay  rolls  prepared  and  au- 
thenticated in  the  manner  prescribed  by  the  Secretary  of  War:  Provided,  That 
stoppages  may  be  made  against  the  compensation  payable  to  any  officer  or  en- 
listed man  hereunder  to  cover  the  cost  of  public  property  lost  or  destroyed  by 
and  chargeable  to  such  officer  or  enlisted  man. 

SEC.  4.  That  no  money  appropriated  under  the  provisions  of  this  act  shall  be 
paid  to  any  person  not  on  the  active  list,  nor  to  any  person  over  sixty-four  years 
of  age,  nor  to  any  person  who  fails  to  qualify  as  to  fitness  for  military  service 
under  such  regulations  as  the  Secretary  of  War,  after  conference  with  the 
National  Militia  Board,  shall  prescribe,  and  who  has  not  voluntarily,  in  addi- 
tion to  his  oath  as  a  member  of  the  Organized  Militia,  also  agreed  to  render 
military  service  to  the  United  States  as  hereinafter  provided. 

SEC.  5.  That  the  President,  with  the  consent  of  Congress,  in  time  of  war  or 
when  war  is  imminent,  or  in  other  grave  emergency  requiring  the  use  of  troops 
in  excess  of  the  Regular  Army  beyond  the  limits  of  the  United  States,  may  by 
order  transfer  to  the  Army  of  the  United  States  any  portion  of  the  Organized 
Militia  receiving  or  entitled  to  receive  the  benefits  of  this  act  to  serve  therein 
for  the  balance  of  their  respective  terms  of  enlistment  or  commission,  unless 
sooner  released  by  order  of  the  President,  and  any  Organized  Militia  so  trans- 
ferred shall  from  the  date  specified  in  the  order  of  such  transfer  become  for 
the  time  being  a  part  of  the  Army  of  the  United  States  and  subject  to  the  same 
laws  in  so  far  as  the  same  may  be  applicable  to  them  during  their  service  under 
such  transfer,  excluding  the  retirement  laws,  and  be  entitled  to  the  same  pay, 
emoluments,  and  allowances  as  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  Regular  Army 
of  the  same  grade  and  the  same  prior  service,  and  shall  be  available  for  any 
duty  for  which  the  Regular  Army  or  Volunteer  Army  may  be  employed:  Pro- 
vided, That  any  member  of  the  Organized  Militia  who,  having  agreed  to  render 
military  service  to  the  United  States  under  the  provisions  of  this  act,  neglects 
or  refuses  to  present  himself  for  service  when  so  transferred,  shall  be  subject 
to  trial  therefor  by  a  duly  constituted  court-martial  under  such  regulations  as 
the  President  may  prescribe :  Provided  further,  That  when  in  the  discretion  of 
the  President  the  necessity  for  their  further  such  use  no  longer  exists,  he  shall 
release  said  organizations  and  the  members  thereof  from  liability  to  render 
further  service  under  said  order  of  transfer,  and  said  organizations  and  the 
members  thereof  when  so  released  shall  cease  to  be  a  part  of  the  Army  of  the 
United  States. 

SEC.  6.  That  whenever  organizations  are  called  into  the  service  of  the  United 
States  under  existing  law,  or  are  transferred  to  the  Army  of  the  United 
States  under  the  provisions  of  this  act,  those  organizations  only  must  be  taken 
into  such  service  or  transferred  to  such  Army  which  have  already  received 
compensation  under  the  provisions  of  this  act,  and,  in  addition  thereto,  such 
other  organizations  as  have  become  entitled  to  receive  compensation  hereunder 
between  the  time  of  the  last  semiannual  disbursement  and  the  time  when  such 
call  or  transfer  is  made.  Organizations  which,  at  the  date  when  called  into 
the  service  of  the  United  States  or  transferred  to  the  Army  of  the  United 
States,  are,  in  the  judgment  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  organized  so  far  as 
practicable  as  prescribed  by  law  and  regulations  for  like  organizations  of  the 
Regular  Army  and  are  entitled  to  pay  under  this  act,  shall  be  taken  by  regi- 
ments, brigades,  divisions,  or  independent  and  separate  organizations,  as  the 
quota  in  each  State,  Territory,  or  the  District  of  Columbia,  or  major  fraction 
thereof,  may  require,  including  all  regimental,  brigade,  and  division  staff  officers 
authorized  by  law  and  regulations  for  the  corresponding  units  of  the  Regular 
Army  or  specially  authorized  by  law  for  the  Organized  Militia :  Provided, 
That  divisions,  brigades,  regiments,  and  battalions  or  squadrons  may  be 
organized  by  the  President  out  of  lesser  separate  units  called  into  the  service 
of  the  United  States  or  transferred  to  the  Army  of  the  United  States  as  herein 
provided,  and  the  President  may  then  appoint  commanders  of  such  organiza- 
tions and  their  respective  staffs  from  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  or  of  the 
Organized  Militia:  Provided  further,  That  the  positions  of  chief  of  staff  and 
assistant  chief  of  staff  shall  be  left  vacant  in  each  division  headquarters 
entitled  to  pay  hereunder,  and  such  vacancies  shall  be  filled  by  appointment  by 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   LAND   FORCES.  89 

the  President  when  the  division  is  called  into  thi  fevice/of  th<*  United  States 
or  transferred  to  the  Army  of  the  United  States.' 

SEC.  7.  That  when  the  Organized  Militia 'is  Called'  TUto '  tH6;  &}tfvico>  of  the 
United  States,  or  by  transfer  as  hereinbefore-  pzoMctea  ^  becomes  a.  part' of  the 
Army  of  the  United  States,  and  is  employed  in  conjunction  with  the  Regular  or 
Volunteer  forces  of  the  United  States,  and  military  operations  require  the 
presence  of  two  or  more  officers  of  the  same  grade  in  the  same  field,  depart 
ment,  or  command,  or  of  organizations  thereof,  the  President  may  assign  the 
command  of  the  forces  of  such  field,  department,  or  command,  or  of  organizations 
thereof,  without  regard  to  seniority  of  rank  in  the  same  grade :  Provided,  That 
in  the  absence  of  such  assignment  by  the  President  officers  of  the  same  grade 
shall  rank  and  have  precedence  in  the  following  order,  without  regard  to  the 
date  of  rank  or  commission  as  between  officers  of  the  different  classes,  viz : 
First,  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  and  officers  of  the  Marine  Corps  detached 
for  service  with  the  Army  by  orders  of  the  President;  second,  officers  of  the 
Organized  Militia  transferred  to  the  Army  of  the  United  States  or  called  into 
the  service  of  the  United  States;  third,  officers  of  the  Volunteer  forces:  Pro- 
vided further,  That  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  holding  commissions  in  the 
Organized  Militia  in  the  service  of  the  United  States  or  in  organizations  trans- 
ferred to  the  Army  of  the  United  States  as  hereinbefore  provided,  or  in  the 
Volunteer  forces,  shall  rank  and  have  precedence  under  said  commissions  as  if 
they  were  commissions  in  the  Regular  Army,  but  the  rank  of  officers  of  the 
Regular  Army  under  their  commission  in  the  Organized  Militia  shall  not  for 
the  purpose  of  this  section  be  held  to  antedate  their  formal  entry  into  the 
service  of  the  United  States  under  said  commissions. 

SEC.  8.  That  all  expenses  necessary  to  the  enforcement  of  this  act,  including 
the  actual  and  necessary  expense  of  travel  of  officers  of  the  Army  when  travel- 
ing on  duty  pursuant  to  orders  issued  by  the  governors  of  the  several  States 
and  Territories,  or  the  commanding  general  of  the  Organized  Militia  of  the 
District  of  Columbia,  shall  be  payable  out  of  any  appropriation  made  to  carry 
out  the  provisions  of  this  act.  ' 

SEC.  9.  That  the  Secretary  of  War  shall  cause  to  be  annually  estimated  the 
amount  necessary  for  carrying  out  the  provisions  in  this  act,  and  no  money 
shall  be  expended  hereunder  except  as  shall  from  time  to  time  be  appropriated : 
Provided,  That  this  act  shall  take  effect  July  first,  nineteen  hundred  and  thir- 
teen. 

o 


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SEP  121941M 


if1  VI 


LOAN 


JAN     5  1968 


/ 


Gaylord  Bros. 

Makers 

Syracuse,  N.  Y. 
PAL  JAN.  21,  1908 


320139 


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